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The analysis of mental disorders necessarily requires careful and multilayered reflection. Psychiatry is indeed focused on complex 
phenomena and symptoms that can be only partly traced back to mere-
ly quantitative objectifiable data. This is the reason why we witness a 
growing methodological and conceptual “mutual enlightenment” be-
tween philosophy and psychiatry. Whereas philosophy offers notions 
that can help to take into account also the qualitative aspects and the 
lived experiences of pathologies, clinical psychiatry seems to represent 
one of the most relevant practical fields for philosophy to test its explan-
atory capacity in relation to its many important issues. The history of 
phenomenological psychopathology, in particular, shows that philoso-
phers have demonstrated a keen interest in the practical consequences 
of these issues in the field of clinical psychopathology.
It is important to note that, in diagnosing and analyzing some 
disorders as well as in providing therapeutic instructions, psychiatry 
turns to concepts that have a pronounced philosophical relevance. Hu-
man being, person, self, intersubjectivity, common sense, lived body 
(Leib) and inanimate body (Körper) are but some of the concepts em-
ployed to comprehend several psychopathologies – for instance, those 
entailing profound emotional and intersubjective disabilities such as 
schizophrenia, autism spectrum disorder and depression. These no-
tions have been the object of lively philosophical discussions. It is 
therefore quite difficult to imagine, for example, that the connections 
between time, body and otherness which emerge in certain psycho-
pathologies could be analyzed in complete detachment from the phil-
osophical debate over these issues or without asking whether there 
is any relationship between mental disorders and the peculiarity of 
human existence.
Considering these convergences, this special issue offers to its 
readers a series of contributions that investigate the possible rela-
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tionships between specific psychopathological symptoms and some 
crucial philosophical issues from various viewpoints. Joel Krueger 
and Michelle Maiese argue that the notion of “mental institutions” 
– discussed in recent debates about extended cognition – can help 
better understand the origin and character of social impairments in 
autism, and also help illuminate the extent to which some mechanisms 
of autistic dysfunction extend across both internal and external fac-
tors (i.e., they do not just reside within an individual’s head). In his 
two papers, John Cutting explores the modus vivendi of schizophrenia 
and that of depression in relation to Max Scheler’s phenomenology. 
Guido Cusinato develops a critical reflection on Cutting’s proposal, 
highlighting the intersubjective and enactive dimension of valuecep-
tion impairments. Underlying  this discussion between Cutting and 
Cusinato there is a different way of interpreting the relationship be-
tween the modus vivendi of schizophrenia and Scheler’s phenomeno-
logical reduction. The next issue of the journal will include Cutting’s 
response to Cusinato’s observations. Guilherme Messas and Melissa 
Tamelini analyze two concepts of a philosophical origin – that of di-
alectics and that of essence – which, in their strict application to psy-
chopathology, could be of considerable value for diagnostic purposes 
and for the introduction and follow-up of therapeutic strategies. Lucas 
Bloc and Virginia Moirera propose an outline of clinical phenome-
nology for eating disorders inspired by Merleau-Ponty’s philosophical 
phenomenology. Francesca Brencio explores the “pathic” dimension 
of existence, which is the capacity of both being affected and being 
situated within moods and atmospheres. The broader purpose of her 
paper is to show how the “pathic” dimension of existence is related to 
psychopathology and clinical practice, for example in affective disor-
ders and schizophrenia. Valeria Bizzari draws attention to the interaf-
fective and intersubjective dimensions of Asperger’s subjects. Finally, 
Gilberto di Petta and Mario Rossi Monti highlight the importance of 
the debate on these issues that took place in Italy, retracing the history 
of the Italian Society for Phenomenological Psychopathology and the 
School of Phenomenological-Dynamic Psychotherapy.
There will be a further issue of the journal on this topic. All to-





tion between psychiatry and philosophy, going beyond a reductive and 
merely symptomatological conception of mental illness and widening 
the horizon so as to research areas that so far have remained on the 
margins of phenomenological psychopathology, such as the dimensions 
concerning value and affectivity.




Joel Krueger & MiChelle Maiese
MENTAL INSTITUTIONS, HABITS OF MIND, AND  
AN EXTENDED APPROACH TO AUTISM
taBle oF CoNteNtS: 1. Extended (social) cognition; 2. Mental institutions and 
their embodiment; 2.1. Mental institutions and habits of mind; 3. Instituting 
impairment: autism, embodiment, and mental institutions; 3.1. “Local” men-
tal institutions and (neurotypical) embodiment; 3.2. ASD, embodiment, and 
alternative habits of mind; 4. Further implications and conclusion.
Our lifeworlds are full of «mental institutions» [Gallagher & Cris-afi 2009]: rich networks of norm-governed practices, artifacts, and 
traditions that shape how we attend to and interact with the world and 
others. But not everyone inhabits the same networks of mental institu-
tions. For example, if the practice of law is a kind of mental institution 
(more on this later), then the specialized resources available within this 
institution will be unavailable to non-lawyers.
Within the last few years, philosophical discussions of mental in-
stitutions have arisen in the context of debates about “extended cogni-
tion”: the idea that cognition may, at times, physically extend into the 
environment via the artefacts, practices, and institutions that support 
our intelligent behavior. But this idea has not received much attention in 
philosophical psychiatry.1 In what follows, we argue that the notion of 
mental institutions can help better understand the origin and character 
of social impairments in autism, and also help illuminate the extent 
to which some mechanisms of autistic dysfunction extend across both 
internal and external factors (i.e., they do not just reside within an indi-
vidual’s head).
First, we provide some conceptual background. We focus on the 
1  Although this has recently started to change. See, for example, Cooper [2017]; Da-
vies [2016]; De Haan [forthcoming]; Fuchs [2018]; Hoffman [2016]; Krueger [2018]; 






connection between mental institutions and embodied habits of mind. 
Next, we discuss the significance of our view for understanding autistic 
habits of mind and consider why these embodied habits are sometimes a 
poor fit with neurotypical mental institutions. We conclude by consider-
ing how these insights highlight the two-way extended nature of social 
impairments in autism, and how this extended picture might assist in 
constructing more inclusive mental institutions for both neurotypicals 
and people with autism alike.
1. Extended (social) cognition
According to the hypothesis of extended cognition (HEC), the physical 
basis of cognition need not be confined to the head. Under certain cir-
cumstances, an individual’s mental states can include processes unfold-
ing not only in her brain and body but also within her environmental 
surround [Clark & Chalmers 1998]. By arguing that cognitive systems 
can include – i.e., be composed of – both biological and nonbiological 
parts, HEC explicitly challenges our thinking about where minds are 
and what they are made of.
A standard way to motivate HEC is by first identifying functional 
properties of some mental state or process and then showing that these 
properties can be realized by a heterogeneous system whose constit-
uents extend across brain, body, and world. For example, one way to 
characterize memory is as the storage and retrieval of information to 
which an individual has ready and reliable access. Often, this informa-
tion is realized entirely in the brain. But it need not be. It may be that 
individuals have equally as ready and reliable access to environmen-
tal resources – information encoded in notebooks, maps, smartphones, 
scraps of paper, and even other people – that, from the perspective of 
HEC, can be thought of as physical realizers of memory [Sutton 2010].
An important development in recent debates has been an increased 
focus on the social character of extended cognition. This social turn 
stresses not only the way that agents interact with a shared world but 
also the way the world, in turn, interacts with agents. It begins with 
the recognition that our cognitive practices arise within distinct socio-
cultural contexts, organized by specific material and normative aspects 
© 2018 Thaumàzein
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that shape the form these practices take [Gillett & Menary 2016; Kirch-
hoff 2012; Stotz 2010]. 
Consider the Mycenaean Linear B tablets, a script predating the 
Greek alphabet that was used to write the earliest form of Greek on clay 
tablets [Malafouris 2013]. These tablets were cognitive artifacts with a 
mnemonic function: record keeping of numbers and quantities. Impor-
tantly, their physical structure also afforded new possibilities for the 
manipulation and representation of information. While the information 
inscribed directly on the surface of each tablet was fixed once the clay 
dried, smaller versions of the tablets could nevertheless be manipulat-
ed like index cards; the order in which the smaller tablets were filed 
was significant, beyond the information encoded on the surface. This 
manipulable structure not only enhanced real-time problem solving. It 
also transformed the physical boundaries of the relevant problem space, 
thereby restructuring problem-solving processes for subsequent users. 
Consequently, cultural practices arose around the production and use of 
these tablets and the new ways of organizing knowledge they support-
ed. These practices introduced new skills and affordances «that radi-
cally reconfigure[d] the cognitive ecology and the dynamics (including 
boundaries and connectivity) of the Mycenaean memory field for both 
current users and subsequent generations» [ibid., 81].
As this example shows, the social turn in HEC debates is important 
for several reasons. Not only does it foreground the central role others 
play in shaping our cognitive ecologies. Additionally, it foregrounds the 
extent to which these ecologies operate on us at multiple timescales. 
Early discussions of HEC mainly focused on real-time synchronic in-
teractions with cognitive artifacts, such as an individual with Alzhei-
mer’s consulting his ever-present, memory-augmenting notebook in or-
der to find his way to the museum. However, by socializing HEC in this 
deep cultural-historical sense, recent work [e.g., Cash 2010; Fabry 2018; 
Hutchins 2011; Kirchhoff 2012; Malafouris 2016; Menary 2013; Merritt 
2013] productively broadens debates to highlight the structuring role 
cognitive extensions play at a diachronic scale. As Cash puts this idea, 
«Our institutions, our languages, and the very cognitive and normative 
practices within which we cognize have been shaped by us to make 





that language-enabled humans possess» [Cash 2010, 664]. In sum, these 
reflections show us how our cognitive ecologies – and the material ar-
tifacts and norm-governed practices that comprise them – scaffold the 
diachronic development of cognitive, affective, and behavioral habits 
distinctive of those who share that milieu.
2. Mental institutions and their embodiment
From the perspective of HEC, our habits of mind – broadly speaking, 
our characteristic ways of attending to, interpreting, and engaging with 
the world – are ecologically structured. This structuring process begins 
early in development. For example, even before they learn language, 
infants are enculturated into nonverbal habits of shared communication 
– rhythmic turn-taking contingencies, forms of emotional expression, 
patterns of vocalization, attention regulation, etc. – that extend their so-
cial-cognitive competence and reflect the norms, values, and patterned 
practices distinctive of their sociocultural milieu [Krueger 2013]. These 
patterned practices are the building blocks of what Gallagher calls 
«mental institutions»: assemblages of social practices, institutions, and 
norm-governed artifacts that furnish access to novel abilities or features 
of the world otherwise beyond our reach [Gallagher 2013; Gallagher & 
Crisafi 2009]. As we will see, mental institutions both extend cognition 
and present top-down constraints on embodied habits of mind.
For Gallagher, mental institutions have two core features: (1) they 
consist of cognitive artifacts and practices produced in specific times 
and places, and (2) they are activated in ways that extend our cognitive 
processes when we engage with them in the right sort of way [Gallagher 
2013, 6]. Mental institutions take many forms: from academic, scientif-
ic, legal, and religious institutions to more encompassing cultural and 
economic practices. Gallagher’s focus is on the various ways mental 
institutions extend cognition insofar as they open up otherwise inacces-
sible cognitive processes.
For example, he argues that certain legal judgments – like evaluating 
the legitimacy of a particular claim – are only possible when individ-
uals engage with artifacts and practices that make up the mental insti-
tution of law. This institution furnishes an array of external resources 
© 2018 Thaumàzein
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(e.g., contracts, systems of rights and laws, norm-governed procedures, 
precedence, etc.) that enable individuals to manipulate and work through 
large amounts of information they couldn’t otherwise process without 
this external support. Similarly, when dealing with complex theories 
and phenomena, scientists’ reasoning processes may extend across a 
heterogeneous system composed of both internal and external resources: 
tools, props, and various representational devices, along with the suite 
of norm-governed practices governing their use [Toon 2015]. Guided by 
these kinds of observations, Gallagher concludes that if we say that cog-
nition supervenes on individual artifacts like notebooks, maps, smart-
phones, and microscopes, we ought to likewise grant cognitive status to 
mental institutions designed specifically to augment our cognitive prac-
tices [Gallagher 2013, 7].
This is not the place to independently motivate Gallagher’s argu-
ment.2 Instead, we are interested in exploring how the notion of mental 
institutions might help us better understand the origin and character of 
social impairments in autism, and more specifically how this notion can 
illuminate the extent to which some mechanisms of autistic dysfunction 
extend across both internal and external factors. In order to do so, it will 
be useful to bring Maiese’s [2018] recent analysis of habits of mind and 
social institutions into this discussion. This analysis is useful because it 
can fruitfully enrich Gallagher’s discussion of mental institutions, and 
the social turn in HEC more generally, in two key respects: by stressing 
both the embodied and potentially maladaptive character of mental-in-
stitution-supported habits of mind.
For Gallagher, mental institutions remain largely external to the in-
dividual.3 They are persistent environmental resources that users can, for 
a time, integrate with and thus use to extend their cognitive capacities in 
2  See the papers in Merritt and Varga [2013] for critical engagements with his view. 
3  To be fair, this is somewhat misleading because HEC challenges strict internal-ex-
ternal boundaries when it comes to thinking about the location and constitution of 
cognitive systems. And nothing in Gallagher’s analysis is inconsistent with Maiese’s 
discussion of habits of mind and social institutions – although Maiese adopts an en-
active perspective instead of HEC. For our purposes, what’s important is that Maiese 
focuses on specific aspects of our bodily practices that aren’t given explicit attention 
in Gallagher’s discussion, and which can therefore fruitfully supplement his account.





order to accomplish some otherwise-inaccessible task. Their cognitive 
impact is therefore short-lived and primarily positive: to productively 
augment institution-specific habits of mind. However, Maiese’s analysis 
helps illuminate how the values, norms, beliefs, and practices that make 
up mental institutions become internalized and sedimented within an 
array of unreflective bodily habits that shape our everyday interactions. 
Additionally, Maiese draws our attention to the fact that not all of these 
habits of mind are positive. While mental institutions cultivate practices 
and habits that promote human flourishing – e.g., by enhancing cogni-
tion or facilitating richer forms of human connection – they may also 
contribute to maladaptive habits that interfere with overall well-being. 
In other words, we are vulnerable to maladaptive manipulation by men-
tal institutions in a way that hasn’t been widely considered within HEC 
debates.4 Understanding the latter will be particularly useful for under-
standing the connection between mental institutions, on the one hand, 
and social impairments and the experience of alienation in autism, on 
the other.
2.1. Mental institutions and habits of mind
Bodies are socially saturated and socio-normatively laden. This claim 
involves more than just the benign observation that cognition and affec-
tivity are always socially contextualized. More substantively, we argue 
that cognition and affectivity are directly modulated by the artifacts, 
relationships, and norms – the mental institutions – distinctive of that 
context. Our habits of mind depend upon both internal and external 
constraints.5
Some examples will help clarify this point. Consider the unreflective 
way we fluidly adopt different styles of speaking, gesturing, behaving, 
and expressing emotions as we negotiate different interpersonal contexts. 
Extravagant expressions of humor (big open-mouthed smile, loud laugh-
4  Although Sterelny [2010] is attuned to this possibility, as is Slaby [2016] (discussed 
in more detail below).
5  See Higgins [2017] for a complementary discussion of the ways that social norms 
become embodied in habitual practices.
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ter, dramatic gestures) may be welcome during a night out with friends, 
but they will be perceived as disruptive in more formal settings such as 
a professional meeting or place of worship. So, we adjust our expressive 
style accordingly as we move through these different contexts. Similarly, 
we attend to and interpret the world in a different way when out for a 
casual night with friends than we do, say, when participating in a sporting 
event or political rally, or when negotiating an unfamiliar city for the first 
time. For example, one might be more inclined to pick up on and respond 
negatively to a dirty look from a stranger – or conversely, respond posi-
tively to a flirty glance – when buttressed by the encouragement of bois-
terous friends than when alone; when touring a city with an architectural 
historian friend, we will be more attuned to specific features of familiar 
buildings and built spaces. Evaluative appraisals of salience are modulat-
ed by our interpersonal context.6
This variation is not simply a matter of internal constraints, such 
as feeling timid during an important meeting with one’s peers and not 
speaking up. Again, the key point is that contextual differences in habits 
of mind are also heavily modulated by ecological constraints: back-
ground forces, norms, and expectations – constitutive features of men-
tal institutions – that contour the dynamics of our bodily responses and 
patterns of appraisal as we negotiate different environments. Crucially, 
we are vulnerable to being manipulated by these ecological constraints 
without our full awareness or consent. For example, unspoken gender 
norms appear to nudge women to both expect and accept more frequent 
interruptions than male counterparts [Hancock & Rubin 2015].
Slaby’s [2016] discussion of the impact of workplace culture on 
cognition and affect helps to further illuminate the structuring role 
mental institutions play in shaping maladaptive habits of mind. Men-
tal institutions distinctive of a particular workplace involve a complex, 
multi-format assemblage of shared norms, practices, and artifacts that 
scaffold processes of cognition and appraisal required to accomplish 
various tasks. Like the legal reasoning case discussed previously, cer-
tain forms of medical knowledge, for instance, might only be possible 
when individuals actively integrate with the artifacts, technologies, and 
6  See Ratcliffe [2016] for a discussion of this idea in the context of self-disturbances 
in schizophrenia.





norm-governed practices of a clinical workspace [Pimmer et al. 2013]. 
But workplace ecologies can infiltrate habits of mind in a more subver-
sive and potentially disruptive way.
As Slaby [2016] observes, the «presence bleed» of contemporary 
knowledge work – the expectation that one should constantly be online 
and available for work-related communication via email or instant mes-
saging – erodes clear-cut boundaries between work time and leisure. 
Ubiquitous communication technologies like smartphones are deeply 
entrenched in everyday habits of mind and usefully extend an array 
of cognitive practices. Yet, as Slaby notes, the timing and location of 
our engagement with them can also reinforce institutional practices and 
expectations (e.g., persistent availability, expectations regarding how 
quickly problems ought to be dealt with) that potentially encourage mal-
adaptive habits of mind: lingering feelings of guilt, excessive responsi-
bility, anxiety, or an inability to “unplug” and enjoy non-work-related 
activities. This is because individuals are drawn into modes of interac-
tion, often by way of affective attunement and habituation to interac-
tion patterns and modes of valuation that are normative for that domain 
[Maiese 2018, 13]. So, an individual who starts working in a high-pres-
sure corporate workplace may find themselves coming to diachroni-
cally embody the maladaptive norms of that mental institution, even if 
they are not fully aware of it (e.g., reflexively checking for new email 
every few minutes when at home or out with friends). Additionally, their 
ongoing adherence to these norms ensures that the larger mental institu-
tion they are part of will continue to structure this maladaptive ecology 
for other agents. For example, if an individual’s colleagues establish 
a workplace culture where important email communication routinely 
occurs beyond regular working hours, their failure to adhere to this 
norm will stand out and they may face increasing pressure to adapt 
— at the expense of their home life. Workplace ecologies can in this 
way diachronically “invade” individuals over time, and at a concrete 
bodily level. They establish top-down constraints that selectively nudge 
individuals toward maladaptive habits of mind that can potentially have 
deleterious downstream effects on their own and others’ wellbeing.
These observations about the interactive dynamics between mental 
institutions and embodied habits of mind highlight two points impor-
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tant for what follows. First, they remind us that mental institutions are 
not free-standing things that are largely external to the individual, apart 
from the limited duration of our synchronic engagements with them. 
Rather, we are bodily «tattooed» [Grosz 1994] by these institutions, in-
sofar as they structure the range of cognitive, affective, and behavioral 
possibilities available to us as we inhabit them. Second, the ongoing 
enactment of our habits of mind collectively feed back onto and rein-
force the mental institutions that constrain them. Embodied subjects are 
not only shaped by their social world; they also help shape their social 
environment through active and reactive contributions and responses. 
Importantly, however, this observation further shows us that while sub-
jects do tend to act in ways that reinforce norm-governed mental insti-
tutions, they can also defy and undermine them, in a range of different 
ways and to varying degrees. These acts of resistance can lead to new 
habits of attention, thought, feeling, and bodily response [Maiese 2018, 
14-15]. We now explore this latter point by looking at the interrelation 
between mental institutions, embodiment, and social impairments in 
autism.
3. Instituting impairment: autism, embodiment, and mental institutions7
We now apply the previous discussion to autistic spectrum disorder 
(ASD). Building off the earlier discussion of HEC, mental institutions, 
and habits of mind, we argue that some of the social impairments dis-
tinctive of ASD aren’t entirely located in individual heads. We discuss 
the significance of this view for understanding autistic habits of mind, 
why these embodied habits of mind are sometimes a poor fit with neu-
rotypical mental institutions, and finally how these insights might help 
us construct more inclusive mental institutions.
First, some background. ASD is a complex developmental disorder 
spanning a spectrum of social, communicative, imaginative, and be-
havioral abnormalities. These abnormalities are wide-ranging and can 
vary with age and individual ability. They include non-verbal commu-
nicative deficits; repetitive behaviors; difficulties in adjusting actions to 
7  The notion of «instituting impairment» is taken from Merritt [2013].





suit a social context; fixated interests, especially in sensory qualities of 
objects; and diminished imaginative capacities, such as the absence of 
pretend play in childhood [Frith 2003; Rutter & Schopler 1987; Stone 
et al. 1997]. ASD also tends to include deficits in affective bonding 
and emotion-related behavior [Hill & Frith 2003; Hobson 1993]. For 
example, people with ASD often avoid direct eye gaze, have difficulty 
seeing and interpreting social cues in gestures and facial expressions, 
and struggle to connect and develop relationships with their peers. Most 
behaviors needed to establish and regulate social interactions are im-
paired in ASD [Gallese & Rochat 2018].
There is currently no consensus about the exact cause of autism. 
However, the five «big ideas» [Frith 2003] dominating current debates 
– Theory of Mind-style explanations; Weak Central Coherence Theo-
ry; Executive Function Theories; the Broken Mirror Neuron Hypoth-
esis; and the Social Motivation Hypothesis – are, despite other differ-
ences, committed to an internalist position insofar as they conceive of 
the root cause of ASD as located inside the head of the individual. But 
there are reasons to be skeptical of this internalist commitment.8 For 
our purposes, two worries are salient. First, these approaches overlook 
key embodied and relational features of ASD social impairments, in-
cluding both self-other mapping deficits that arise from a dysfunction 
of perception-action coupling systems [Rochat et al. 2013], as well as 
distinct ways of moving, perceiving, and emoting that define autistic 
ways of being-in-the-world [Constant et al. 2018; Krueger forthcom-
ing; Leary & Donnellan 2012]. Second, they overlook the central role 
that interpersonally-distributed factors play in shaping dysfunctions 
characteristic of ASD [De Jaegher 2013; Gallagher & Varga 2015; 
Hobson 2002; León 2019; Schilbach 2016]. Conceptual resources 
from the previous discussion of HEC and mental institutions can help 
address these worries and thus be used to develop richer characteriza-
tions of ASD experience.
8  See Bolis et al. [2017] and De Jaegher [2013] for further discussion.
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3.1. “Local” mental institutions and (neurotypical) embodiment
Gallagher’s discussion of mental institutions primarily focuses on large-
scale mental institutions such as legal systems and academic research 
practices. However, we find mental institutions at work at a more local 
level, too, regulating the dynamics of our everyday engagements with 
others. For example, commuter trains, grocery stores, and cocktail par-
ties all can be understood as institutions that regulate our behavior and 
interactions. These local mental institutions are particularly relevant to 
understanding some of the social difficulties that people with ASD face 
on an everyday basis.
One of the lessons of Gallagher’s analysis of mental institutions, 
particularly when conjoined with a complementary discussion of em-
bodied habits of mind, is that much of our everyday understanding of 
others and the world more generally is carried not just by brain-based 
processes or internal “mentalizing” strategies, but also by beyond-the-
head practices designed specifically to make us intelligible to one an-
other as social agents [Zawidzki 2013]. These norm-guided practices 
are examples of «epistemic actions» [Kirsh & Maglio 1994] that have 
several cognitive functions. They can augment cognition by furnishing 
access to novel abilities and/or features of the world otherwise beyond 
our reach (e.g., rendering legal judgments). This augmenting function 
is Gallagher’s primary focus. But they can also extrapolate existing 
capacities, the way that microscopes bring small things into the range 
of visual detection; and they may even convert phenomena accessible 
in one modality into a form accessible in another, the way that sonar de-
vices with visual displays convert worldly events (e.g., flight paths) into 
a digital-representational format [Humphreys 2004]. And they do these 
things while regulating our behavior in predictable ways.
Consider playing chess. Chess-playing occurs within a mental in-
stitution: it is an activity organized by a rich network of rules, prac-
tices, artifacts, and expectations that exist prior to token episodes of 
chess-playing. What is important here is that, when playing chess with 
someone, we needn’t rely upon an intracranial capacity to infer our op-
ponent’s desire to play chess and intention to do so fairly; rather, we see 
these things directly in their playing, just as they see our desires and 
intentions in our chess-playing behavior. In other words, we make our-





selves intelligible to one another by conforming over time to the insti-
tutional practices, rules, and strategies of playing chess [McGeer 2015]. 
Following Humphreys [2004], we can say that the local institution reg-
ulating this shared practice converts a computationally demanding folk 
psychological task (making inferences about others’ mental states) into 
an easier perceptual-motor task (jointly coordinating our behavior to 
shared rules of chess) – and, in doing so, reduces the descriptive com-
plexity of the environment by guiding our attention to salient features 
of our opponent’s norm-governed behavior. It thereby assists us with the 
process of selective attention.
This is just one example of a local mental institution. They take 
many forms, and vary with time and place: playing games; lining up in 
the queue to board a train or airplane; placing our menu on the table as 
a signal that we’re ready to order; taking a phone call in the vestibule to 
avoid irritating fellow rail travelers in the quiet carriage; pausing in a 
conversation to let the other person finish a thought; or expressing our 
disapproval with a well-timed eyebrow raise. Van Dijk and Rietveld 
[2017] give the example of being seated in a “silence area” in a train, so 
that talking is not really an option; nor is drinking from the bottle of wa-
ter that belongs to one’s neighbor. For those operating within a mental 
institution, «certain models of expectancy come to be established, and 
the patterns, which over time emerge from these practices, guide per-
ception as well as action» [Roepstorff et al. 2010, 1056]. Many aspects 
of social understanding are in this way carried by the world, scaffolded 
by the norms and routines that regulate our embodied interactions and 
habits of mind, and which have their social significance built into them 
[McGeer 2001]. Understanding others involves bringing shared norms 
to bear, for our sense of what people generally do and what they can be 
expected to do is linked to our views about what they ought to do. The 
ability to apply norms and identify situations in which relevant routines 
are appropriate rests on a capacity for navigating different social con-
texts.
To return to HEC, we thus see that local mental institutions extend 
cognition at multiple timescales. On a synchronic basis, they provide 
the regulatory tracks upon which token episodes of social interaction 
run and acquire their normative character. This is a process that be-
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gins at birth, within infant-caregiver interactions. However, repeated 
engagements with local mental institutions also shape the diachronic 
development of bodily practices and habits of mind that are respon-
sive to the institutions, habits that become sedimented within our more 
general way of negotiating the world. That is, we learn these rules over 
the course of learning and socialization; when our behavior conforms 
to shared expectations, it is met with approval and praised; and when 
it fails to conform to these expectations, it is met with disapproval and 
sanctioned. Over time, we internalize norms and shared expectations in 
the form of characteristic behavior or habits.
What Rietveld and Kiverstein [2014] call «situated normativity» 
encompasses norms of adequacy and inadequacy associated with ha-
bitual behavior within sociocultural settings. As children engage with 
aspects of the environment, their performance is subject to normative 
assessment as better or worse, and as more or less correct given situa-
tional demands. As a child attempts to name various colors, for exam-
ple, she receives feedback about the appropriateness of her responses 
and thereby acquires a feel for which uses are acceptable. Which color 
names are better or worse, correct or incorrect, depends in part on so-
ciocultural norms and the specific setting in which color naming takes 
place [ibid., 332]. Whereas a more coarse-grained categorization may 
be appropriate when it comes to traffic signs, clothing and home décor 
may call out for a more nuanced naming of particular shades. What 
counts as adequate-color naming will depend, in large part, on what 
other members of a sociocultural practice do. Along similar lines, a 
child will learn how to engage with various tools and artifacts, and how 
to conduct herself within various social settings.  When she fails to con-
form to expectations, she will receive feedback that alerts her to this. 
She will, for example, be corrected or scolded, often by way of subtle 
indicators of social disapproval.
To return to ASD, the salient point is this: because people with 
ASD lack (for reasons discussed below) experiential access to many of 
the normative features of neurotypical mental institutions, they are ex-
cluded from the social-cognitive benefits and embodied habits of mind 
these institutions help to develop, regulate, and sustain. Such difficulty 
is connected to the fact that in neurotypical institutions shared expec-





tations often are conveyed by way of very fine-grained nuances in tone 
of voice, facial expression, posture, and other forms of body language. 
Because people with ASD lack access to these fine-grained features, 
they find it difficult to engage effectively with others within these so-
cial environments. This lack of experiential access is a key part of the 
social difficulties they face in negotiating the neurotypical world. Im-
portantly, however, this lack of access is not an “in principle” exclusion. 
There are ways of co-constructing more inclusive mental institutions 
that both neurotypicals and people with ASD may jointly inhabit and 
benefit from.
3.2. ASD, embodiment, and alternative habits of mind
We now unpack this claim in several steps. First, we discuss the explan-
atory significance of the distinct ways that people with ASD experien-
tially inhabit and use their bodies to move, express emotions, and attend 
to the world and others. Next, we consider why and how the distinctive 
character of these embodied habits of mind fail to be responsively inte-
grated into neurotypical mental institutions, and how this lack of inte-
gration leads to social difficulties for people with ASD.
To begin with the first step: people with ASD often use their bod-
ies in ways that, from a neurotypical perspective, may appear unusual 
or off-putting. For example, they may repeatedly shrug, squint, pout, 
or rock back and forth; repeatedly touch specific objects; turn away 
when someone attempts to speak with them; maintain unusual or inert 
postures, or appear to get “stuck” in indecisive movements; have diffi-
culty imitating actions; and require explicit verbal or gestural prompts 
to perform an action [Donnellan et al. 2012; Leary & Donnellan 2012; 
Robledo et al. 2012]. A particularly salient example is a delay in conver-
sational responses. Donnellan and colleagues found that twelve young 
adolescents with minimal verbal skills, all of whom were labeled devel-
opmentally disabled or autistic, were, in fact, capable of offering com-
petent conversational responses – but only, on average, after fourteen 
seconds of silence [Leary & Donnellan 2012, 57]. However, such a de-
lay violates neurotypical norms; most neurotypicals would likely find a 
pause this long uncomfortable and either change the subject or abandon 
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the conversation. ASD habits of mind thus often fail to mesh smoothly 
with neurotypical institutions.
These are embodied ASD habits of mind observable from an exter-
nal third-person perspective. However, first-person reports also indicate 
that people with ASD often experience their bodies in ways that differ 
from neurotypicals. They experience difficulties controlling, executing, 
and combining movements – from fine motor control, grip planning, 
and anticipatory movements, to more complex action-sequences like 
reaching for a book, dancing, or negotiating a crowded hallway [Eigsti 
2013; Leary & Hill 1996; Whyatt & Craig 2013]. This feeling stems 
not simply from measurable coordination difficulties but also from a 
felt sense of diminished agency and loss of bodily control, including 
diminished proprioceptive and kinaesthetic awareness [Blanche et al. 
2012; Robledo et al. 2012]. These experiential difficulties can lead to 
challenges when it comes to effortlessly engaging with the environment 
and other people – that is, smoothly integrating with neurotypical pat-
terns of interaction and habits of mind. Some individuals with ASD are 
aware of these differences. One person reports that «I was sitting on the 
floor and when I got up after looking at a couple of books, my friend 
said I got up like an animal does» – and furthermore, that although she 
is aware that her patterns of movement and habits of mind are different 
from those of neurotypicals, she remains unaware of how they differ, 
exactly [Robledo et al. 2012, 6].
These reports lend support to the idea that people with ASD ex-
hibit a kind of perceptual «style blindness»: an inability to perceive 
expressive or stylistic qualities of neurotypical patterns of movement 
and embodied habits of mind [Krueger forthcoming]. As a result, they 
lack experiential access to socially-salient information needed to fit into 
and become responsively regulated by the expressive norms governing 
neurotypical mental institutions. When we speak of stylistic qualities of 
movement, we are referring to the specific way an action is performed, 
its qualitative character.9 For instance, we can reach out to shake some-
one’s hand in a friendly, aggressive, or indifferent manner; similarly, 
a smile can be cold, sarcastic, confident, or wry. These are expressive 
9  Daniel Stern [2010] calls these qualities «forms of vitality».





qualities of actions that carry socially salient information. To under-
stand the intentions and meanings of others’ actions, it is not enough to 
simply see the action itself. We must also perceive the social informa-
tion encoded in its style, that is, within the qualitative dynamics of its 
performance. And these stylistic features often are very subtle. Consid-
er the fine-grained difference between a friendly kiss and a lover’s kiss, 
as well as between playful sarcasm and angry sarcasm. To distinguish 
between the two types of kiss, one must attend to the highly specific 
features of the kissing movements as they unfold; and to distinguish 
between the two types of sarcasm, one must attend to highly specific, 
often subtle, features of the speaker’s volume and intonation patterns.
There is evidence that individuals with ASD lack perceptual access 
to these fine-grained stylistic features of actions. Several studies high-
light atypical processing of low-level, sensory, and perceptual informa-
tion in ASD [Dakin & Frith 2005; Happé 1999; Mottron et al. 2006]. 
There is evidence, for instance, that children with ASD struggle to ex-
tract relevant information from biological cues [Rutherford et al. 2006]; 
they also fail to correctly interpret human activities portrayed in point 
light displays [Blake & Shiffrar 2007]. Other studies have found that 
both children and adults with ASD struggle to decode visual informa-
tion found in facial expressions and actions [Ashwin et al. 2006; Atkin-
son 2009; Hubert et al. 2007; Teunisse & de Gelder 2001], and to extract 
social-emotional information from vocal cues [Philip et al. 2010].
Perhaps the most powerful support for style blindness in ASD is 
found in a recent study by Rochat et al. [2013].10 Twenty high-function-
ing patients with ASD, along with twenty neurotypical controls, watched 
a series of short video clips involving two people sitting across from one 
another at a table, performing different actions. These actions included 
giving a high five, shaking hands, pointing, caressing the other person’s 
forearm, taking the other’s hand, giving or retrieving a mug, and hold-
ing up their hand to signal “stop”. In these clips, the same type of action 
was performed with a different style: e.g., a vigorous handshake in one 
clip, a gentle handshake in another. Participants in the study viewed dif-
ferent combinations of these action clips and were then asked to make 
10  See also Gallese and Rochat [2018].
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judgments about them. While participants with ASD were similar to 
neurotypicals in identifying kinds of actions (e.g., handshake vs. high-
five), they made frequent errors when making judgments about the style 
of different actions, including difficulty recognizing similar styles (e.g., 
gentle) across different actions (e.g., handshake vs. high five). Accord-
ing to the authors, these findings advance previous work insofar as they 
suggest that style blindness is not limited to imitative contexts (e.g., 
such as when an individual with ASD is asked to imitate an observed 
action) but that it is, rather, a primary deficit – a perceptual inability to 
extract socially salient information from the qualitative kinematics of 
others’ actions [ibid., 1922].
This style blindness is significant for how people with ASD inhabit 
– or fail to inhabit – neurotypical mental institutions. This is because, 
within such institutions, people’s desires and expectations often are 
communicated via fine-grained modulations in the qualitative dynamics 
of action and expression. These modulations include an ever-so-slight 
raise of the eyebrows to signal skepticism, subtle modifications in the 
tone of voice to signal sarcasm, or subtle changes in posture to indicate, 
“you’re annoying me; stop talking”. Conforming to social norms and 
expectations within neurotypical institutions requires that subjects be 
able to gauge fine-grained features of other’s bodily expressions. How-
ever, subjects with ASD find it difficult to attend to these features; and 
without perceptual access to stylistic features of neurotypical patterns 
of behavior, people with ASD often cannot smoothly participate in the 
everyday practices of neurotypical institutions and understand the emo-
tions and intentions of others. Moreover, the ability to imitate these ex-
pressive kinematics is a core skill needed to be responsively regulated 
by the different (local) mental institutions through which we move on a 
day-to-day basis [Lakin et al. 2003; Meltzoff & Decety 2003]. However, 
without this capacity, people with ASD lack fluent access to the cogni-
tive and emotional benefits these ritualistic practices confer [Ingersoll 
2008; Stewart et al. 2013]. Because subjects with ASD have difficulty 
detecting these subtle social cues, they sometimes turn to general rules 
or explicit theorizing strategies to compensate [Shanker 2004].
From the perspective of HEC, there is a sense in which children and 
adults with ASD can be said to inhabit different social worlds – under-





stood as collections of mental institutions that shape distinctive habits 
of mind – than neurotypicals do [Klin et al. 2003]. But, to be clear, it’s 
not the case that people with ASD lack access to any kind of norm-gov-
erned mental institution whatsoever; nor is it the case that they lack 
access to neurotypical mental institutions entirely. Clearly, they do have 
some degree of access to the latter. People with autism are part of our 
shared world and, to varying degrees, responsive to what neurotypical 
people say and do. Rather, the point is that they have diminished prac-
tical fluency when it comes to engaging with neurotypical institutions, 
the way a non-scientist may lack practical fluency with a microscope or 
set of research practices and thus lack access to the cognitive benefits 
and habits of mind scientific institutions confer. This diminished practi-
cal fluency occurs because the signposts for social interaction found in 
neurotypical institutions typically are too fine-grained and nuanced for 
subjects with ASD to gauge.
Nevertheless, the social worlds and mental institutions of ASD 
may have their own norm-governed character, one not easily accessible 
to neurotypical partners. This becomes clearer by first observing that 
some of the unusual movements, behavior, and habits of mind people 
with ASD exhibit are more than meaningless reflexes or nervous tics. 
Rather, they are environmentally responsive and often situationally-ap-
propriate; they play an important role in helping individuals with ASD 
adapt to and negotiate changing environments. For example, patterns 
of “self-stimulation” or “self-stims” – which consist of behavior like 
hand-flapping, finger-snapping, tapping objects, repetitive vocaliza-
tions, or rocking back and forth – may be context-sensitive habits of 
mind that help to organize incoming sensory flows in order to manage 
the physical, perceptual, and emotional demands of a given situation 
[Leary & Donnellan 2012, 51]. In cases where this incoming informa-
tion threatens to be overwhelming (i.e., hypersensitivity), self-stims 
can occlude signal noise and down-regulate the individual’s anxiety; 
alternatively, in cases where the individual requires heightened arousal 
in order to better access salient information (i.e., hyposensitivity), self-
stims can have an arousal-generating, attention-directing effect. Self-
stims thus can be understood as a way to strengthen selective attention 
so that subjects can ignore irrelevant information and focus on what is 
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important; this puts them in a better position to gauge relevant social 
cues. So, treatment programs that have traditionally tried to eliminate 
or suppress self-stims [e.g., Azrin et al. 1973] have failed to see their 
norm-governed character and the positive role they may play within 
autistic habits of mind.
Additionally, there is evidence that many social difficulties people 
with ASD face result from the fact that neurotypical norms, expecta-
tions, and mental institutions simply aren’t adequate to meet the needs 
or idiosyncratic features of ASD habits of mind. What makes them 
inadequate is that these norms and expectations often are unspoken, 
highly context-specific, and communicated by way of nuanced body 
language. Because subjects with ASD rely primarily on straightforward 
verbal expressions and more coarse-grained body language to commu-
nicate, neurotypical mental institutions often do not suit them.
To see this, note that within neurotypical mental institutions, the abil-
ity to use language appropriately and understand what others say goes 
well beyond knowing the literal meaning of the expression used. It also 
involves an appreciation of the setting in which the speech occurs. The 
meaning of “Mark is at the bank”, for example, is highly context-sensi-
tive, and rests on knowledge about whether Mark frequently goes angling 
at the river or instead works at Chase Manhattan [de Villiers et al. 2007, 
295]. de Villiers and colleagues found that subjects with ASD do not have 
much difficulty with the appropriate use of language when it comes to 
the content of literal speech, but exhibit pronounced deficits with respect 
to figurative speech. This makes it difficult for them to understand meta-
phor, irony, and conversational implicature [ibid., 315]. Understanding the 
meaning of figurative speech requires that subjects attend to fine-grained 
contextual features and gauge the desires and intentions of those who 
are speaking, but these desires and intentions typically are conveyed via 
highly nuanced aspects of bodily expression and comportment. Because 
subjects with ASD find it challenging to engage in this sort of selective 
attention, often they say things that lack relevance to the hearer, do not 
anticipate what hearers will want to know, and take figurative speech (in-
cluding metaphor, sarcasm, and irony) literally.
But it is possible to design institutions that are a better fit for subjects 
with ASD. This observation is strengthened by findings that high-func-





tioning autistic people report pleasurable and efficient interactions with 
other autistic persons, even when they struggle to connect with neuro-
typical mental institutions [Komeda et al. 2015; Schilbach 2016]. This is 
because their interactions with other people with ASD take place within 
mental institutions governed by ASD-friendly norms and expectations. 
In these settings, the norm is for people to speak in more straightfor-
ward terms, relying primarily on literal language rather than metaphor 
and more clearly signaling the use of sarcasm. For example, if a subject 
with ASD wants someone to stop talking, the expectation may be that 
s/he simply will say “stop talking”. This request will not be understood 
as rude or impertinent but as clear and competent communication of her 
desires. So, it’s not as though people with ASD lack social competence 
entirely. Rather, their impairment is heightened when trying to inhabit 
and engage with mental institutions that aren’t organized in ways de-
signed to accommodate ASD habits of mind.
In sum, these insights suggest that the disturbance of breakdown 
leading to social impairments in ASD is, in an important sense, a two-
way impairment, and not just confined to the head of the individual 
with ASD [McGeer 2009, 310]. It includes environmental features: neu-
rotypical institutions that lack the flexibility and inclusivity needed to 
responsively mesh with ASD habits of mind. As we’ll see in the fi-
nal section, such considerations may have important consequences for 
thinking about intervention and therapeutic strategies.
4. Further implications and conclusion
As we’ve discussed, ASD has for several decades been thought to con-
sist in a Theory of Mind deficit. This assumption has shaped treatment 
and intervention strategies, which have generally been geared toward 
helping individuals develop their individual mentalizing capacities 
[Begeer 2014]. However, based on the previous considerations, we can 
highlight at least two shortcomings of such approaches. First, they over-
look the role that embodied and interactive features play in shaping 
characteristic impairments and offer few resources for addressing these 
features. Second, they presuppose that social difficulties in ASD con-
sist in a failure to conform to normative expectations of neurotypicals, 
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without acknowledging (or offering resources to address) the two-way 
nature of these impairments.
If, as we’ve argued, autism is fundamentally an embodied and re-
lational phenomenon – and not simply an in-the-head cognitive deficit 
– intervention strategies should be tailored accordingly. One promising 
strategy is music therapy, which can involve listening, singing, or joint 
music-making. Srinivasan and Bhat [2013] observed that music-based 
interventions are attractive for individuals with ASD for three rea-
sons. First, they can address core impairments in joint attention, so-
cial reciprocity, and verbal and nonverbal communication, along with 
comorbidities of atypical perception, motor performance, and behav-
ioral problems. Second, children with ASD often have enhanced pitch 
processing abilities and musical memory compared to typically devel-
oping children and therefore may find these interventions particularly 
pleasurable [Heaton 2003]. Third, music-based activities can provide 
non-intimidating contexts to interact with musical instruments and oth-
er people by engaging in predictable musically-guided interactions with 
social partners [Darrow & Armstrong 1999].
Evidence suggests that these kinds of musical interventions posi-
tively impact various forms of development, including communicative, 
social-emotional, and motor development. For example, music thera-
pies can facilitate verbal and gestural skills in children with ASD; en-
hance social skills such as eye contact, joint attention, mimicry, and 
turn-taking; and support the improvement of fine and gross motor skills 
[Srinivasan & Bhat 2013]. This can help subjects with ASD to strength-
en their ability to gauge fine-grained social cues and their capacity for 
“body-reading”. In a music setting, subjects do rely on bodily expres-
sion to communicate – but eye contact, bodily expressions, and mim-
icry are more exaggerated than in standard neurotypical settings. And 
because they are punctuated by changes in musical tone and rhythm, 
they are easier for subjects with ASD to detect.
In this way, musical activities like listening, singing, and joint mu-
sic-making provide a regulative context in which children with ASD can 
work with neurotypicals to construct alternative musically-guided men-
tal institutions. Musically-generated auditory and rhythmic signals can 
regulate attention and movement in a number of ways: by influencing 





the timing of motor neuron discharge; decreasing felt muscle fatigue; 
facilitating automatic movements by providing predictable temporal 
cues; improving reaction time and response quality through facilitated 
responsive anticipation; and providing auditory feedback for proprio-
ceptive control mechanisms [Thaut 1988, 130]. Music can thus serve 
as scaffolding for the development of selective attention and strengthen 
subjects’ ability to detect social cues [Krueger 2019; Maiese 2016].
In addition, the opportunity to interact in a musical setting may 
help counteract the tendency of some subjects with ASD to withdraw 
from social interaction. Shanker [2004] notes that because subjects with 
ASD are sometimes overreactive and feel overwhelmed by visual or au-
ditory stimuli, they may avert their gaze, put their hands over their ears, 
or avoid interaction with others. Likewise, McGeer [2001] suggests that 
in an effort to manage sensory experiences, subjects with ASD might 
feel the need to shut out other people; however, that makes it difficult 
for them to develop social and communicative skills. The more a child 
with ASD avoids interaction with others, the more s/he is deprived of 
the sorts of experiences needed for social development. Musical set-
tings provide a place where subjects can come together with other peo-
ple and begin to develop an intuitive understanding of what others are 
thinking and feeling. Coordinated musical improvisation, for example, 
may help give participants a sense of being part of meaningful shared 
activity. There are often moments in music therapy where there is a 
“buzz” between the two players, for example when they spontaneously 
come together at a cadence point or somehow know when to end or 
where to go next [Maratos et al. 2011, 92]. This kind of “communicative 
musicality” allows subjects to experience a kind of relating that is very 
different from that involved in talking, and yet offers them an avenue to 
overcome social isolation. In addition, it allows those who feel “out of 
sync” with the social world to “get back into the groove” of interacting 
with others.
To conclude, these reflections harbor an important lesson: instead 
of expecting children and adults with ASD to responsively conform to 
neurotypical mental institutions, we ought to explore ways of develop-
ing more inclusive institutions – in both everyday as well as therapeutic 
contexts – that provide a common space for individuals to get into the 
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groove with one another. To reach subjects with ASD, we need to move 
beyond “fixing” the heads of single individuals and instead consider 
ways of adjusting the social world.
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Abstract
We argue that the notion of “mental institutions” – discussed in recent debates about 
extended cognition – can help better understand the origin and character of social im-
pairments in autism, and also help illuminate the extent to which some mechanisms 
of autistic dysfunction extend across both internal and external factors (i.e., they do 
not just reside within an individual’s head). After providing some conceptual back-
ground, we discuss the connection between mental institutions and embodied habits 
of mind. We then discuss the significance of our view for understanding autistic 
habits of mind and consider why these embodied habits are sometimes a poor fit with 
neurotypical mental institutions. We conclude by considering how these insights 
highlight the two-way, extended nature of social impairments in autism, and how 
this extended picture might assist in constructing more inclusive mental institutions 
and intervention strategies.























MAX SCHELER’S PHENOMENOLOGICAL REDUCTION 
AS THE SCHIZOPHRENIC’S MODUS VIVENDI
taBle oF CoNteNtS: 1. Introduction; 2. Scheler’s Phenomenological Reduc-
tion; 3. The Schizophrenic Person as a Phenomenologically Reduced Human 
Being; 4. Conclusion.
1. Introduction
In Max Scheler The Constitution of the Human Being [Scheler 1924-1928/2008, henceforth referred to as Constn], an English translation 
of Scheler’s metaphysical and anthropological writings, there are three 
sections [Constn, 77-86, 99-113, 403] on his version of the «phenome-
nological reduction». What Scheler meant by this was quite different 
from how Husserl had formulated it in coining the term. For Scheler 
the procedure was a thought experiment in which the real world and 
everything of it which pertained to a human being was envisaged as 
cancelled out and the resulting human situation then analysed. Husserl’s 
version was, by comparison, a lame duck – it was merely a judgement, 
on Husserl’s part, of what a human being would experience of some 
object (an apple tree in blossom being his example) if the reality of the 
actual object were «bracketed» [Husserl 1913/1982, 215-216; Constn, 
103]. Husserl’s conclusion was that the quality of the experience under 
conditions of his version of the ‘phenomenological reduction’ would not 
be altered ‘one jot’ relative to the situation of an ‘unreduced’ human be-
ing.  Scheler, on the other hand, appreciated that the human being would 
be profoundly affected by this procedure, and that their experiences, 
beliefs, thoughts and emotions would be utterly transformed vis-à-vis 
an ‘unreduced’ human being.
The purpose of this article is to examine in detail what Scheler pre-
dicted would be the human being’s situation after a phenomenological 
© 2018 Thaumàzein
10.13136/thau.v6i0
max Scheler'S Phenomenological reDuction
43
reduction carried out properly and then to show how similar this is to 
the customary modus vivendi of a schizophrenic person.
I shall then give a brief overview of extant psychological and philo-
sophical theories of schizophrenia, concluding that Scheler’s ‘phenom-
enological reduction model’ is superior.
I shall first list the separate consequences of the phenomenological 
reduction according to Scheler, then give his account of why they occur, 
and then match each of these with aspects of schizophrenic psycho-
pathology, concluding with a brief critique of other psychological and 
philosophical accounts of the condition.
2. Scheler’s Phenomenological Reduction
There are no less than 11 relatively discrete consequences of the phe-




3. ‘aseparation’ of experiences;
4. enrichment and free-floatingness of qualities;
5. distortion of values, qualities and forms;
6. uniqueness of same object at different times and in different places;
7. interchangeability of individuality and universality;
8. transformation of world into an idea;
9. loss of sovereignty (loss of myness);
10. experience as an act of an absolute mind whereby the act of know-
ing and the thing known are one;
11. the ‘reduced’ world as personal and alien, even to other denizens 






This follows because the vital pole of the human being and its envi-
ronmental correlates have been wiped out. It is reality, which Scheler 
emphasises time and time again [e.g. Constn, 79], that determines the 
individuality of anything, and the abolition of reality, in the thought ex-
periment, then precludes any chance happenings, or accidental being-so 
of anything. What remains are «pure and typical essences».
An essence, in Scheler’s account, is a subjective scheme which has 
been built up over a person’s life by means of a ‘functionalization’ of 
their objective experiences: e.g. how you were loved is how you will 
love; what you experienced is how you will experience. It is a loose fa-
cility, flexible and incomplete, but it provides the only measure of what 
something is. It is neither a spectral entity hanging around in limbo 
before any experience occurs (as in Plato’s account), and nor is it latent 
in the potentially experienceable thing awaiting release (as in Aristot-
le’s account). It is certainly not experienceable in itself as in Husserl’s 
account, and nor is it an abstraction from any experience after the event 
as in empiricists’ formulations. It is triggered simultaneously with the 
happenstance of an event – in the ‘unreduced’ human – but is now – in 
the ‘reduced’ human – the only determination of what is going on.
2) Adynamy
The phenomenologically reduced human being not only loses any sense 
of accident or chance in their experience but any sense of movement as 
well. Abolition of the vital contact with reality means that all notions of 
‘causal interconnections’ also wither away, because ‘reality itself is the 
basis of all such causes’. Nothing appears to effect anything any more 
and the human being is left to contemplate a frozen tableau, himself or 
herself also a frozen onlooker.
3) ‘Aseparation’
It further follows that the denizens of this essentialized and lifeless world 
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are themselves unseparated one from another. Why? Because: «Of the 
two special forms of separateness, namely ‘next-to-one-another’ and 
‘after-one-another’, [which are] the spatial and temporal extensions of 
dynamically conditioned acts, there is no trace whatsoever» [Constn, 
79]. Time and space, as Scheler notes elsewhere [Scheler 1927/1973, 
341, 331], are respectively the potential for change and the potential for 
movement, and if there is no possibility of change or movement there 
is no apartness of events or things, both of which will be experienced 
as running into each other or interwoven with other objects and the 
onlookers.
4) Enrichment and free-floatingness of qualities
Not all is down-beat and stale in the ‘reduced’ human. There is a par-
adoxical upsurge in the richness of qualities, colours for example, and 
a sense that these qualities have become detached from the objects that 
they were hitherto an integral part of. Why? Because a being with via-
ble drives, for nourishment for example, will select only those qualities 
of things, out of a myriad of potentially experienceable qualities, which 
satisfy these drives, green grass as opposed to brown, dried-up grass in 
the case of a herbivore. A ‘reduced’ being, with no such vital appetites, 
will lose this selectivity and will be unaware of the status of the qual-
ity as a sign for the thing desired.  Other qualities, vitally-neutral and 
hitherto unselected, will now shine forth and seem independent of any 
‘thing-linkage’.
5) Distortion of values, qualities and forms
What is created in the awake, ‘unreduced’ human – created certainly, 
but not as a solipsistic venture envisaged by Husserl – is a rule-gov-
erned edifice originally determined by the reality of the world. Its el-
ements are selectively chosen to suit the contemporary state of your 
drives (e.g. you see food outlets and not shoe shops in the High Street 
if you are hungry) and your more stable ordo amoris (the unique rank 
order of your life’s goals [Scheler 1914-1916/1973]). What is ‘created’ 
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when the contemporary state of drives and the ordo amoris are wiped 
out is, however, neither chaos nor a sort of lifeless photography of an 
erstwhile world (as in Husserl’s contemplations on an apple tree in blos-
som). It is rather a differently rule-governed selection of what reality has 
on offer. Scheler expends much effort in unravelling all this in the sec-
tions referred to above. His exquisite knowledge of perceptual experi-
ments carried out by his contemporaries, mainly Gestalt psychologists, 
much of which has been overlooked by our contemporaries, led him to 
realise that the building blocks of the world were a series of dependen-
cies of one quality upon another, and a preference for one quality rather 
than another because of its vital significance. So, for example, in some 
ambiguous situation, such as shimmering shadows underneath a tree 
in sunlight, you can either see movement of an invariant shape or static 
metamorphosis of shapes. According to Scheler the former interpre-
tation is preferred in the natural attitude, whereas the latter comes to 
the fore in the ‘reduced’ human, because movement of something is a 
vital clue of a sign of life to a predator. Other examples are a preference 
for constancy, regularity and quantity, and these dissipate when their 
advantages for a vital being are no longer in question, giving way to an 
upsurge in inconstancy, irregularity and quality in the ‘reduced’ human. 
He gives many other examples, but for our purposes it is sufficient to 
appreciate that the world of the ‘reduced’ human is alien to his or her 
‘unreduced’ former self in value, quality and form for all these reasons.
6) Uniqueness of same object at different times and in different places
The ‘unreduced’ human being, according to Scheler, has a nuanced sense 
of similarity, sameness and identity (the child, according to him, has a 
more blurred notion of all these, and tends to see identity in what is mere-
ly similar). The ‘reduced’ human, however, differs from either in this re-
spect, as he or she denies identity of two events or things if they crop up 
at a different time or in a different place: «The same event occurring at a 
different time becomes a different event, and the same objects in different 
places become different from one another» [Constn, 101].
This follows because time and space, as Scheler saw, are not the nor-
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the opposite effect, namely to create manifolds whereby similarity, same-
ness and identity can themselves arise and flourish. Nietzsche and Berg-
son were much exercised by this too, both realising that the recognition 
of sameness was a vital concern to an animal who would otherwise not 
identify its food: «not ‘to know’ but to schematize – to impose upon cha-
os as much regularity and as many forms as our practical needs require» 
[Nietzsche 1906/1967, 515]; «it is grass in general which attracts the her-
bivorous animal […] a similarity felt and lived» [Bergson 1896/1991, 159]. 
The apparent paradox that if reality is the only individuating facility un-
der normal circumstances and if it is cancelled out why difference and not 
sameness emerges will be explained below.
7) Interchangeability of individuality and universality
If reality is the precondition of individuality, as Scheler thought, and if 
reality is artificially wiped out in the ‘reduction’, then any sense of indi-
viduality should also be deleted.  But this is not so, as we saw above. In 
the phenomenological reduction everything is different, and that applies 
to the individual objects perceived, the overall world of the ‘reduced’ hu-
man (as we shall see below), and even the experiencer himself or herself. 
The only available candidate for this sense of difference now lies with the 
essences, because they are the only determining facilities. What is expe-
rienced therefore must be an exemplar of an essence, and every exemplar 
must come with a stamp of difference from any other exemplar. What 
Scheler refers to as the interchangeability of individuality and universal-
ity is precisely this – everything is a universal with a spurious individu-
ality; every apparent individual is an exemplar of a general sort of thing.
What then constitutes the difference between exemplars? Scheler 
makes a critical distinction here between individualisation and singu-
larisation. Time and space for him are not individuating facilities but 
singularising ones. Consider further that time is an individuating factor 
for Husserl [1950/1995, 75], and his position, as Scheler saw, is an ideal-
istic one. He needs time to account for the individuation of his essences, 
in the same way as the phenomenologically reduced human being needs 
time and space to singularise essences, such singular entities being 
mere clones rather than genuine individuals. As we shall see below – in 
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the section on schizophrenic psychopathology, although this is rather 
assuming the argument I wish to prove – it is precisely time and space 
which do singularise essences. It is not for nothing that two of the great-
est psychopathologists of the 20th Century – Minkowski and Tatossian 
– realised that Husserl’s account of a supposedly normal human being 
was actually an account of schizophrenia [Minkowski 1933/1970, 310; 
Tatossian 1964/2014, 159].
8) Transformation of world into idea
The reduction enacts an essentialization of the world in the way 
it is experienced, and transforms the world into an idea for the 
sake of thought [Constn, 102].
This follows because the only facility in contention is now Geist, and 
this deals with essences and ideas. The world so created is indeed there-
fore an idea, showing up all idealistic philosophies, including Husserl’s, 
as pathological formulations of the human being.
9) Loss of sovereignty (loss of myness)
There is a shift in the status of my act of thinking whereby it be-
comes not an act of consciousness of whatever is around, but an 
act within the realm of absolute being.  The sovereignty of this 
act, previously mine, now becomes completely under the aegis 
of God [Constn, 103].
The phenomenological reduction, in Scheler’s account, as we have seen, 
not only effects a radical change in the experience of the world, but pro-
foundly alters the sense of who is experiencing this. The subjective as 
well as the objective is transformed. The sense of being a unique experi-
encer, distinct from any other person or agent who might experience the 
same thing, is abolished. Nothing is mine anymore, but rather belongs 
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10) Experience as an act of an absolute mind whereby the act of know-
ing and the thing known are one
This is a further stage of condition 9 above:
Things appear as if part of an absolute mind, as if the act of 
knowing and the thing known were one, even as if the whole 
situation were proof of God’s existence [Constn, 111].
This comes about because all independent objectivity has been struck 
out. All objectivity is now the creation of subject, a subject moreover 
who is not an identifiable person, but a universal mind, God’s par ex-
cellence.
11) The ‘reduced’ world as personal and alien, even to other denizens 
of a ‘reduced’ world, i.e. the ‘reduced world’ is a multiplicity of indi-
vidual worlds
The reduced world is therefore a personal-individual world […]. 
Between three people – A, B and C – this new world of theirs is 
mutually incomprehensible because it is ontically different one 
from another. This is in complete contrast to the generally valid 
environment world [Constn, 111-112].
This is self-explanatory. The ‘reduced’ world is different from the nor-
mal ‘unreduced’ world, as we have seen, but, critically here, the ‘re-
duced’ world of any individual person is not shared by any other person, 
even one who has undergone the same phenomenological reduction. 
The normal ‘unreduced’ world is a shared venture; the ‘reduced’ world 
is unique to whoever has been submitted to the ‘reduction’.
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3. The Schizophrenic Person as a Phenomenologically Reduced Human 
Being
1) Essentialization
Several psychopathologists in the early decades of the 20th Century com-
mented on the fact that the things perceived or hallucinated by schizo-
phrenics were radically different from anything that a sane person ex-
perienced in waking life: «Except for delirium, where the hallucinations 
resemble normal perceptions, the great majority of patients with psychic 
illnesses have hallucinations which do not resemble these» [Schröder 
1915, 9]; «The things to which the patients refer by familiar names have 
ceased to be the same things for them that they are for us […]. Their land-
scapes are mere broken remnants of our world» [Straus 1935/1963, 191].
Much later it was then appreciated by a handful of psychopatholo-
gists that a common theme in their idiosyncratic perceptions and hal-
lucinations was a tendency for the ‘thing’ perceived or hallucinated to 
be an idealistic version of the sort of thing it was. Tatossian [1957/2014, 
139, 152], Sass [1994] and Stanghellini [2004] all grasped this. Tatossian 
saw that whereas a normal perception was an incomplete, perspectival 
experience of something, an hallucination was a complete and essential 
version of something. Sass, commenting on actual, everyday schizo-
phrenic experience, wrote: «The experience may thus be the sheer sense 
that this event is in certain respects a copy of some prototype […] like 
some Platonic or noumenal essence, to lie behind the merely phenome-
nal world» [Sass 1994, 106]. Stanghellini put it as follows: «What is left 
is a world lacking its reality moment […]. It may be rich, even richer 
than reality itself […] but at its best it will be a world of essences rather 
than a world of life» [Stanghellini 2004, 194].
The essentialisation is evident in their visual hallucinations, audi-
tory hallucinations, everyday experience of things and everyday expe-
rience of other people.
Here are samples of their visual hallucinations [Cutting 1997, 93-
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big animal like an octopus;
blue rectangular being;
little matchstick men made of copper fighting with each other;
octopuses, pterodactyls, wolves, square boxes;
black slugs coming and going up her jumper.
In fact, there is a geometrical flavour to some of these, as if things and 
people are being stripped down to their formal elements as in a Picasso 
picture mid-career.
In a study of their auditory hallucinations [Nayani & David 1996], 
no matter whether the experiencer were young or old, male or female, 
black or white, when asked whose voice they heard subjects tended to 
nominate a middle-aged, male, white, middle-class and middle-Eng-
land person (i.e. a BBC voice). The voice, in other words, belonged to a 
stereotypical person, not a recognizable individual.
The stripping off of all adventitious qualities of a perceived thing is 
well illustrated in these two autobiographical accounts of the condition.
I am a fascinating creature. I move in no stultifying ruts. There’s 
no real yoke of custom on my shoulders […]. My mind goes in no 
grooves made by other minds […]. When I look at a round grey 
stone by the roadside I look at it not as a young woman, not as a 
person, not as an artist, nor a geologist, nor an economist, but as Me 
– as Mary MacLane – and as if there had not before been a round 
grey stone by a roadside since the world began [MacLane 1917, 190].
Things looked smooth as metal, so cut off, so detached from 
each other, so illuminated and tense that they filled me with ter-
ror. When, for example, I looked at a chair or a jug, I thought not 
of their use or function – a jug not as something to hold water and 
milk, a chair not as something to sit in – but as having lost their 
names, their functions and meanings: they became ‘things’ and 
began to take on life, to exist [Sechehaye 1950/1970, 40].
Finally, there is Tatossian’s analysis of his patient Hélène’s experience 
of other people: «What constituted another person for Hélène was not 
actually a real person but a certain structure of being […] which could 
not precisely be seen but conformed to a representation. Her ‘husband’ 
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was part Charlie Chaplin, part the Duke of Gloucester […]. The oth-
er was an idea […] experienced at some universal level» [Tatossian 
1957/2014, 94].
2) Adynamy
A sense of stasis is a common experience in schizophrenics.
In Renée’s autobiography her world was: «a mineral lunar coun-
try, cold as the wastes of the North Pole. In this stretching emptiness 
all is unchangeable, immobile, congealed, crystallised» [Sechehaye 
1950/1970, 33]. Hélène also experienced the world as grinding to a halt: 
«like a distant country in sunshine, with all the workers on strike, as if 
everything had come to a standstill» [Tatossian 1957/2014, 74].
Fischer’s collection of patients with abnormal experiences of time 
include several with a similar sense of lack of movement: «I’m as cold 
as a piece of ice, frozen to the core […]. I feel as if I’m frozen in win-
ter-time» [Fischer 1929, 551]; «the clock is exactly the same, but time 
stands still, for me time does not move» [ibid., 553].
Minkowski’s general view of schizophrenia was that it concerned 
a loss of vital contact with reality, with a diminished sense of the flow 
of time, and an enhanced sense of stillness and symmetry: «Everything 
seems immobile around me» [Minkowski 1927/1987, 199]; «I am al-
ways looking for immobility. I tend towards rest and immobilisation 
[…]. I like immovable objects, boxes and bolts, things that are always 
there» [ibid., 209].
3) ‘Aseparation’
Numerous schizophrenics have a sense that their body, self or things 
in their world are interpenetrated by other items from the same realm. 
What I have called «violability» [Cutting 1997, 252] occurs in no less 
than one third of schizophrenics:
own eyes embedded in paper as he read;




max Scheler'S Phenomenological reDuction
53
others’ faces feed into him;
other people’s bodies intermingle with hers.
Here is Henriksen and Nordgaard’s [2016, 266] patient:
Increasingly I began to feel that I sort of fused with my sur-
roundings.
4) Enrichment and free-floatingness of qualities
Among the numerous ways in which things and people look different to 
a schizophrenic an enhancement of certain qualities of things, particu-
larly colours, has often been remarked upon.  Here are some examples 
[Cutting 1997, 112-114];
colours more vivid – red, orange, yellow stood out;
colours, especially blue, upsetting;
increased intensity of red and blue;
colours are very vibrant, especially red;
certain colours, things or aspects of things unduly prominent, 
so much so that he felt compelled to ‘fix’ on them – radiators, 
fire-extinguishers, light switches, houses at the end of a long 
row, other people’s left ear, red, white and black.
Sometimes these anomalous perceptions appear to form the basis for 
what is known as a delusional perception, where the perceptual experi-
ence is immediately coupled with a peculiar idea about the experience.
Matussek [1952/1987, 89-103], Conrad [1958/2012, 176-193] and 
Blankenburg [1965/2012, 165-176] all realized that «the freeing up of 
the cloud of essential qualities», as Conrad put it, was the critical event 
in this delusional formation, although none of them invoked the phe-
nomenological reduction as an explanation. Matussek saw that the shift 
in perspective was from natural to symbolic, which was close. Conrad 
appealed to a loss of Gestalt, which was the best psychological explana-
tion available to him. Blankenburg compared the situation to an artist’s 
preoccupation with the structure of things, which is also helpful, par-
ticularly so when he concluded that the schizophrenic is he or she who 
cannot but see the object in this way, whereas the artist can revert to a 
natural attitude as well.
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5) Distortion of values, qualities and forms
Accounts of the schizophrenic experience of the world, other people, 
their own body and their very self are replete with descriptions of a rad-
ical change in all these. But even the greatest psychopathologists have 
struggled to explain a fraction of all this with a single all-encompassing 
notion, which at best has been metaphorical or out-dated psychological-
ly – e.g. Kraepelin’s «orchestra without a conductor», Bleuler’s «distur-
bance of associations». Minkowski’s «loss of vital contact with reality» 
is correct, but he did not sufficiently elaborate the ramifications of this 
into all areas of the schizophrenic’s psychopathology, which is what I 
am attempting here.
What is proposed here is that the changes involving values, quali-
ties and forms are explained by the withering away of the vital signifi-
cance of each of these and a compensatory upsurge in their spiritual or 
mental meaning. The phenomenological reduction, in Scheler’s hands, 
is an enquiry into the winners as well as the losers in the enterprise.
What is lost in the phenomenological reduction, and pari passu in 
schizophrenia, according to my argument here, are vital values (includ-
ing a sense of togetherness with other people), vital qualities, and the 
selection of forms according to their vital significance. The first of these 
has been documented time and time again from Minkowski’s remarks 
in the 1920’s onwards: «the pragmatic use of things is affected early in 
this condition […] the value and complexity of things no longer exists» 
[Minkowski 1927/1987, 197]. Following Blankenburg’s [1968/2001] 
analysis this is now referred to as a lack of common sense. The vital 
quality of things is also lost in a myriad of ways. Here is how the schizo-
phrenic experiences other people [Cutting 1997, 113]:
on the Underground all I could see were people in a car and they 
looked like ghosts, statues, monuments, dead people, as if cre-
mated;
people looked dead, pale, cold;
everyone seemed to be walking around like Zombies.
According to Scheler the form of things should be inconstant, irregular 
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people’s faces changing […] things on the ward aren’t organized 
– they change all the time, TV channel keeps changing;
houses float, walls move in on her and then drift away;
objects in odd proportions, street seems to tilt, walls of building 
closing in;
organisation of things different, there was no-one I could recog-
nize, they seemed changed;
things looked larger than life;
writing and other things got smaller;
birds look far away with old-fashioned markings, everything in 3D.
Yet some patients make a new order in all this. They sense a spiritual, 
philosophical or aesthetic dimension in their situation, which is quite 
alien to their erstwhile humdrum lives. Stanghellini and Ballerini 
[2007] have demonstrated just such a shift. Blankenburg’s [1965/2012, 
165-176] patient is a striking example of re-valuation of qualities. He 
was a car-worker who happened to see a painting in a gallery on his 
way to the doctors, then became preoccupied with the blueness in the 
picture, an experience which led him into a whole new world of the 
nature of aesthetics.
6) Uniqueness of same object at different times and in different places
One of the commonest delusions in schizophrenia is delusional misiden-
tification, in which the subject holds that some erstwhile familiar X 
(person, thing, place, time, even self) has been substituted by a bogus 
version of it, and, in addition quite often, this X is deemed to have 
multiple instances in different places and at different times. Attempts 
to explain this peculiar delusion have been undermined by the facts of 
the matter as they have emerged since Capgras and Reboul-Lachaux 
[1923] described the first variety of it with respect to persons. It cannot 
be ambivalence about this other person, as Enoch and Trethowan [1979] 
suggested, because things, time, space and self are also the focus of the 
delusion. It cannot be a failure to register the emotional valence of a face 
with preserved ability to recognize its physical identity, as proposed by 
Ellis and Young [1990], because there are congenitally blind subjects 
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with the condition [Rojo et al. 1991], and, anyway, the condition spans 
all sorts of matters in addition to misidentification of persons.
Only Scheler’s version of the phenomenological reduction can ex-
plain the condition, in my view, because only Scheler saw that the can-
cellation of reality would lead to a denial of identity if the same person 
or thing cropped up at a different time. Consider this case of MacCal-
lum [1984]: a woman – not schizophrenic but with right hemisphere 
dysfunction which also causes delusional misidentification – believed 
that her daughter who nursed her in the morning was a different person 
from the one who talked to her in the evening.
The common theme in delusional misidentification, whether schizo-
phrenic or right-hemisphere-induced, and whether the object is a person 
or thing, or place or time, is a denial of the item’s uniqueness with a 
concomitant belief that this person or thing or place or time has multiple 
instances in time or space. «A man believed that there were eight dupli-
cates of his wife and children, each living in separate duplicate cities with 
a double of himself» [Thompson et al. 1980, 1271]; «Man who insisted 
that he had been in ten different hospitals (he had only been in one) and 
gave plausible names for each» [Kapur et al. 1988, 579]; «Man who had 
fought in the First World War who said ‘It is not a real war, but merely an 
experimental war’. (When asked to explain the carnage and devastation 
he replied) it is a custom every year to pay certain local authorities to put 
on a real exhibition of shooting in their district» [Vié 1944, 248]. 
In short, the real individuality of something is denied (what greater 
example of this could be found than Vié’s case?) and a spurious singularity 
of multiple instances is then attributed to odd spatial locations and times.
7) Interchangeability of individuality and universality
In schizophrenia there is an essentialization of people and things, as we 
have seen. The actual individuals which populate their world are part-
ly clones which differ in respect of their temporal and spatial lay-out 
as we have also seen. But they are also conglomerates. In Tatossian’s 
case of Hélène [1957/2014, 94] her intimates were a mélange of all sorts 
of historical and contemporary celebrities (Spartacus, Charlie Chaplin, 
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ler predicted in the case of the phenomenological reduction – a coming 
to the fore of all sorts of iconic exemplars of people in one artificial 
person. Sass [1994, 93], too, appreciated that what the schizophrenic 
experienced was a specious individuality – what he called «phantom 
concreteness», and which he thought was an objectification of the very 
act of seeing itself.
8) Transformation of world into idea
The schizophrenic is a living example of the most extreme idealis-
tic philosophical position, as Minkowski [1933/1970, 319], Tatossian 
[1964/2014, 159] and Sass [1994, 95] realised. The world is not my idea 
under normal circumstances, despite what Schopenhauer and Husserl 
opined. My world is your world too because we share the same vi-
tal concerns. But when reality and these vital concerns are abolished 
in the ‘reduction’ only the lone thinker and God remain as potential 
world-creators. Schreber’s autobiography of madness, the best of them 
all, makes this quite clear. Sometimes he believed that God relied on 
Schreber himself as a creative force, even musing at one point: «What is 
to become of God – if I may so express myself – should I die?» [Schre-
ber 1903/1988, 213].
At other times he feels himself manipulated by rays emanating from 
God. As Sass [1994, 64] points out Schreber vacillates between seeing 
himself as God’s sole creative conduit and sensing that he himself is 
God’s own creation.
9) Loss of sovereignty (loss of myness)
A sense of estrangement from the acts of thinking, feeling, willing and 
doing was noted 80 years ago as a common experience in schizophrenia, 
so much so that Kurt Schneider [1939] included them among his first rank 
symptoms of the condition. The matter has been given prominence more 
recently, with the name «lack of ipseity», by contemporary psychopathol-
ogists – Parnas [2000], Sass [2003] and Stanghellini [2004].
Its provenance, from a philosophical perspective, I have discussed 
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elsewhere [Cutting 2015]. In short, lack of myness, I argued, stems from 
an elimination of the accidental qualities to a person’s experience – what 
Scheler [1927-1928/1995] elsewhere refers to as the zufälliges Sosein 
of something as opposed to its Wesensein (its essence). That anything 
should be uniquely mine is a chance individuality engendered by the 
reality of a human being’s situation, which, as we saw, is deleted in the 
phenomenological reduction.
10) Experience as an act of an absolute mind whereby the act of know-
ing and the thing known are one
This was partly discussed in 8) above in relation to the schizophrenic’s 
sense that the world is his or her idea. But Scheler means something dif-
ferent here, because he qualifies it with the remark that the experience 
reveals proof of God’s existence. It is this that Schreber struggles to 
square with an equally powerful sense of himself as world creator, and 
it is this that Sass [1994, e.g. p.76] carefully teases out from a simple 
solipsism. The schizophrenic is a world creator and a co-creator with 
God and a creation of and testimony to the existence of God Himself, 
or at least some non-self absolute mind.
Elsewhere Scheler remarks that the situation of the normal person 
– i.e. the «unreduced human being» – has its paradoxes: «the whole sit-
uation is like a living mirror, where we find [as if already created] what 
we are creating» [Constn, 406].
In other words – and I stress that this is the normal situation – the 
conscious knower or experiencer does not experience or know that he 
or she as a life-bound entity has already created out of reality what it, 
the conscious knower, assumes to be a ready-given world, i.e. objec-
tivity. In the ‘reduced’ human being the objectivity is eliminated and 
the conscious knower thinks that he or she or God or both together 
have created everything de novo. As Scheler [Constn, 113] says, «God 
is switched on» in the «reduction», and godliness pervades everything, 
because the subject, paradoxically correctly, realizes that he or she or 
God must have caused everything to come into being. What appears is 
then deemed a creation of the conscious knower or some other knower, 
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one who also ignores the first unconscious creation and mistakes re-
flection on this (which is the true situation of a conscious knower) for a 
conscious creation. Again Husserl’s supposed philosophy of the normal 
epitomizes the pathological situation of the schizophrenic.
11) The ‘reduced’ world as personal and alien, even to other denizens 
of a ‘reduced’ world, i.e. the ‘reduced’ world is a multiplicity of indi-
vidual worlds
This is autism, which, from Bleuler’s [1911/1950] initial account to now 
[e.g. Ballerini 2016], has been recognised as a complete antithesis to 
the shared world of the normal human being.  Why this should arise in 
schizophrenia is adequately explained in terms of the phenomenolog-
ical reduction – a demise of mutual understanding as part of the elim-
ination of a living being’s shared values and needs, and a concomitant 
upsurge in the human being’s status as a thinker.
4. Conclusion
Comparing schizophrenia with the consequences of Scheler’s phe-
nomenological reduction has proved a fruitful venture. A large tranche 
of schizophrenic psychopathology, hitherto obscure, and in Jaspers’ 
[1913/1963, 305] view «ununderstandable», has been clarified.
Psychological proposals as to the nature of schizophrenia are legion, 
beginning with Bleuler’s [1911/1950] suggestion of «loss of association» 
in the same book where he coined the term schizophrenia (meaning 
roughly ‘shattered mind’). This was incorrect because the association 
theory of mental functioning was already an anachronism by then, and, 
as Scheler [Constn, 150] saw, was itself an example of a semi-patholog-
ical process proclaimed as the ‘normal’ way of being, as it only applied 
to the modus vivendi of old people, and schizophrenia afflicts young 
people. Subsequent psychological theories have largely concentrated on 
the nature of paranoia, which is only a very small part of schizophre-
nia and is also part of all the other psychoses – delirium, dementia, 
depressive psychosis and mania. Psychological theories of schizophre-
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nia are also tightly constrained by the prevailing psychological model 
of the mind. Psychoanalytic, behavioural, Gestalt, social psychologi-
cal and cognitive theories came and went during the 20th Century, all 
capturing a flavour of schizophrenia but merely re-formulating selected 
aspects within a new model. In any case the bizarreness of schizophre-
nia, which Jaspers referred to as ununderstandability, and the obvious 
matters affected – temporality, spatiality, identity, for example – cry out 
for the application of philosophical techniques. The four psychiatrists 
who met up in Zurich in 1922 – Minkowski, Binswanger, Straus and 
von Gebsattel – and formed the phenomenological psychopathological 
movement were exquisitely aware of the inadequacy of psychological 
theorizing at that time and were also alert to the poverty of all the or-
ganic approaches so far.
Philosophical theorizing about schizophrenia began with these 
four in the 1920’s and 1930’s. Minkowski’s [1927/1987] notion was 
the best and still is. He proposed that the core deficit was a lack of 
a vital contact with reality’, which led to an arrest of personal devel-
opment and a compensatory intellectualization of all matters. As we 
have seen, this encapsulates the core deficit, but he could not have been 
aware of Sche ler’s writings on these matters, as they were only pub-
lished after his, Minkowski’s, death. Kuhn [1952] and Kraus [2007], 
taking up Heidegger’s idea that there are two ways of approaching ob-
jects in the world – treating them as tools (Zuhandenheit, i.e. ready to 
hand, without recognizing them as things), or seeing them as objective 
things (Vorhan-denheit, not only seeing them as things but assuming 
that they were there before anybody saw them), proposed that schizo-
phrenia was an inappropriate transformation of what is ready-to-hand 
(Zuhandenheit) into what has always been there (Vorhandenheit). This 
accounts for the impractical way in which schizophrenics pursue their 
life and what I [Cutting 1999] called their morbid objectivization – e.g. 
ball bearings in body, bionic arm – but does not account for much else. 
Finally, Tatossian [1979/1997] realized that the schizophrenic was not 
a pathological specimen of humanity at all, which is explicit or implicit 
in all previous formulations – psychological, organic or philosophical 
– but someone whose versatility with respect to taking an intellectual 




max Scheler'S Phenomenological reDuction
61
You or I can quickly switch from discussing philosophical matters to 
wondering what we should do about supper. The schizophrenic is stuck 
in the former mode, forever intellectualizing the most mundane issues. 
This insight of Tatossian was a great advance in the formulation of 
schizophrenia.
Altogether, therefore, I commend Scheler’s phenomenological re-
duction as the best philosophical model available for explaining the 
maximum of schizophrenic psychopathology. Nothing else accommo-
dates the nature of schizophrenic hallucinations, the provenance of delu-
sional perception, delusional misidentification, autism, their anomalous 
perceptions, and their sense of a lack of myness to these experiences.
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Abstract
The aim of the article is to show the similarity between a thought experiment of the 
phenomenological philosopher Max Scheler (1874-1928), known as the “phenome-
nological reduction”, and the psychopathology of schizophrenia. The “phenomeno-
logical reduction” envisages a human being whose access to reality and whose status 
as a living being have been grossly compromised. Such a being would be utterly 
transformed relative to a normal person: in its experience of the world – things and 
people would be “essentialized”, changeable, adynamic, interconnected, and yet rich 
in qualities; in its experience of itself – loss of sovereignty, yet resembling a creative 
God, whose thoughts are indistinguishable from the thing thought; and in its tempo-
ral and spatial moorings – frozen in time and space. The schizophrenic’s experience 
of their world, themselves and their temporo-spatial situation is then shown to be ac-
curately predicted by the various consequences of the “phenomenological reduction”. 
The things around them and the people they encounter are devoid of individuality 
and are more clones of some essence. They themselves are a “little God”, yet devoid 
of any sense of “myness” in anything they do or experience. Their world is frozen, 
changeable, interpenetrated by all sorts of entities, yet rich in qualities.
Consultant psychiatrist






MAX SCHELER’S DIONYSIAN REDUCTION  
AS THE DEPRESSIVE’S MODUS VIVENDI
taBle oF CoNteNtS: 1. Introduction; 2. The Dionysian Reduction; 2.1. Sche-
ler’s remarks; 3. The Psychotic Depressive’s Modus Vivendi; 4. Conclusion.
1. Introduction
In Max Scheler’s notes for a book on metaphysics that he never lived to write there is a short extract on what he calls the Dionysian re-
duction [Scheler 1924-1928/2008, 402]. This is a thought experiment in 
which he envisages what a human being would look like if its geistig 
faculties (spiritual and higher mental) were expunged. It is the complete 
antithesis of the more commonly known phenomenological reduction, 
first conceived of by Husserl [1913/1982, 66], but given a radical twist 
by Scheler [1924-1928/2008, 78-86, 99-113, 403]. The phenomenologi-
cal reduction imagines a state of affairs in which reality is struck out, 
whilst mind and spirit are intact; the Dionysian reduction investigates 
the inverse scenario, in which mind and spirit are abolished but reality 
is preserved.
The purpose of this article is to analyse what Scheler said about the 
Dionysian reduction, and then argue that the core psychopathological 
features of a psychotic depressive illness (melancholia) closely match 
the changes in the human being which Scheler found in his Dionysian 




max Sheler'S DionySian reDuction
67
2. The Dionysian Reduction
2.1. Scheler’s remarks
To set the scene we can quote the translated extract in its entirety [Scheler 
1924-1928/2008, 402]:
The Dionysian reduction, known to Schopenhauer and Bergson, in-
volves the following.
1. There is a switching off of mind, intellect and the experienced 
sense of the primacy of perception.
2. There is a coming to the fore of sympathy, animal sexuality 
and the imaginal portrayal of the world drawn from the forces 
of nature and life’s drives.
3. Our participation in all this is not objectified (i.e. none of this is 
experienced as things or qualities of things).
4. There is an enhanced awareness of the historical dimension of 
mankind and a heightened sense of being part of nature.
5. The artistic in the human is at the forefront.
6. The power of instinct is to the fore.
In respect of the integration of the reductions with the metaphysics of 
the absolute the following remarks are pertinent. The following, howev-
er, concern only the Dionysian.
a. All images are expressive.
b. Life is experienced physiognomically (i.e. as if everything were a 
face).
c. The predominant mode of knowledge is through sympathy.
d. Everything here stems from the sexual drive of the human.
e. In place of the now switched off mental apparatus of the human 
there is an intuitive sense of participating in everything to do with 
the life-force: a «co-striving», a «co-feeling» and a «co-urgency».
f. This participation is non-objectified (i.e. not in the form of per-
ceived things or qualities).
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g. Animal instinct is already of this Dionysian realm.
h. The discipline of characterology comes into its own in nature and 
history.
Some of this is repetitive, but, taking the extract as a whole, there are 
three generic ways in which the human being would be fundamentally 
different from the normal state of affairs: 1) in respect of its experienced 
objectivity; 2) with regard to what constitutes its subjectivity; and 3) by 
virtue of what it can know. Most of the comments, as I shall show, fit 
into these broad categories.
1) Altered objectivity
What is experienced is an objectivity of sorts, but not one populated by 
things. In Heidegger’s [1927/1962, 106] terminology there is no sense 
of Vorhandenheit (a sense of «already-thereness» of things). Elsewhere 
[Scheler 1927/2009, 31] he writes that only a being possessed of Geist, 
i.e. a human being, can experience things as things, but because Geist is 
wiped out in the reduction so too is thingness.
What does the ‘reduced’ human being then experience by way 
of objectivity? Scheler makes clear that it takes the form of images 
(Bilder), expressions and physiognomonic representations, almost as if 
the ‘world’ were merely a face. This is reminiscent of descriptions of 
primitive world views [e.g. Lévy-Bruhl 1927/1928], where the living, 
the dead and the never-alive are scarcely distinguished, and all three 
have a human face. There is also an ontogenetic regression as well as 
an atavistic one, whereby the ‘world’ increasingly resembles what an 
infant first sees – its mother’s face.
2) Altered subjectivity
Who is the Dionysian experiencer? From Scheler’s remarks above it is 
obvious that he or she is closer to a non-human animal than is the every-
day, unreduced human being. There is mention of «animal sexuality», 
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er of instinct». There is a heightened sense of participation in nature, 
and of there being a «co-striving», a «co-feeling» and a «co-urgency». 
In fact, as well as the atavistic and ontogenetic regressions just men-
tioned, there is a phylogenetic regression.
3) Altered knowing
How does the Dionysian human being know what it knows? Again, 
Scheler is quite clear: «the predominant mode of knowledge is 
through sympathy». Sympathy, for Scheler, was a central human 
faculty, the subject of a book-length treatment [Scheler 1913/2008]. 
His unique contribution to the subject was to see that this was a fac-
ulty which directly captured the state of mind of another person, not 
by means of analogy with some previous experience of the knower, 
but through a psychic facility which ‘perceived’ this, just as anyone 
perceived a thing, albeit through a different facility. At one stroke 
he had solved the age-old philosophical conundrum of how we know 
other minds. In the case of the Dionysian human, however, he or she 
is entirely reliant on this, and has no means of grasping the idea or 
essence of anything, as you or I can also do, because this is specific 
to a being with Geist.
3. The Psychotic Depressive’s Modus Vivendi
1) Altered objectivity
What does the depressive experience of their world that the normal 
person does not? He or she experiences a non-objectified world. The 
‘thingliness’ of things starts to disappear, whether the object is in the 
external world, their own body or even their own biography:
no clothes; things void;
other people didn’t exist;




parts of body and brain have gone, no blood pressure, hardly any 
lungs;
everything in history and in books is as if they never were, peri-
od when there was nobody about the streets;
father lost his job, parents have sold their house, sister not at uni-
versity [Cutting 1997, 139, 259].
These are known as nihilistic delusions in conventional psychopatho-
logical terms, and account for a large tranche of a psychotic depressive’s 
delusions. This is precisely what Scheler said of the Dionysian reduc-
tion, that it would result in the experience of ‘no-thingness’.
What replaces this, or rather what was dormant but now looms large 
because of the non-availability of thingness as a mode of experience, is, 
according to the Dionysian reduction, a ‘physiognomonic’ picture, as if 
the world were a human face. Consider these accounts [Cutting 1997, 
117]:
people all had pointed ears:
Isaac Newton (on bank note) stood out 3D from page;
people’s faces had particular meaning;
eyes enormous and bulging;
faces caricatured – prominent nose.
These experiences illustrate the pre-eminence of the face in the depres-
sive’s world.
Several psychopathologists last century grasped the rudimentary 
nature of the depressive’s objectivity [Tellenbach 1974; Maldiney 1976; 
Tatossian 1979/1997, 71, 82]. All saw that, in Heidegger’s terminology, 
the depressive is stuck in a pre-objectivized world where Zuhandenheit 
(ready-to-handness) reigns, whereas Vorhandenheit (thingliness, al-
ready-thereness) cannot be achieved. Here is Tatossian [1979/1997, 82], 
commenting on Tellenbach:
It is because tools have not yet become things that Zuhandenheit has 




max Sheler'S DionySian reDuction
71
Here he is [Tatossian 1983/2016, 104], exploring nihilistic bodily delusions:
Everything is experienced as if the body-as-object is wiped out 
and the depressive identifies solely with the body-as-subject.
2) Altered subjectivity
Who is the melancholic subject? He or she is someone with a four-fold 
difference from the normal state of affairs. a) There is, first, an over-iden-
tification with the social situation of other people. b) Secondly, there is 
an over-attunement with nature itself. c) Thirdly, the melancholic is de-
prived of certain emotions and acts which Geist normally supplies. d) 
Fourthly, the melancholic has a heightened sense of its animality.
a) Minkowski [1933/1995, 305] gave numerous examples of a de-
pressive’s undue subservience to other people:
When you insist on something I must submit to your will. It an-
noys me intensely that I am only a sort of pet animal of someone 
I cannot resist. I don’t dare do anything without your say-so. If 
you insist that I leave, then I must leave.
I am entirely wrapped up in whatever you say. It is awful not to 
be able to say anything for myself.
Tellenbach [1974] and Kraus [1982] also identified a pre-morbid ten-
dency in their melancholic subjects to be overly wrapped up in their 
social situation, and when this was disrupted by some exit event – child 
leaving home, death of spouse – their ability to accommodate this was 
hugely compromised and they switched over into an actual depressive 
condition.
b) Not only is the melancholic unduly influenced by other people, 
but they are overly involved in the wider realm of nature and society. 
This shows itself in the frequent delusions of guilt that they entertain. 
Here are some examples [Cutting 1997, 313]:
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cut up a worm and fed it to a sparrow:
if she eats, other patients won’t have enough food;
people angry with him because he made a suggestion that he 
should give £5 a week to (striking) firemen.
O’Connor et al. [2007] described this as «the moral system on 
overdrive».
c) Next, the depressive subject is deprived of certain mental acts 
and emotions. The first of these is vividly described by Ratcliffe [2013], 
in an article on loss of hope in depression. The depressive does not 
merely lose hope in some positive future, but loses hope tout court. 
Hope is a geistig (mental) act which is not available to him or her at all.
Furthermore, the depressive is not able to access the range of 
emotions available to a normal person, because some of these are 
subserved by Geist. Paradoxically, for example, the depressive cannot 
feel sad [Schulte 1961] and complains bitterly that he or she has lost the 
ability to love their family. Only Kurt Schneider [1920], who studied 
under Scheler, and understood Scheler’s layered formulation of emotions 
[Scheler 1913-1916/1973, 105-110, 337-344], properly explained the 
paradox. He alone appreciated that if a person experienced feelings about 
lack of feeling then that must be because there are more than one class 
of feelings, which is what Scheler said, and the feelings experienced 
(about the lack of feeling) are those that are preserved in depression, 
and the lack of feeling (whose absence the subject recognises and does 
feel about with their intact set of feelings) is that which is wiped out. 
Love and sadness are geistig feelings; gloominess, which is preserved, 
is a vital feeling. Again the Dionysian reduction as a depressive’s modus 
vivendi accommodates all this, as it predicts that geistig feelings are 
eliminated, vital feelings not.
d) Minkowski’s [1933/1995, 305, 308] further extracts from his de-
pressed patients include some extraordinary remarks about a sense of 
animality that they experienced:
I am nothing but a sort of animal functioning […]. I have the feel-
ing that I am only a life of ‘tripes’ [guts], only vegetative func-
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all; I am in anguish but it isn’t moral fear, it’s a bestial fear [une 
crainte bestiale] the fear of an animal who is barely existing.
I am only the stupid animal plaything of someone [la bête de 
quelqu’un].
Again, this is quite consistent with Scheler’s own remarks on the 
Dionysian man or woman. There is even a study [Mathew et al. 1979] 
which showed that an increase in libido, not a decrease, which is cus-
tomarily assumed, characterises depression.
In short, the depressive, at least in the psychotic form, is someone 
whose subjectivity is a mix of: over-engagement with the vicissitudes 
of another person’s life; over-attunement to living creatures in general; 
alienation from the mental acts and emotions which allow humans to 
transcend their animal nature; and, in some cases, an actual sense of 
being no more than an animal, restricted to a cycle of ingestion and 
excretion.
3) Altered knowing
The depressive is both a compromised knower and a wiser knower.
The former is evident in his or her lack of dreams [Herschmann 
& Schilder 1920; Mathew et al. 1979], virtual absence of experienced 
imagery [Hurlburt 1990], complaints of inability to think [Lewis 1934], 
and a dilapidated grasp of the essence of anything, as evidenced in their 
nihilistic delusions, as discussed above. What the depressive lacks is 
what Scheler [1924-1928/2008, 99] refers to as «meaning». Meaning is 
a coming together of the idea of something with the image it presents in 
reality. But if there is no idea, extinguished in the Dionysian reduction, 
there is no meaning. The depressive complains bitterly of the meaning-
less nature of their life, and their status as a living testament to the Dio-
nysian reduction is the only extant explanation of why this might be so.
And yet the depressive, in an inspired experiment by Alloy and 
Abramson [1979], is more attuned to the reality of some situation – 
judging one’s own performance on a task – than any normal person. A 
normal person tends to overestimate his or her performance on some 
task, whereas the depressive is spot on, a state of affairs known as «de-
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pressive realism» [Beck 1967]. Again, Scheler’s Dionysian reduction is 
the only philosophical formulation that can get a handle on this, because 
it portrays a human being who is immersed in reality to a greater extent 
than any normal. The only mode of knowledge available to the Dionysi-
an man or woman is «sympathy» – an attunement to the real situation of 
self and others – and that explains the depressive’s superior assessment 
relative to the normal’s.
4. Conclusion
Scheler’s thought experiment, the Dionysian reduction, envisaging what 
a human being would look like if its spiritual and higher mental facul-
ties were wiped out, proves to be an accurate model of what it is like to 
experience melancholia.
It certainly betters the psychological attempts to tap into its essence 
– whether Freudian [Freud 1917/1957], behavioural [Seligman 1975] 
or cognitive [Beck 1967]. Freud likened melancholia to bereavement, 
Seligman to the consequence of consistently negative appraisals of a 
subject’s achievements, and Beck to a faulty personal schema whereby 
potentially positive aspects of a person’s life are given a negative stamp. 
All these may apply to someone with a depressive temperament, or even 
to someone with a neurotic depressive illness, but none goes anywhere 
near explaining nihilistic delusions or delusions of guilt.
The extant philosophical/phenomenological excursions fare much 
better. Their critical insight is to see that the melancholic is compro-
mised with respect to his or her access to the objective mode of thing-
ness and is thrown back on an exaggerated sense of commonality with 
other human beings and living things in general. Minkowski [1933/1995, 
319], Tellenbach [1974], Maldiney [1976], Tatossian [1979/1997, 71] and 
Stanghellini [2004, 203] all appreciated this.
Scheler’s Dionysian reduction model is a convenient way of accom-
modating all the particular insights of these psychopathologists and also 
provides the most plausible explanation yet of what is going on in the 
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Abstract
This article aims to illuminate the psychopathology of melancholia (depressive 
psychosis in Anglo-American parlance) by comparing it to a thought experiment 
conducted by the phenomenological philosopher Max Scheler (1874-1928), which 
he called the “Dionysian reduction”. The “Dionysian reduction” envisages a human 
being devoid of what in German is referred to as Geist – spirit and higher intellectu-
al functions. Such a being would be tantamount to a non-human animal: reliant on 
instinct and with an overwhelming communal bond; devoid of a sense of objectivity 
and incapable of appreciating the essence of anything; and whose subjectivity is ex-
quisitely that of the social milieu to which he or she belongs. The melancholic is he or 
she who has delusions of guilt – believing that they are responsible for anything that 
befalls their “tribe”; they are further prone to nihilistic delusions, the basis of which 
is a disappearance of the thingness of entities – e.g. “I have no bowels”; and a sense 
of subservience to other people – e.g. “I must submit to your will”.
Consultant psychiatrist






THE MODUS VIVENDI OF PERSONS WITH  
SCHIZOPHRENIA: VALUECEPTION IMPAIRMENT 
AND PHENOMENOLOGICAL REDUCTION
taBle oF CoNteNtS: 1. Introduction; 2. Intersubjective and enactive dimension 
of valueception impairments; 3. The case of Paul Schreber: the modus vivendi 
of persons with schizophrenia and Max Scheler’s phenomenological reduction.
1. Introduction
In recent years, several works have highlighted the relevance of the subjective [Sass & Parnas 2003, Sass 2014] and intercorporeal [Fuchs 
2005; Fuchs & Schlimme 2009] disturbances of the modus vivendi of 
persons with schizophrenia. Earlier, Bin Kimura had already proposed 
to assign a central role to the intersubjective disturbances.1 Underlying 
these attempts there is the need to overcome a purely neurobiological 
perspective and to reach a less partial and reductive understanding of 
the schizophrenic’s modus vivendi. The schizophrenic patient is affected 
in their most profound and non-objectifiable structure: in their being an 
embodied person who feels, expresses themselves, evaluates, prefers, 
loves, hates, positions themselves in the world, and perhaps changes 
when encountering another person. The modus vivendi of persons with 
schizophrenia is a typically human phenomenon and as such has an 
anthropological dimension that has been little investigated so far.
In this perspective, the disturbances of the schizophrenic’s modus 
vivendi do not affect an aseptic subject, but the organ that orientates the 
positioning of the embodied person in the world. German phenomenol-
ogist Max Scheler (1874-1928), referring to Augustine, describes this 
1  Kimura’s analysis of intersubjectivity is based on the Japanese concept of “aida”, 
which means “between” [Kimura 2013].
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organ as ordo amoris, i.e. the unique and unmistakable “order” of feel-
ing which structures and directs the intentionality of every individual 
embodied person [Scheler 1973b]. By “order” I do not mean a rule that 
is imposed from above on the emotional sphere by the intellect, but an 
individual and dynamic structure that emerges from feeling through the 
practices of emotional sharing and that reflects the very physiognomy of 
the person [Cusinato 2018b].
The field that extends the analysis of the schizophrenic’s modus 
vivendi to include the core of the person’s structure can be referred 
to as the «psychopathology of the ordo amoris» [Cusinato 2018a]. By 
putting forward a «psychopathology of the ordo amoris», I have tried 
to integrate Sass and Parnas’ [2003] Ipseity-Disturbance Model with a 
phenomenology of the embodied person, so that also the affective, value 
and anthropological dimension of the disturbances of the schizophrenic’s 
modus vivendi can be taken into account [Cusinato 2018a]. Indeed, these 
dimensions have largely remained in the shadows so far.
The research conducted by psychiatrist John Cutting is one of the 
few notable exceptions. In one of his most recent books, A Critique of 
Psychopathology [2011], Cutting aims to overcome a reductive concep-
tion of psychopathology by linking it to the philosophy of the twentieth 
century. Cutting develops a philosophical analysis of psychopathology 
going beyond the standard references to Husserl and Heidegger. Draw-
ing especially on the posthumous writings of the later Scheler, he sheds 
light on some aspects of the schizophrenic’s modus vivendi which oth-
erwise would remain inexplicable. In line with the tradition inaugurated 
by Kurt Schneider’s Die Schichtung des emotionalen Lebens und der 
Aufbau der Depressionszustände [1920], Cutting takes as his reference 
point the value classification offered by Scheler in his Formalismus 
(1913/1916). The numerous studies carried out by Cutting on Scheler 
and psychopathology represent an important contribution to the dia-
logue between psychiatry and philosophy [Cutting 2009; 2016; 2018a; 
2018b].
There are two crucial points in Cutting’s proposal. On the one hand, 
he asserts that an impairment of valueception underlies the schizo-
phrenic’s modus vivendi: «The schizophrenic is […] someone whose 




levels, but whose grasp of spiritual and mental values is intact, if not 
hyperacute» [Cutting 2009, 149]. On the other hand, he identifies an 
analogy between the loss of contact with reality of the schizophrenic’s 
modus vivendi and the bracketing of the vital impulse (Lebensdrang) 
that Scheler places at the basis of phenomenological reduction [Sche-
ler GW IX, 44]. Instead, the modus vivendi of persons with depression 
is made to correspond to the Dionysian reduction, understood as the 
bracketing of the Geist so as to reach a fusion with the vital impulse 
[Cutting 2009, 145; Cutting 2018b].
Here my intention is not to take into consideration Cutting’s position 
as a whole. I do not even wish to dwell on the many aspects of his pro-
posal that I agree with, like his acknowledgment of the central role of the 
Schelerian concept of valueception (Wertnehmung) in psychiatry. Rather, 
I will limit myself to considering what in my opinion are the two some-
what problematic points of Cutting’s proposal: 1) the relationship between 
the impairment of valueception and the perception of certain value class-
es; and 2) the interpretation of Scheler’s phenomenological reduction and 
its comparison with the modus vivendi of persons with schizophrenia.2
2. Intersubjective and enactive dimension of valueception impairments
As we have already seen, Cutting observes that in the schizophrenic’s 
modus vivendi the «grasp of spiritual and mental values is intact, if not 
hyperacute». This statement raises two preliminary fundamental ques-
tions: a) Do «spiritual» and «mental» values coincide or do they belong to 
two different value classes? b) Is what we can observe in the schizophren-
ic’s modus vivendi a simple focus on Geist-related values or is there also 
an ability to understand and interact effectively with these values?
In speaking of spiritual and mental values, Cutting refers explicitly 
to Scheler’s theory of values. In his Formalismus, Scheler distinguishes 
between vital values (vitale Werte), understood as «values of vital feel-
ing» (Werte des vitalen Fühlens) [Scheler GW II, 123], and personal or 
«spiritual» values (geistige Werte). By personal values, Scheler means 
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ethical, aesthetic and cultural values, but not the «mental» values typical 
of positive science [Scheler GW II, 125]. While the class of personal val-
ues establishes the ultimate orientation of phenomenological reduction, 
that of «mental» values underlies scientific reduction (wissenschaftliche 
Reduktion) [Scheler GW X, 461; 482]. The «mental» values concern the 
capacity for abstract reasoning, the kind that allows one e.g. to abstract 
the concept of geometric sphere from a round object [Scheler GW X, 461].
Therefore, for Scheler, personal and mental values are two distinct-
ly different classes of values. So, in the modus vivendi of persons with 
schizophrenia, is there a simple focus on these two classes of values or 
is there also an actual grasping of them?
The focus of the schizophrenic’s modus vivendi on “mental” val-
ues as well as the capacity to really grasp these values is testified to by 
numerous studies that have shown an accentuation of certain intellectu-
al capacities associated with a hyper-reflexive attitude [Pérez-Álvarez 
2008]. It is well known that there are e.g. cases of schizophrenic person-
alities exceptionally gifted in the logical and mathematical fields.
The focus on “personal values” is instead confirmed e.g. by the phe-
nomenon of idionomy. It is widely noted that the schizophrenic person 
tends to remain dissatisfied with commonsensical answers and to ob-
sessively ask questions of a metaphysical or religious nature. However, 
focusing on metaphysical or religious issues does not guarantee, as Cut-
ting claims, an effective grasping of these values. E.g. the fact that the 
schizophrenic person is obsessed with themes that deal with the “sacred” 
does not mean that they are a religious person, a saint or a mystic. If we 
consider e.g. the delusions and hallucinations described by Paul Schre-
ber in Denkwürdigkeiten eines Nervenkranken [Memoirs of My Nervous 
Illness], it can certainly be concluded that religious and metaphysical 
themes are the center of his interest. However, Schreber brings the whole 
reality back to himself: it is the whole world that “winks” and is traced 
back to his own ego. Scheler, Cutting’s reference, interprets these forms 
of autistic self-focus, which lead to the absolutization of one’s ego, as a 
valueception impairment that compromises the perception of personal 
values. In Scheler’s perspective, Schreber’s religious delusion is there-
fore a valueception impairment concerning personal values.
The above confirms Cutting’s thesis only with respect to mental 
© 2018 Thaumàzein
10.13136/thau.v6i0 82
values, but not to personal ones: it can in fact be observed that the mo-
dus vivendi of persons with schizophrenia is actually focused on per-
sonal values, but this does not guarantee that these values are also really 
grasped, at least not in the sense that they are experienced in the per-
spective of openness to the world (cf. the next paragraph).
On this point, it is interesting to also consider the modus vivendi of 
persons with depression. Several researches show that the characteristic 
traits of melancholia consist in the sense of guilt and the stigmatization 
of one’s emotional anesthesia, as well as in one’s being constantly tor-
mented by ethical questions, by what is false and authentic, right and 
wrong [Stanghellini & Mancini 2017]. The depressive’s modus vivendi, 
therefore, can also involve a focus on ethical values which, as we have 
seen, Scheler places among personal values or Geist-related values. 
Consequently, it is problematic to agree with Cutting’s claim that de-
pressed persons remain confined in their bodily sphere without contact 
with Geist-related values [Cutting 2018b].
These observations suggest that the valueception impairments in 
the modi vivendi of schizophrenia and depression do not concern so 
much the perception of certain value classes, but rather the structure of 
valueception itself. What does Scheler mean by the concept of value-
ception? The compound Wert-nehmung – a neologism that Scheler be-
gan to use in 1913 (it appears several times, for example, in the first edi-
tion of the Sympathiebuch) – was coined on the model of the compound 
Wahr-nehmung, which is usually translated as “perception”. However, 
whereas Wahr-nehmung literally means taking (nehmen) something as 
true (wahr), Wert-nehmung signifies taking or grasping (nehmen) val-
ue (Wert) through feeling ( fühlen). This grasping is not based on rep-
resentation or judgment, but on the image (Bild), and is therefore con-
figured as a primordial perception that precedes and grounds sensible 
perception (Wahrnehmung) [Cusinato 2018a].
According to Scheler, valueception is an original activity that allows 
a living organism to position itself in the environment and a human being 
to position themselves in the world and to practice emotional sharing. In 
this perspective, different forms of valueception impairment correspond 
to the modi vivendi of persons with schizophrenia and depression.
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tify valueception impairments that also concern personal values and 
that lead to absolutizing one’s ego, or to the inability to transcend one’s 
self-referential perspective and to come into contact with another per-
son’s singularity (on this aspect, see the next paragraph).
As regards the depressive’s modus vivendi, it is useful to remember 
that Scheler associates melancholia with the weakening of the pressure 
of the vital impulse (Lebensdrang), a process that Scheler describes 
using the term «insensitivity» (Fühllosigkeit).3 Insensitivity in mel-
ancholia is a particular type of valueception impairment: this form of 
sterilization of valueception drastically reduces the motivations for and 
interest in bodily and emotional interaction with other people and with 
the world. In this case, the valueception impairment compromises the 
motivations of the affective sphere. Insensitivity signalizes a lack of 
motivation and enactive ability. If we can assume that emotions pro-
vide the motivation to perform any movement or action, in the absence 
of emotions, as is the case with insensitivity, paralysis ensues. I have 
already argued that in the depressive’s modus vivendi the valueception 
impairment weakens the enactive capacities of sense making [Cusinato 
2018a]. Moreover, enactivism in psychopathology as well as the rela-
tionship between depression and enactivism are already the focus of 
some recent works [Maiese 2018; Spremberg 2018].
This perspective shift enables us to understand valueception im-
pairments as disturbances related to the very structure of the embodied 
person. Valueception impairments in the modi vivendi of schizophrenia 
and depression signalize that there is a «disorder of the person». I pro-
pose to interpret Scheler’s theory of valueception in the sense of «psy-
chopathology of ordo amoris» [Cusinato 2018a]. The embodied person 
is rooted in the affective sphere and is characterized mainly by being an 
order of feeling. In my opinion, this «order of feeling» should be under-
stood, on the one hand, as an orientation center for emotional sharing 
practices and, on the other, as an enactive center. In the schizophren-
3  «Such “insensitivity” [Fühllosigkeit] is therefore a quite different defect in man to 
lack of co-feeling [Mitgefühl]. It is chiefly found in pathological cases (e.g. in mel-
ancholia), where it arises as a result of the patient’s exclusive preoccupation in his 
own feelings, which altogether prevents him from giving emotional acceptance to the 
experience of other people» [Scheler 2008b, 14, translation modified].
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ic’s modus vivendi, valueception impairments translate into a process of 
disembodiment that undermines the intersubjective dimension, where-
as in the depressive’s modus vivendi of depression they compromise the 
enactive activity [Cusinato 2018a].
3. The case of Paul Schreber: the modus vivendi of persons with schizo-
phrenia and Max Scheler’s phenomenological reduction
Relative to the second point, my arguments turn primarily to the tradi-
tional interpretation of Scheler’s phenomenological reduction, to which 
Cutting also refers, and secondly to the juxtaposition that Cutting pro-
poses between Scheler’s phenomenological reduction and the schizo-
phrenic’s modus vivendi [Cutting 2018a].
Cutting’s proposal is more convincing with respect to Husserl’s 
phenomenological reduction. According to Cutting, the act of ideation 
and intuition of essences (Wesensanschauung) is the key to the phenom-
enological reduction. Scheler, however, confers on this act, conceived 
at first by Husserl, a “moral” meaning and reinterprets it in function 
of an epoché of egocentricity, which is absent in Husserl. As I have 
already shown in several of my previous works, Scheler’s phenomeno-
logical reduction is in some respects “reversed” compared to Husserl’s. 
Indeed, by means of phenomenological reduction, Scheler does not aim 
to bracket the world, but rather the self-referential structure of the sub-
ject that limits our access to the world. The main objective of the phe-
nomenological reduction in Scheler is therefore to increase the openness 
to the world (Weltoffenheit). I have already demonstrated that, contrary 
to what is often supposed, Scheler’s phenomenological reduction does 
not aim to put the whole reality in brackets, but only the reality of the 
structure of the self-referential subject [Cusinato 1998a; 1998b; 1999; 
2012], for only by so doing is it possible to come into living contact with 
the singularity of another person.4 The aim of Scheler’s phenomenologi-
cal reduction is analogous to Jean-Luc Marion’s [1989]: more reduction, 
more givenness, or better, more reduction, more openness to the world 
(Weltoffenheit) [Cusinato 2017a].
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It is evident that, instead, the schizophrenic’s modus vivendi tends to a 
solipsistic closure towards both the world and other persons, as described 
for example by Daniel Paul Schreber in his Memoirs of My Nervous 
Illness. I therefore argue, unlike Cutting, that Scheler’s phenomenological 
reduction and the modus vivendi of persons with schizophrenia move in 
different directions. In Memoirs of My Nervous Illness, Schreber recounts 
the transformations of his own body to better merge with God in a cosmic 
copula. Little by little, his libidinal investment was withdrawn from all 
that lied outside this cosmic copula, so that the «others» were conceived 
as «fleeting-improvised-men», that is, as ghosts. The inability to open up 
to others and to share their experiences clearly emerges here.
Schreber’s modus vivendi closely resembles what Scheler regards as 
an extreme form of «egocentricity» in which everything outside of oneself 
automatically becomes a shadow devoid of its own value.5 The fundamen-
tal difference is that while Scheler considers non-pathological forms of 
egocentricity from an ethical point of view, the modus vivendi experienced 
by Schreber is a form of self-defence without which he probably could 
not survive. Except for this difference, the similarities between Schreber’s 
and Scheler’s descriptions are surprising on this point. In Sympathiebuch 
Scheler notes that in the extreme forms of egocentricity the other is giv-
en only in reference to one’s ego [Cusinato 1998a, 293]. «These others 
certainly exist as souls, but, it is, for all that, a shadowy sort of existence; 
the phrase is significant, for such an existence is in reality and character 
merely relative to his own ego, his own field of values, and his own sup-
posedly absolute notion of reality» [Scheler 2008b, 59]. What is described 
here is a pathological form of egocentricity that Scheler explicitly refers to 
Bleuler’s concept of autism in the dementia precox, i.e. in the schizophre-
nia: «Bleuler’s term “autism” seems the most suitable for the pathological 
symptoms of that type of self-absorption (Selbstversunkenheit) where all 
interest in the environment disappears. He gives an instructive description 
of “autistic” states in his book on Dementia precox» [Scheler 2008b, 58, 
5  «By “egocentricity” I mean the illusion of taking one’s own environment to be the 
world itself, i.e. the seeming givenness of this environment as “the” world. As an 
apprehension of the reality of objects, egocentricity is equivalent to solipsism; with 
regard to volition and practical behaviour, it is egoism; and as an attitude of love it is 
auto-erotism» [Scheler 2008b, 58].
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translation modified]. The others have only a weakened existence, a shad-
owy existence so to speak. They become shadows and ghosts: they are 
reduced to Scheler’s «secondary man» (Nebenmensch) or to Schreber’s 
«fleeting-improvised-men». «In the egocentric and solipsistic attitude, we 
take this secondary man [Nebenmensch], whose existence for us is in fact 
dependent on our own nature and range of interests, as the ultimate and ab-
solute reality of the other» [Scheler 2008b, 59, translation modified]. This 
situation is not determined by logical errors or mistaken reasoning, which 
can therefore be corrected by rational arguments, but by valueception im-
pairments. It concerns a real form of self-deception (Selbsttäuschung) and 
infatuation (Vergaffung) which can distort our relationship with reality.
In normal conditions, this egocentric illusion is contained by cer-
tain feelings, such as the feeling of respect (Ehrfurcht) for life which 
implies the recognition of the value of the other. These feelings do not 
develop through pure mental reflection, but thanks to emotional sharing 
practices that, according to Scheler, are the root of phenomenological 
reduction. As early as 1921, in his essay Vom Wesen der Philosophie, 
Scheler analyzed how the affective structure makes phenomenological 
reduction possible when arguing that the «moral impulse» (moralischer 
Aufschwung) arising from respect for the other is the basis of philoso-
phy [Scheler GW V, 89].
Thanks to the development of feelings such as respect, the other is no 
longer Scheler’s «secondary man» (Nebenmensch) or Schreber’s «fleet-
ing-improvised-man», but becomes a person to whom absolute value must 
be recognized. In this conversion, which coincides with the phenome-
nological reduction, an objectifying conception of the other is overcome 
and it becomes possible to grasp a truth that, translated into the form of 
judgment, would sound more or less like this: «The other, as a human 
being and as a living being, has the same value as you; the other exists in 
a way just as true and authentic as you do; the value of the other is equal 
to your value» [Scheler 2008b, 60, translation modified]. This equality of 
worth once established, the other person also becomes equally real to us, 
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Abstract
So far, the value dimension underlying affectivity disorders has remained out of fo-
cus in phenomenological psychopathology. As early as at the beginning of the 20th 
century, however, German phenomenologist Max Scheler examined in depth the 
relationship between affectivity and value dimension through the concept of val-
ueception (Wertnehmung). In this sense, a recent noteworthy contribution has been 
provided by John Cutting, who has drawn attention to the importance of Scheler’s 
analyses for psychiatry. In this work I take into consideration only two aspects of 
Cutting’s proposal: 1) the relationship between the impairments of valueception 
and the perception of certain value classes; and 2) the interpretation of Scheler’s 
phenomenological reduction and its juxtaposition with the schizophrenic’s modus 
vivendi. According to Cutting, in the modus vivendi of persons with schizophrenia 
the valueception impairment entails putting vital values in brackets and focusing on 
personal values, with a process that recalls Scheler’s phenomenological reduction. 
Regarding the first aspect, I share Cutting’s starting point, but then shift the focus on 
how important the valueception is for the intersubjective dimension. In particular, I 
maintain that rather than compromising the perception of vital values, valueception 
impairments in the modus vivendi of persons with schizophrenia interfere with the 
intersubjective dimension and are interwoven with a process of disembodiment. My 
thesis is that the modus vivendi of schizophrenia involves a disturbance of the inter-
subjective dimension that arises from the level of valueception and that determines 
the person’s self-referential closure. With regard to the second point, by analyzing 
Scheler’s phenomenological reduction, I sustain that its main objective is to increase 
both the interaction with otherness and the openness to the world (Weltoffenheit). As 
a consequence, the modus vivendi of persons with schizophrenia, in my opinion, is 
not comparable, as Cutting claims, with Scheler’s phenomenological reduction, but 
goes in a different direction.
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THE PRAGMATIC VALUE OF NOTIONS  
OF DIALECTICS AND ESSENCE IN PHENOMENO-
LOGICAL PSYCHIATRY AND PSYCHOPATHOLOGY 
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chopathology; 2.1. Hegelian dialectics; 2.2. Proportional dialectics; 3. Rede-
fining the notion of psychopathological essence – melancholia as an example; 
4. Conclusions: Implications for building a therapeutic strategy.
1. Introduction
The fundamental epistemological assumption behind phenomeno-logical psychopathology is that psychological disorders are a dis-
turbance or transformation of all existence and not just of isolated psy-
chic functions [Binswanger 1958]. Phenomenological psychopathology 
is an elaborated form of empirical science [Stanghellini 2009] that aims 
to provide the basis for pragmatic, therapeutic objectives without fail-
ing to consider intimate links with anthropological reflections [Nau-
din 2003]. We intentionally use the term “anthropological reflections” 
rather than “philosophical anthropology” to stress that the relationship 
between description and identification of pathological experiences, on 
the one hand, and reflections on the wholeness of human existence, on 
the other, is extremely diverse, to the point of this school having been 
referred to as «metaphysical psychopathology» [Cutting 2012]. In tune 
with a trend already observed in the classical period of phenomeno-
logical psychopathology [Tatossian 1997], a whole plethora of authors 
shelter under the benevolent tent of phenomenological psychopathology 
[Wiggins & Schwartz 2011], each of whom claims some degree of phil-
osophical affiliation. We can discern two fundamental perspectives of 
using phenomenological philosophy in psychopathology. At one end of 
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what we might call the phenomenological spectrum1 are those authors 
– or works of authors – like Binswanger and Boss, who seek out the ori-
entation for their intellectual enterprises by entering into dialogue with 
some philosopher or even by importing philosophical concepts directly 
to psychopathology, developing a sort of philosophical psychopatholo-
gy [Spiegelberg, 1972]. At the other end are those authors – or works 
of authors – for whom phenomenological concepts serve only as «an 
instrument aiming at the clinic» [Basso 2009, 21] or who claim affinity 
to Blankenburg, arguing that his philosophical concepts serve as a «[h]
euristic guideline (Leitfaden), nothing more» [Blankenburg 2007, 149]. 
Given this second perspective’s looser ties to works of a declaredly phil-
osophical turn, they have already been referred to – not without good 
reason – as phenomenological-anthropological psychiatrists [Kraus 
1999b]. Although they often draw on the work of philosophers and con-
cepts from philosophy, they recognise that the use of philosophy and 
some of its concepts serves an eminently empirical purpose. The reflec-
tions and, above all, the categories of philosophy have for them the ben-
efit of serving as more precise conceptual instruments to denominate 
objects of knowledge that are hard to put a name to. Authors following 
this perspective make clear that their use of concepts and methods im-
ported from phenomenological philosophy – especially that of Husserl, 
Heidegger and Merleau-Ponty, but also of Scheler and Henry – gains 
authorial overtones at the expense of a certain disregard for the original 
meanings intended by the philosophers who created them. These works 
find specificities in psychopathological method that distinguish them 
and set them apart, in terms of procedure and purpose, from the needs 
of philosophers [Di Petta 2012]. These specificities relate directly to the 
need to make psychopathological diagnoses before real patients, which 
serve as the basic orientation for concrete clinical action that is consis-
tent with the features of each patient’s unique personality and mental 
disorder.
This article seeks to support the aspirations of the second perspec-
tive of this group of phenomenological psychopathologists, featuring 
two concepts from psychopathology of a philosophical origin which, 
1  The same author may belong to both groups or perspectives, depending on the work 





in their strict application to psychopathology, could be of considerable 
value for diagnostic purposes and for the introduction and follow-up of 
therapeutic strategies: the notions of dialectic and essence. As this is a 
work on psychopathology geared towards the pragmatic use of catego-
ries, we will show through some clinical conditions, especially melan-
cholia, the advantages of using such concepts empirically. With this, 
we seek to stress how phenomenological understanding can help the 
establishment of productive clinical strategies.
2. Dialectics and phenomenological psychopathology
The use of the concept of dialectics in philosophy is so broad that even 
a superficial investigation would far exceed the objectives of this contri-
bution. Such a task would involve trawling through virtually the entire 
history of philosophy! For the purposes of this paper, it will suffice to 
present the main meanings by which the notion of dialectics has been 
incorporated into phenomenological psychopathology. We are interest-
ed in its technical incorporations – the works or passages where the 
use of the term is the centre of attention and has a set function in the 
discourse or argument. We also limit ourselves to the explicit use of 
the word “dialectic”, leaving out any considerations that may implicitly 
present the technical features of dialectics without terming them as such 
(Binswanger being a case in point, as we will see below). We will not 
consider any cases of more casual use of the word “dialectic” in phe-
nomenological psychopathology.
There are two main technical uses of dialectics in phenomenolog-
ical psychopathology, both of them drawing especially on the work of 
Blankenburg [1982; 2007]. Although the author uses this concept only 
as a category of anthropological comprehension, we believe that the 
introduction of the notion of dialectics in phenomenological psycho-
pathology has paved the way for new insights and developments in the 
field [Messas 2010a; 2014]. We intend to show how this anthropologi-
cal-investigative use is especially important for the perspective on clin-
ical psychopathology addressed here.
In order to do so, it is worth spending some time here on these 
sadly little known and surely underestimated works in terms of their 
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extraordinary value to the movement of phenomenology in psychiatry 
and psychopathology. The author begins by approaching the problem 
of the apparent paradox contained in the idea of a dialectical phenome-
nology [Blankenburg 2007, 155]. At first sight, an association between 
phenomenology – primarily Husserlian – and dialectics could be taken 
as contradictory. Blankenburg is fully aware of the difficulty for a read-
er habituated with philosophy to accept combining classical phenome-
nology, which seeks a vision of the essence of phenomena, with dialec-
tics, especially in its Hegelian sense, geared towards comprehending 
the movements of reality and the subsumption of phenomena on higher 
levels. It would be almost a contradiction in terms, because dialectics 
would stand opposed to phenomenological essentialism.2 Essentialism 
implies searching for something fixed and general in a pathology (e.g., 
schizophrenia), while a dialectical view would be concerned with the 
movements implied in the psychopathology. Nevertheless, are these two 
interpretations so mutually exclusive in psychopathology that no recon-
ciliation between them is possible? A historical reading of phenomeno-
logical psychopathology shows that it is possible for there to be mutu-
ally fruitful action between the interest of phenomenology in essence 
and the interest of dialectics in transformation, consolidated in what 
is known as dialectical essentialism [Messas et al. 2017]. In classical 
psychopathological essentialism, the psychopathologist seeks, through 
an act of eidetic reduction [Kraus 1999b] or empathic penetration (diag-
nostic par pénétration) [Minkowski 1995], to identify the essential core 
of the pathology – its general, unvarying features. In the dialectic form 
of essentialism, to which Blankenburg contributes, the researcher has 
dual tasks: focusing on recognising the essential core of the psychopa-
thology, while also observing the movements around which this essen-
tial core is transformed [Messas 2004]. In Blankenburg, as mentioned 
above, the work of dialectical essentialism can operate using two differ-
ent strategies derived from two different readings of phenomenological 
psychopathology.
2  For a more detailed criticism of essentialist theories in psychopathology, see Mi-
shara & Schwartz, 2013.






It is precisely the different ways of comprehending the logic of the move-
ment and value given to the categories for apprehending it (its heuristic 
value) that determine the different way the author addresses the topic 
of dialectics. In one of his approaches, clearly inspired by Hegel, albeit 
with perceptibly Jasperian overtones [Jaspers 1959, 285], Blankenburg 
focuses on the dynamics of transformation by analysing the positivity 
of negativity and the negativity of positivity. This school of thought 
heralded by Blankenburg and applied to the major existential disorders 
[1974; 1982; 2007] was later extended to personality disorders in gen-
eral [Dörr-Zegers 2008]. Let us take the example of hysteria to illus-
trate dialectics in its Hegelian aspect in the realm of phenomenological 
psychopathology. Positively, hysteria is a personality variant which, for 
its exaggerated and overdramatic expression, can lead to major losses 
in the interpersonal or professional field of the people for whom it is a 
marked characteristic. Failing to observe the social norms prescribed 
for social situations, people with hysteria break the rules of the human 
game to their own detriment. However, the same overly flexible way 
people with hysteria adopt their social roles that may make them un-
able to forge deeper relationships can, from a negative perspective, be 
understood as creative irreverence towards social impositions, enabling 
them to act with a certain existential freedom [Messas et al. 2018]. A 
possible synthesis, at a higher level, between the positive and negative 
aspects would be to merge the creativity of hysteria with its apparent 
lack of authenticity, bringing about – albeit within certain bounds – a 
personalised, independent existence. Hegelian dialectics as interpreted 
by Blankenburg and Kraus alerts us to the need to take into account the 
ambiguities of psychological reality [Moreira 2016]. The notion of am-
biguity brings an important contribution to treatment strategies, since it 
opens the way for the therapist to search in the very core of the patient’s 
experiences for his/her recovery pathways. Thus, to continue with the 
example of hysteria, the psychopathologist would seek to heighten the 
creative aspect of the experiences of hysteria, working psychologically 
with the patient to find a way of bringing it effectively into their exist-
ence. Knowledge of the negativity of positivity puts a healthy restric-
tion on the breadth of the therapeutic plane, directing the psychological 
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work towards what the patient already has, negatively, within them-
selves. This knowledge could, in cases of hysteria for instance, prevent 
working towards curbing the patient’s expressiveness.
However it seems to us that some progress could be envisaged in 
working through the particulars of these existential indeterminations, 
better detailing the features of dialectical essentialism and showing how 
it allows for a reshaping of the notion of essence and thereby supplies the 
means for forging more refined clinical practice, as we will see later on.
2.2. Proportional dialectics
The second use of dialectics made by Blankenburg is of especial inter-
est here because it is the one that will guide this contribution. When 
wondering about the scope of dialectical perspective in psychopatholo-
gy, the author proposes a solution that provides some workable catego-
ries which, if taken to their logical conclusion, do not only enable the 
immanent movements of existence to be observed, but pave the way 
for extending phenomenological therapy to a synthesis of psychological 
and biological therapies [Tamelini & Messas 2017]. It is not a matter of 
a new use in the history of phenomenological psychopathology; rather, 
it is a use whose founder is Binswanger and which is manifest in the 
notion of anthropological proportion [Blankenburg 1982]. This notion 
inspired the first of Binswanger’s three famous essays, brought togeth-
er in his Three Forms of Failed Existence (Drei Formen missglückten 
Daseins) [1956]. In this work, which served as a key inspiration for the 
theses of Blankenburg and of the first author of this article [Messas 
2004; 2010b; 2014], the Swiss psychiatrist proposes that human essence 
should be perceived through different anthropological dimensions that 
interact proportionally to one another. For example, schizophrenia and 
schizotypal conditions are vertical distortions of existence, where the 
verticality of individual ambitions is out of proportion to the horizon-
tality of shared experiences. Thus, all human experience could be treat-
ed from the perspective of an interplay of forces in dynamic states of 
proportion and disproportion. The relative proportion of verticality and 
horizontality or of natural evidence versus a lack thereof [Blankenburg 
2012] in the case of schizophrenia, or of the past in relation to the future 





in the case of melancholy [Tellenbach 1983], or of self-determination 
in relation to freedom in the aforementioned case of hysteria, are a few 
examples of polarities operating in different proportions. The simulta-
neous observation of existential dimensions in their relations of pro-
portion determines a global structure that is greater than the sum of its 
parts. Thus, one could start out by saying that the notion of essence in 
psychopathology could be abandoned – which could ultimately lead to 
calls by anti-psychiatry for the negation of all mental disorders – and 
its complete substitution by the notion of structure. By such a method, 
phenomenology brings dialectics closer to the idea of structure, con-
solidating itself in structural phenomenology [Barthélémy 2012] and 
rejecting the notion of norm or essence [Töpfer 2013].
By understanding existence as anthropological proportion, phe-
nomenological psychopathology is able to examine each clinical case as 
if the relative participation of each partial pre-reflexive dimension were 
articulated between each other and were in motion at every moment of 
consciousness. For instance, examine what proportion of past, present 
and future exists in an experience of melancholia or what proportion of 
self-determination and external determination exists in experiences of 
schizophrenia. This perception of dialectics is not designed to record 
existential movements through a specific synthesis of positivity and 
negativity, but through arrangements of equilibriums in an imprecise 
individual architecture marked by uncertainty. The possible participa-
tion of negativity in this second dialectic model lies in the inclusion of 
temporality and not in the specific ambiguity inherent to each case of 
positivity. Obviously, the two conceptions of dialectics that phenome-
nological psychopathology encompasses are not mutually exclusive; in-
deed, they feed into one another naturally, merely modulating the main 
object of knowledge. Thus, to return to the model of hysteria sketched 
out earlier, the model of proportion would focus on how much closer 
a person with hysteria in a given situation would be to representing a 
social role conventionally or otherwise, casting a free creative aspect 
on it. Likewise, to take another example, it would be concerned about 
the proportion to which a person with schizophrenia in a given situa-
tion at a particular moment of existential distortion was lost in herself 
or taking part in her community of sense. The examples are infinite. 
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What we want to make clear here is that this model of a dialectics of 
proportions allows one to reshape one’s understanding of the patient 
as a whole at any time, since their anthropological proportions will be 
redesigned the whole time. Every state of anthropological proportion 
expresses a meaning for existence and, in turn, every existential mean-
ing is expressed through an anthropological proportion. As existence is 
immanent movement, the heuristic method of dialectical proportions is 
the most suitable for addressing an individual life. It is mainly because 
of this last attribute – i.e., because it is so useful for recognising a pa-
tient’s individuality – that we defend the use of this model as the main 
phenomenological instrument for diagnostic and (as we will see below) 
therapeutic purposes. As we see it, at this stage in the history of psy-
chopathology, we can no longer content ourselves with a general inter-
pretation of a pathological experience (which more often than not is an 
interpretation picked up from something that has already been thought 
of; not that there is anything dishonourable in picking something up, 
since we are, after all, referring to the anthropological fundamentals of 
humankind), but must see how this generality presents in particulari-
ties [Stanghellini 1997; Messas 2014]. It is precisely this that we intend 
to do in the coming pages. But in doing so, it is essential to examine 
more closely the abovementioned notion of essence of the psychopatho-
logical experience, since, if we take what we have just said to its logical 
conclusion, it would mean discarding the notion of an essence of a dis-
order from the field of psychopathology. Does knowledge of dialectical 
proportions give us the right to take such a decision without hesitation? 
We would argue that it does not: maintaining the notion of essence is 
fundamental for the science of psychopathology. Indeed, we would hold 
that the way the notion of psychopathological essence is conceived is 
decisive for a complete understanding of psychopathological findings 
and, more importantly for the thrust of our argument, that it determines 
distinct therapeutic objectives. What we will seek to demonstrate is 
how, in order to maintain the heuristic and anthropological vigour of the 
notion of psychopathological essence, its conception must be renewed. 
We will illustrate this thesis briefly with the notion of melancholia.





3. Redefining the notion of psychopathological essence – melancholia 
as an example
The quest for the essence of melancholia has led to different results 
in the history of phenomenological psychopathology. Melancholia has 
been understood as depersonalisation [Gebsattel 1966], a collapse of 
temporality with consciousness being restricted to the past [Minkowski 
1999], an invasion of the future in the past [Binswanger 1960], the ex-
cessive corporealisation of experience [Stanghellini 2004], a disordered 
corporeality [Dörr-Zegers et al. 2017] or intercorporeality [Fuchs 2013], 
an excessive submission to social identity [Kraus 1977], or a compro-
mised existential feeling, the pre-reflexive layer of existence that under-
pins all emotional experiences [Ratcliffe, 2015]. All these interpreta-
tions, perhaps with the partial exception of Kraus (who is interested in 
comparing melancholia with obsessions [2007a] and hysteria [2007b]), 
stress the core aspect of melancholia, or its essence, even if this is identi-
fied in different parts of the fundamentals of existence, like time, space, 
embodiment, social identity or individual freedom.
Our contribution draws on these authors’ observations by seeking 
to link the notion of essence to a proportional dialectical procedure. Its 
focus is no longer just on the essence of melancholia, but also on its 
anthropological meaning; i.e., the way it is composed and manifested. 
As the essence of a pathology is not an entity that inhabits a Platon-
ic world – like the imagination of a triangle or number – it should be 
recognised in the concrete, individual reality of clinical cases, or «ex-
periential essences» [Berrios 1989, 427]. This recognition leads to a 
first, albeit incomplete, definition for the purposes of this paper: that the 
essence of each psychopathological experience is a typical proportion 
of anthropological dimensions, which may be approached via differ-
ent anthropological categories, such as the ones mentioned above. For 
instance, from a temporal perspective, the essence of melancholia is a 
lack of proportion between the relative value of the past to the present 
and future. However, this definition does not have a broad enough scope 
for our purposes here, because a case of sadness or grief may have sim-
ilar features – the temporal predominance of the past over the future. 
The anthropological meaning of the psychopathological essence has to 
be determined more precisely. The emergence of the psychopatholog-
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ical essence is directly linked to the loss of dynamic of the existen-
tial dialectic. In existential moments when this disproportion is fixed 
enough for it to be diagnosed by a psychopathologist, then melancholia 
is at play. As the immanent, spontaneous dialectic of the anthropologi-
cal proportions moves the equilibrium of its parts, existence may return 
to a path of more flexible interplay of times, bringing about a varying 
preponderance of the past, present and future in existence as a whole. 
When this happens, we can no longer talk of a psychopathological state, 
because future, present and past interrelate flexibly with one another. 
A great inspiration for this understanding is to be found in the work of 
Cutting, who establishes for melancholia (which he refers to generally 
as “depression”) an essential definition that does not dispense with the 
incorporation of its constitutive dialectic elements. In line with his in-
spiration on the work of German philosopher Max Scheler, Cutting pro-
poses that the essence of depression is a lack of proportion between an-
imal instincts and the intellect, with the former gaining predominance 
over the latter [Cutting & Musalek 2015].
It is very important to underline the meaning of the affirmation 
that the essence of a disturbance is a relatively stable form of dispro-
portion, i.e., a typical style of disproportion cognisable by an act of 
eidetic intuition [Kraus 1999b]. Some examples could help elucidate 
this statement, which is central to the argument presented here. Let us 
return to the essentialist acceptations of melancholia presented above, 
focusing for practical purposes on a single classic case. Minkowski 
states that melancholia is an inhibition of time [1995], an erosion of 
the future, resulting in consciousness being overwhelmed by the past. 
All experiences of the present are tinged with the past, with certainty, 
with listlessness; they can no longer be transformed even by any new 
facts coming from the future; the patient is convinced that the future 
reserves nothing more than eternal suffering that they deserve because 
of past errors. According to the dialectics of proportions, Minkowski is 
absolutely right. However, there is a flaw in his identifying melancholia 
essentially with a loss of future time. The proportional dialectical per-
spective would say that Minkowski’s patient is, at this time of her life, 
so paralysed that the disturbance of future time can be seen fully. If 
they were mentally healthy, their anthropological proportions would be 





mobile enough for them not to fix on one essential state. The temporal 
essence of the disorder is thus the outcome of a paralysis or slowing 
down of the natural becoming of existence.3 Outside psychopathologi-
cal – or quasi-pathological – states, the immanent movement of exist-
ence prevents psychopathological essences from forming, because the 
essence of a normal experience like nostalgia or anger is less visible, 
and should be denominated as a proportional existential formation. The 
less prevalently an experiential essence manifests in consciousness – 
and thus the more visible its proportional composition – the healthier 
the existence is.
Under normal conditions, proportional formations gradually dis-
solve and do not paralyse our vital becoming. (This statement should 
not, however, be mistaken for some people who are guided through life 
by anger towards someone. In this case, from an existential viewpoint, 
there is nothing psychopathological at play, since the anger has become 
a guiding thread for life.) By its very immanence, existential becoming 
is always constituted by the reproportioning of the different anthropo-
logical modes that can be experienced in terms of proportions. All ther-
apeutic action is therefore directed towards a regime of proportions and 
disproportions (including here, in more severe cases of schizophrenia, 
proportion between psychotic experience and the rest of the patient’s 
personality [Blankenburg 2012]). As a psychopathology is ultimately a 
paralysis of existence that is stable enough for a pathological essence 
to emerge in a certain point of existence, it could be stated that melan-
cholia is an essence composed of more than one mode of anthropolog-
ical proportions, which could also justify the diversity of therapeutic 
outcomes. Thus, melancholia could be experienced by one person as 
their being too tied to the past, which understanding would foreplay a 
paralysis of temporal anthropological proportions; it could likewise – 
and without ceasing to be categorised as melancholia – be constituted 
of an excessive observance by the global identity of one of the partial 
roles (i.e., disproportion between personal identity and social identity) 
[Ballerini 2008], or, from a spatial perspective, be experienced as a lack 
of availability of the objects of the world for their activation [Tellenbach 




1956] (i.e., disproportion between objects experienced as instruments 
and objects experienced as things).
This way of identifying the essence of psychopathologies with fixed 
styles of anthropological disproportion is not, however, without its prob-
lems. One might object that if an essence is to be defined this way, it 
should no longer go under such a name, since an essence is by definition 
irreducible, something ultimate that sets apart and defines a phenome-
non. This raises the issue of the ontological status of psychopathological 
entities: either the notion of pathological essence would have to be re-
defined or it would have to be given up altogether. This begs a question: 
Is there anything similar in the different experiences of melancholia 
proposed by the classical and contemporary authors that unites them, 
allowing for the notion of an essence of melancholia? Or should we 
give up the notion of a psychopathological essence and thus return to 
classificatory operationalism [Parnas & Gallagher 2015], restricting the 
definition of disorders to a syndrome-based collection? Or should we 
understand the essence of a disorder ideally, in the Platonic sense of 
the word – ante rem (or fully) realism, according to medieval ontology 
– which would ultimately lead to a sceptical nominalism [Oulis 2008], 
but now not syndrome-based but essence-based? Neither a real ideal 
essence (Platonic) nor the exclusive individuality of the proportions 
seems to offer a satisfying answer to this ontological issue. What would 
remain of any imaginative variation of phenomena that might justify 
identifying the essence of melancholia? Is there any essence in the ex-
perience of melancholia or are there just ideal types [Fernandez 2016] 
or typical anthropological proportions, as Binswanger would appear to 
propose in his “Three Forms”? Clinical experience consolidated over 
the years would, however, lead us to sustain that it is possible to recog-
nise the essence of melancholia. One possible solution for this apparent 
impasse may lie in the importance of the notion of essence as formu-
lated by Scheler [Cutting 2009]. Cutting, following Scheler – who to a 
certain extent follows the Aristotelian conception of essence – suggests 
that «[i]t is the coming together of the phenomenon and the idea [of the 
phenomenon] at the same time which confers the essence of anything, 
and not the idea on its own» [Cutting 2012, 304, emphasis added]. The 
notion of essence of itself, from this perspective, loses its nature of com-





pleteness and comes to be understood as a Skizze, or sketch: vague and 
defined by its negativity – i.e., it needs some element from outside itself 
to be introduced before it can be complete. According to this concep-
tion, essence becomes a sort of incomplete a priori virtuality. Some re-
flections stem directly from these observations. The first has to do with 
the vagueness of the notion of essence: it should not be taken as making 
it impossible to identify, but as its tendency not to appear in its totality, 
as Merleau-Ponty teaches us when he speaks of the impossibility of a 
complete reduction of phenomena [1945]. Negativity is constitutive of 
the very notion of essence. This negativity of an essence that would 
complete it could be exemplified in the case of melancholia. The observ-
er’s capacity to identify the essence of a psychopathology depends, al-
beit tacitly, as mentioned above, on the combination of the a priori idea 
she has of melancholia – apprehended from years of clinical practice – 
and the psychopathological facts before them, to which she necessarily 
belongs, as a co-constitutive element. Only when both are present is the 
essence of melancholia completed and can we consider it a pathologi-
cal experience. This assertion has some crucial consequences for the 
construction of psychopathology and a phenomenological therapeutic 
practice, because it includes the scientist-observer not just in defining 
the essence, but also, and even more importantly, in actually activating 
and being part of the essence. The cognisant, scientific movement of the 
observer is thus completely active and objective in the constitution of 
the essence itself.4 Let us return to an example, considering the compre-
hension of melancholia as just a restriction of identity roles. The experi-
ence of sadness and lack of motivation reported by a patient is nothing 
in psychopathological terms until such a time as the psychopathologist 
is capable of experiencing in herself some idea or feeling that actualises 
this form; e.g., until the moment when the psychopathologist does not 
just see through the lens of eidetic intuition the paucity of the patient’s 
social identities, but actually experiences it in her own professional 
identity. In this sense, there is absolute validity in Rümke’s [1941, 337] 
statement that «[t]he doctor’s internal attitude induced by the patient is 
4  As a consequence, there is no reason to postulate that psychopathological objects 
are only ideal types [Schwartz & Wiggins 1987]. As a matter of fact, they are inter-
personally constituted existential types [Dörr-Zegers 2008].
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a very sensitive diagnostic tool, and it would be helpful if we were more 
skilled in recognizing changes in our own internal attitude». In the case 
of melancholia, for instance, the psychopathologist would feel by affec-
tive resonance the impoverishment of her own professional role, such 
as, say, her incapacity to elevate the patient’s existential creativity. It is 
at this point, and only at this point, that the presence of an essence can 
be affirmed. In medieval understanding of the Aristotelian philosophy, 
essence is treated in re, meaning that an essence is only manifested in 
the objective phenomenon to which it belongs.5 This Schelerian concep-
tion of essence, like Skizze, annuls many of the false dilemmas between 
scientific objectivism and subjectivism. An essence identified in re is 
the moment of ultimate objectivity of the psychopathologist’s knowl-
edge, because it is a co-constitutive act of an irreducible experience. 
This ontological conception of the psychopathological essence enables 
a dynamic of the diagnostic act to be established. Until such a co-con-
stitutive act takes place – which can obviously also be undertaken by 
an empathic act of someone who is familiar with, friends with or close 
to the patient – there is only the shadow of an essence and a proto-ex-
perience awaiting essential signification. Up to this point, we could talk 
about ideal types. From the moment of the co-constitutive activation 
of the essence on, we are talking about a real type of an essential/ex-
istential nature. In other words, an isolated subjective experience is an 
ontological mystification, negativity with no profound meaning. There 
is no such a thing as a complete or autonomous subjectivity.
This co-participation of the observer in the production – and not 
just the description – of the pathological essence is what justifies the 
diverse – and sometimes frankly contradictory – observations made by 
authors in the field of phenomenological psychopathology. The individ-
ual manifestations of psychopathological essences should therefore be 
understood as forms of instantiation of the psychopathological essence 
in the patient’s consciousness and their interpersonal relationships. 
This comprehension overcomes the scepticism of nominalism and 
idealism, because it permits a new understanding of variations in the 
clinical presentation of psychopathological conditions. Inter-individual 
5  Oulis [2008] called this ontological condition of psychiatric objects neo-Aristote-
lian realism. It is a sort of moderate realism, in contrast with radical Platonic realism.





psychopathological variations depend on the strength of fixation, pen-
etrance,6 degree of autonomisation [Blankenburg 2012, 169], positional 
value (Stellenwert) [ibid.], or the «[i]ntensity, energy and duration […]» 
[Binswanger 1956, 318] of the psychopathological essences. Thus, the 
fact that some people with melancholia are better understood from the 
perspective of time and others from the perspective of body or identity, 
etc., has to do with the how the observer and the observed become ex-
istentially in tune with one another – affective resonance in the sense 
proposed by Minkowski.
This state of essential intuition does not, however, last indefinitely, 
since the proposal of treatment is precisely to undo it. The end of the 
essentialist moment in the phenomenological procedure heralds the be-
ginning of the dialectic procedure. As of the moment when existential 
becoming is resumed, the formation of the essence dissolves and the 
observer’s perspective should no longer be attuned to identifying the 
essence, but to the proportions that constitute the essence. Methodo-
logically speaking, there are therefore two observational paths in a pro-
portional dialectic phenomenological conception designed to address 
the notion of essence in psychopathology. Paths which may in theory 
be different, but which often overlap. The first of them examines just 
the essence, picked up by eidetic intuition and co-constituted by the 
observer. The second heuristic path is no longer about observing the 
essence of the pathology, but the dialectic movement of anthropological 
constituents, for which the most useful heuristic concept is not essence, 
but structure and its anthropological proportions. Thus, we could say 
that the phenomenological diagnostic procedure – and the follow-up of 
therapy – follows what we would call bifocal phenomenological com-
prehension, where one of the foci observes the essential core of the con-
dition and the other observes its movement. Essence and dialectic pro-
portions are thus offered up as key instruments for the observation of 
different and sequential existential moments of life in the patient. This 
enrichment of the understanding of the essence of the psychopathology, 
leading towards a dialectic comprehension, is not, however, exhausted 
in the understanding of disturbing experiences, as we will see below.
6  Di Petta calls this phenomenon the pervasiveness of the pathology [2010, 266].
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4. Conclusions: Implications for building a therapeutic strategy
The renewal of the notion of an essence of a disorder by introducing 
its dialectic proportions also breathes new life into the comprehension 
of treatment. Treating is no longer just about returning psychic life to 
a state of subjective well-being, which is generally identified with the 
suppression of the essence of the disorder – something that is not always 
possible, as can be seen from the great number of unsatisfactory ther-
apeutic outcomes in mental health – but crucially about bringing about 
a new balance between anthropological proportions; a balance which, 
while it may follow technical precepts that are fairly well established in 
therapeutic terms, depends greatly on the particular conditions of the 
anthropological fundamentals available. Thus, curing is not a case of 
suppressing – whether partially or completely – an essentially patholog-
ical state, but gradually reinstating proportion to the forces in simulta-
neous dialectic contact. This reproportioning may be observed through 
more than one dialectic category, enabling the treatment to be guided 
by more profound anthropological criteria. For instance, a person with 
melancholia may make some progress at the beginning of treatment 
through pharmacological means, but may quickly relapse because of 
their incapacity to enrich their excessively poor performance of social 
roles. In this case, the initial pharmacological intervention will have re-
constituted them temporally and spatially by boosting vitality, but will 
not have reached the kernel of their identity. Dialectic recognition of 
their insufficiently flexible capacity to play social roles could be used 
to guide the therapy towards identity reconstruction [Kraus 1999a], a 
step that requires more cautious measures and takes longer to mature. 
Pursuing treatment in proportional dialectic terms means focusing the 
gaze on how new anthropological proportions emerge as the essence of 
the disorder is gradually left behind – or on how the sticking force of the 
essence of the disturbance prevents a structural evolutionary modifica-
tion [Messas 2004]. Thus, following up the therapeutic process means 
identifying which anthropological proportions emerge as the essence 
of the pathology gradually disappears. This observation will lead to 
different meanings for clinical recovery. For instance, a clinical evo-
lution where improvement in temporal terms is not accompanied by a 
resumption of a social role already stabilised by the patient has a differ-





ent clinical meaning from a clinical improvement where a habitual role 
is resumed. A patient whose symptoms of melancholia improve – their 
general disposition, for instance – but who does not simultaneously con-
solidate a new social role may be at the mercy of a relapse or only lim-
ited improvement. This phenomenon is observed primarily in clinical 
situations where a patient is no longer able to execute a social role of sig-
nificance to them, such as melancholy that emerges after retirement or 
when children leave home. As the patient with melancholia holds onto 
the previous – now empty – role, their clinical improvement in temporal 
terms is actually constituted not in significant existential change, but 
just in a window of opportunity where the therapist can search, togeth-
er with the patient, for a new role. The whole initial period when their 
overall disposition is improved can be understood as no more than a 
tool for transition to the establishment of a new role, and should there-
fore not be understood as a cure in its deepest sense. The establishment 
of treatment in terms of dialectic proportions is, we believe, the main 
challenge to phenomenological psychopathology and its technical arm, 
phenomenological psychiatry, at the current time. Investigations into 
essences have already yielded significant and potentially unsurpassable 
work on their general form. However, the restriction of the conception 
of essence to an idealistic ontology has had the unintentional outcome 
of blocking the way to a better diagnostic conception and thus better 
therapeutic procedures. The strategic observation of the details of the 
interplay of anthropological proportions arranged structurally in dialec-
tic relations still offers vast, as yet untapped potential, identifying the 
different alternatives for restructuring anthropological proportions in 
interaction with psychopathological essences.
We would like to thank Dr. John Cutting for his reading of the draft of 
this paper.
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Abstract
Phenomenological psychopathology is an elaborated form of empirical science that 
aims to provide the basis for pragmatic therapeutic objectives, without failing to 
consider intimate links with phenomenological philosophy. This article seeks to fea-
ture two concepts from psychopathology of a philosophical origin which, in their 
strict application to psychopathology, could be of considerable value for diagnostic 
purposes and for the introduction and follow-up of therapeutic strategies: the no-
tions of dialectics and essence. There are two main technical uses of dialectics in 
phenomenological psychopathology, both of them drawing especially on the work 
of Blankenburg: Hegelian dialectics and proportional dialectics. Hegelian dialectics 
focuses on the dynamics of transformation of existence by analysing the positivity of 
negativity and the negativity of positivity; proportional dialectics focuses on the an-
thropological proportions of existence, seeking to establish the relative participation 
of partial pre-reflexive dimensions like temporality, spatiality, embodiment or iden-
tity in any psychopathological entity. The conception of proportional dialectics leads 
to the need to redefine the notion of an essence of psychopathological entities, now 
defined as a relatively stable form of disproportion. Clinical examples are offered. 
As a consequence, we define phenomenological procedures as constituting a bifocal 
comprehension, where one of the foci observes the essential core of the condition and 
the other observes its movement. Essence and dialectic proportions are thus offered 
up as key instruments for the observation of different and sequential existential mo-
ments of life in the patient. We conclude by showing some practical consequences of 
the use of these concepts in phenomenological psychopathology.
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OUTLINE OF CLINICAL PHENOMENOLOGY  
FOR EATING DISORDERS INSPIRED  
BY MERLEAU-PONTY’S PHILOSOPHY
taBle oF CoNteNtS: 1. Introduction; 2. The phenomenology of the body in 
Merleau-Ponty; 2.1. The body as a primordial habit; 2.2. Being and having 
a body: necessary ambiguity and balance; 3. The body schema: the architec-
ture of corporeality; 4. The power of flesh: a deepening of corporeality; 4.1. 
(In)visibility and invasion: the body incrusted in the flesh; 4.2. The mirror 
phenomenon as an extension of the relationship with the body; 4.3. The incor-
poration power of flesh; 5. Conclusion.
1. Introduction
When psychiatrists identified that philosophical phenomenology enabled a new approach to clinical attitude interest in philosoph-
ical phenomenology was aroused. Thus, as of the 1920s, the clinical 
field began to be investigated and expanded, initially inspired by the 
contributions of Husserl and Heidegger. Psychiatrists such as Karl Jas-
pers, Ludwig Binswanger, Eugene Minkowski, Medard Boss, Erwin 
Strauss, Viktor von Gebsattel, Hubertus Tellenbach, Arthur Tatossian, 
among others, understood and used phenomenology to better under-
stand mental disorders. Thus, clinical phenomenology rapidly devel-
oped out of the desire for an open ‘dialogue’ between phenomenology 
and psychiatry [Dastur 2014].
The option to use the term clinical phenomenology derives from a 
theoretical and practical point of view, combining two dimensions that 
are not clearly associated. On the one hand, phenomenology is a specif-
ic philosophical field that can cover several domains due to its breadth, 
methodological potential and diversity. On the other hand, clinic practice 
corresponds to the ‘psy’ domain (psychiatry, psychopathology, psycholo-
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gy and psychotherapy) and interaction with the individuals who struggle 
with their existence and illness. Philosophical phenomenology is used as 
an inspiration, providing clinical tools for a better understanding of dif-
ferent pathological experiences and clinical interventions that contribute 
to the improvement of those who struggle with these experiences. It pro-
vides us with directions and sources to uncover and understand the phe-
nomena as well as being present at the clinical meetings.
Most of the work in phenomenological psychopathology is focused 
on psychoses, particularly schizophrenia. However, we consider that 
philosophical phenomenology serves as an inspiration for an original 
and critical approach to clinical phenomenology when dealing with eat-
ing disorders. We believe that the philosophy of Merleau-Ponty, taken 
as a point of reference in this article, brings significant contributions 
that surpass the philosophical field and contribute to the clinical field 
in a fruitful and diverse way. Following the same lines of Husserl and 
Heidegger, who have traditionally inspired clinical phenomenology, we 
believe that Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenology is a powerful tool for un-
derstanding eating disorders.
Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenology is a source of inspiration for the 
clinical treatment of eating disorders mainly because of his contribu-
tions to the notion of body, providing a framework for the reflection and 
‘expansion’ of the concept. The formulation, but also disruption, that 
Merleau-Ponty establishes between the notion of the body and other 
notions, such as those of body and flesh image, invites us to investi-
gate further and, as far as possible, achieve the unity of his thinking. 
Our hypothesis is that Merleau-Ponty’s work may be an essential tool 
for understanding eating disorders, since it allows us to address both 
the subjects’ sensitive experience and the mundane constitution of their 
experience. His approach may be a primary tool for understanding the 
body experience in the carnal tissue of our existence.
The aim of this article is to propose an outline of clinical phenome-
nology for eating disorders inspired by the philosophical phenomenolo-
gy of Merleau-Ponty. We first describe the phenomenology of the body, 
showing how the discussions about habit and ambiguity between being 
and having a body can contribute to elucidate eating disorders. Next, 
we discuss the notion of the body schema as the one that reveals the 
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architecture of corporeity and organization of the particular way of be-
ing a body in eating disorders. Finally, we explore the notion of flesh to 
further investigate corporeality in eating disorders through three funda-
mental elements: (in)visibility and invasion, mirror and incorporation.
2. The phenomenology of the body in Merleau-Ponty
The word ‘body’ has many meanings that will depend on the frame-
work used as reference and its use changes according to associated 
cultural and historical elements. Investigating the body involves dif-
ferent sciences that use their own techniques and modes of expression, 
including methods and epistemologies to study sensations [Corbin et. 
al. 2005]. The work of Merleau-Ponty occupies a central place in the 
phenomenological discussion about the body and addresses several no-
tions in his work, such as the body, the lived body or even corporeality, 
emphasizing the experience of the body, from a perceptive, but also 
sensitive, perspective. In relation to the body schema and body image – 
widely used notions in psychiatry and neurology – Merleau-Ponty gives 
them specific status when he recognizes their role in organizing (inter)
body experience. It seems, therefore, that Merleau-Ponty’s philosophi-
cal intent is relevant and rich because it gives the body a role that allows 
it to overcome attempts of objectification by involving it extensively in 
experience. It is a «process of subjectivation of the human being that is 
part of the structure of the body» [Sichère 1982, 202].
2.1. The body as a primordial habit
In the works of Merleau-Ponty, habit is recurrent. In the Phenomenol-
ogy of Perception, habit is defined as a kind of «power we have to di-
late our being-in-the-world or to change our existence by including new 
tools» [Merleau-Ponty 2010, 827]. It is neither knowledge nor automa-
tism – «it is knowledge that is at hand, which only results from bodily 
effort and it cannot be translated into objective designation» [ibid., 827]. 
Merleau-Ponty cites several examples, such as the habit of driving or 
typing. All this includes «knowledge of familiarity» and it «invites us 
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to rephrase our notion of ‘understanding’ and our notion of body» [ibid., 
828]. We have a habit that makes familiarity possible and it belongs to 
our habit how we see things and place them in relation to ourselves and 
the world. Habit thus expresses the way of being a body in the meeting 
of our being with the world in a common dimension.
Merleau-Ponty admits the existence of a generality of our habits 
and bodily functions. Habit can be understood as our ability to expand 
in the view of what is new, but it is also the result of daily experience 
that allows us or not to give it customary, habitual meaning. We may say 
that there is positivity with expansion, with the opening of possibilities, 
but also negativity when we are stuck in a habit and when it becomes the 
only possible way for us. Body functions are the way to relate to objects, 
expressing a movement of existence [Merleau-Ponty 2010].
The act of eating is an early acquired generality and it can change 
throughout life; it is simultaneously a habit and a bodily function. How-
ever, these two dimensions can also change. The non-recognition of a 
body function, for example, does not allow the development of a habit 
because there is no movement, as we can see, for example, in patients 
with anorexia who deprive themselves from the act of eating and disre-
gard their functions as a vital element to exclusively focus on the body 
as an object. Over time, the habit of everyday eating is lost, which tends 
to hinder the habitual, and necessary, act of eating. In cases of hyper-
phagia, the centrality of the act of eating, evidenced by the function it 
exerts on the life of these people, (re)creates habits, changes the way of 
functioning of an individual who cannot refrain from eating.
There is a dialectic movement between habit and body function 
which, in the case of eating disorders, is often altered or unbalanced. 
It is the distancing between how one relates to the body, the act of eat-
ing as a movement of existence, and the constitution of a style through 
habits that are developed throughout life. Eating surpasses nutritional 
function and, over a lifetime, habits are created and recreated. Bodily 
functions play a role in intentional meaning for the world, and in this 
case for food, making it possible to develop a habit. Habit allows the 
flow of these bodily functions and makes the way of being effective, an 
existential style. If the habit is the communion of an act and knowledge 
shows us a personal style [Saint Aubert 2013], which is also constructed 
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in the world, the act of eating goes beyond a simple behavior in that it 
also carries a personal style built by «knowledge» imposed on and ex-
posed by the subject and the world. As we are our body, we (re)live our 
daily habits full of meanings and (im)possibilities, constantly between 
change and permanence. The eating acts evoke, in their indispensable 
daily presence, the movement of the own existence.
2.2. Being and having a body: necessary ambiguity and balance
Approximately ten years before defending his thesis, in 1945, and in-
fluenced by Gabriel Marcel [Saint Aubert 2005], Merleau-Ponty writes 
about a body that cannot be neither as an object nor as a set of qualities 
and characteristics. In considering that «I am my body», Merleau-Ponty 
emphasizes a body in which we make common cause, going beyond 
something we only have. It is a perspective between what I have and 
what I am, because «if my body is more than an object that I possess, 
it can no longer be said that it is myself: it is on the border of what I am 
and what I have» [Merleau-Ponty 1997a, 39], at the limit of being and 
having. Merleau-Ponty sees a movement between «being» and «hav-
ing» that defines the human condition. While it is my body, it is not like 
that of others. It is an ambiguous being, a thing that is, at the same time, 
ours and something that we are [Barbaras 2005].
The body itself has its «particular mode of existence» [Barbaras 
2008, 69] in addition to an objectification. The body itself is our body 
and it is in the sense of intimacy with the body that we live with, feel 
and experience it as our own. Merleau-Ponty proposes a phenomenol-
ogy of the body itself which emphasizes the ambiguous reality of the 
body that is both sentient and sensible, object and subject, the one that 
feels and is felt. The term body itself is ambiguous, for it is at the same 
time a body like the others (Körper), but it is also a lived body (Leib) 
that distinguishes itself from those of others by highlighting the lived 
experience in a body dwelling. This line of thought is present in a sig-
nificant way in several later works of Merleau-Ponty and it eventually 
leads to the distinction between the object body and the subject body.
By living in the first person, the subject body guides the experience 
of the body, the lived experience in its sensitive, particular and spa-
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tio-temporal dimension incarnated in the world, a body set in motion by 
intentionality and subjectivity. The object body, however, refers to the 
«way of being of a thing» [Dupond 2007, 38], which can be dissected, 
studied by sciences, and observed by others and by ourselves. The body 
itself is necessarily both subject and object. However, Merleau-Ponty 
considers that «the distinction of subject and object is scrambled in my 
body» [Merleau-Ponty 1960, 166]. There is an inversion and constant 
scrambling of the subject and object roles in the body [Barbaras 2005, 
207]. Ambiguity rooted in bodily life may seem natural, particularly if 
we consider the balance between what we have and what we are. How-
ever, an imbalance may exist and open space for psychopathological 
experiences.
The relationship between the body and food is complex, since for 
man the act of eating has a meaning that goes beyond food itself and 
it is rooted in the body itself. There is always a «personal» position in 
relation to eating, which means that each of us has a particular style 
resulting from our relationship with the world, with others and with our 
own food.
Understanding eating disorders as a «form of existence» [Mer-
leau-Ponty 2010, 787], whose body is expression, in the anorexic ex-
perience, one could argue that the object body is in evidence. The act 
of eating is related to body changes, to the possibility of the subject 
gaining weight and how others see it: it is the body for others. Although 
the individual is hungry, eating is a threat and it is not always a desired 
event. Hunger itself is imposed by the individual onto herself, it is a 
necessity whose implications go beyond necessity itself. In anorexia, 
experiencing hunger and struggling against it prevents it from being 
sufficient to force the act of eating. Being hungry or not is not a choice 
that the individual can constantly control. When the individual eats, 
she «confronts herself with the otherness of what she is not» [Legrand 
& Taramasco 2016, 310], because it is a demand that she does not want 
to be subjected to. It can be said that the experience of eating, or even 
of feeling hunger, is experienced by the subject body and «inevitably 
places the individual before the other» [ibid., 311], it is an experience 
that is present from birth. The action of not eating enough in anorexia 
demonstrates the symbolic role of eating and the threat that goes beyond 
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its nutritional value. In addition, in more severe cases, there is a distor-
tion of one’s own body image. The imbalance between the subject body 
and the object body seems to create this distortion, a distance, between 
the body as it is seen and the one that perceives it and it is the symbol of 
ambiguity of the body and its mundane constitution. Evidence is placed 
on the present object body and the subject body, but it is discordant be-
cause the way others see it plays a growing role.
In the case of hyperphagic experience, we might suggest that there 
is a momentary suppression of the body itself. The individual loses con-
trol over the act of eating and intensity lives with the desire to eat. There 
is a kind of short circuit in the bodily experience that consists of an im-
balance between the subject body and the object body. On the one hand, 
there is a difficulty in experiencing bodily feelings due to the distancing 
from the lived body as well as from others. The individual momentarily 
loses connection and contact with others and herself, which would favor 
possible control over eating. The act of eating becomes a necessity, an 
urgent need to eat immediately. The revival, then, of the object body is 
the possible feeling of guilt often experienced. It exists due to vulnera-
bility that emerges from how others see it or even simply from the im-
minence of how others see it in its anthropological dimension: «eating 
behaviors are loaded by the images of the body and the images of the 
world» [Charbonneau & Moreira 2013, 537].
By acknowledging the ambiguity of the body, through the contri-
butions of Merleau-Ponty, one may perceive the risk of losing balance 
between the body that we are and the body that we have. In the case 
of eating disorders, original and simplified circularity of hunger-eat-
ing-satiety is not evident, and dynamics becomes the origin or even 
the indication of intense suffering. Eating disorders cannot be solely 
reduced to eating. However, if these changes refer to that experience, it 
has a meaning. Attention must be given to the body but knowing that 
this body is both a subject and an object in the world and for the world; 
it is part of a story and it plays an ambiguous role. What we have just 
described is rooted in the body itself; understanding the (un)balance 
between being and having a body seems to be fundamental for cases of 
eating disorders.
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3. The body schema: the architecture of corporeality
From the Phenomenology of Perception [2010, original 1945] to recent 
writings, Merleau-Ponty criticizes, discusses, investigates, and defines 
the notion of the body schema that has proved to be beneficial for the 
development of other concepts, such as that of the flesh. He introduced 
this notion into phenomenological philosophy [Petit 2010], which had 
only been previously used by neurologists and psychiatrists. This no-
tion became increasingly important and further investigated by Mer-
leau-Ponty, both for the definition of its theoretical course and for the 
development and consolidation of other concepts. It is an indispensable 
theoretical instrument for the development of Merleau-Ponty’s ontolog-
ical project [Verissimo 2012].
Since the beginning of his work, Merleau-Ponty distances himself 
from the cognitive definitions of the body schema as a representation 
to approach a pre-reflective, expressive understanding connected to the 
world. He considers that the body schema to be «a way of expressing 
that my body is in the world» [Merleau-Ponty 2010, 780]. The body 
schema «is related to the whole body, to all its vital dimensions, possi-
bilities of expression and relation to the world» [Saint Aubert 2013, 84]; 
the body interacts with oneself and with the world. As the role of the 
body is to organize, the body schema is, according to Merleau-Ponty, 
«the architecture of corporeality that constructs the world» [ibid., 18], 
and this happens through a relational fabric that involves the body, the 
world and others.
During the Sorbonne courses, Merleau-Ponty discusses the inter-
subjective character of the body schema. He is interested in the genesis 
of perception of the other, using different contributions from psycholo-
gy, particularly in the works of Wallon and Piaget [Saint Aubert 2013]. 
In his course Structure and conflict of childhood consciousness, Mer-
leau-Ponty argues for the existence of a unity of the body in relation 
to the world. It is a sensitive dimension lived in experience that tran-
scends our own boundaries and reaches the world. The body schema is 
«connected to the field of animal and human expressiveness» [ibid., 73]. 
From childhood, this expressiveness represents the original opening to 
the world, polarized by the relationship with others. The body schema 
is the «bearer of meanings» [Merleau-Ponty 2011, 162]. From an adap-
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tation process, the body «adapts itself to the world to transform itself 
and change the world within the same movement; body and world are 
mutually changed, composing one another» [Saint Aubert 2013, 108]. 
It is a mutual metamorphosis, a double affectation, an invasion of one 
over the other.
In his course held in 1953 on The Sensitive World and the World 
of Expression [2011], Merleau-Ponty regards the body schema as an in-
ter-bodily event. The influence of Schilder’s work on his thought has 
become important and is the framework of his philosophical position: 
«The body schema has a libidinal structure and it is deeply inhabited 
by the relationship with others» [Saint Aubert 2013, 121]. This libidinal 
structure has an important dimension that affects our relationship with 
the world. In other words, the libido is «the animating principle of the 
body schema» [ibid., 123]. This body has senses and desires. It should 
be noted that Merleau-Ponty replaces the libido with desire and insists 
on the truly relational dimension of the body schema. This evolution 
signifies an increasing association between the sensory-motor life and 
the desiring life. The explicitness of the body schema reveals a relation-
ship with itself but is associated with a relationship with others. The 
other important affective component is the establishment of a relation-
ship with others.
The audacious course proposed by Schilder seduced Merleau-Pon-
ty. For both, the body schema is never isolated; there are permanent ex-
changes, a ceaseless trade supported by its ability to “destroy and build 
itself”. Merleau-Ponty does not abandon the motor dimension that had 
become so important, especially in the Phenomenology of Perception, 
but attention to desire and the relation of the body with the world inten-
sifies as of 1953. It is the body schema that is responsible for relational 
fabric and makes the relationship with the world possible. In his courses 
on The Nature, Merleau-Ponty fully reveals his reflection on the body 
schema, on intercorporeality, and on the matter on the other. Thus, the 
progress and deepening throughout his works open new perspectives on 
the issue of eating disorders.
Returning to his 1945 thesis, Merleau-Ponty defends the intentional 
character of the body schema and emphasizes the lived dynamics, the 
experience per se. This indicates that there is lived experience of the 
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body and by the body that leads to the development of the body sche-
ma. This intentional dimension implies an openness that is built on the 
relationship between the body and the world. Meanings are produced in 
this relationship and are lived by the body. Unity does not only concern 
the body, it results from the (co)belonging of the body and the world. 
This unity does not necessarily mean harmony because it is an intense 
(co)relation in movement. This composition has dialectical tension that 
tends to establish a movement of exchanges, and the absence of this 
movement may not be, we might say, healthy insofar as it can produce 
disorganized being-in-the-world.
Although the study of eating disorders had never been the goal of 
Merleau-Ponty, his conception of the body schema can be useful for un-
derstanding eating disorders as they are considered as a kind of failure 
or even a distortion of this process of signification. The body schema is 
part of this development that is open and not limited only to the body 
itself, to the individual. Experiencing an eating disorder is associated 
with an existential operation rooted in the subject and world, body and 
world. The body schema is not a simple individual construction; the 
symptoms are not productions of an isolated subject and they cannot be 
considered as such, but rather as those which allow the revealing of the 
placement of the body in the world.
The perception of the body itself and the external perception that 
comprise our body schema cannot be singled out in eating disorders. 
Seeing the world and other bodies determines the way we see ourselves 
and the world. It is necessary, then, to go beyond behavior, without ig-
noring it, and to approach the meanings sustained by the body schema. 
Several behaviors, such as those present in the anorexic experience, for 
example, when one does not want to eat even when experiencing hun-
ger, in the bulimic experience, in which one vomits after a hyperphagic 
episode, or in the obese experience, in which there may be significant 
episodes of food intake during an episode of loss of control of the act 
of eating, seem to be sustained by the action of the body schema that 
allows the placement and organization of the body in the world. It is a 
driving force that, in this case, is not positive, it is not regulated, and it 
may lead to the suffering of the subject: it is the body schema that allows 
action. There is in fact a desire in the genesis of these ways of being, 
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even though this way of being is pathological, such as in the examples 
cited; this desire is organized, present and produced intercorporeally.
The body schema allows expressive space while including sever-
al things that become familiar through habit. Incorporating everything 
does not necessarily mean integrating well or meaning good. We en-
gage in a notion of incorporation. We are accustomed to eating from 
birth according to a process of regulation and “evolution”. But this is not 
as simple as it may seem because individuals have their own dynamics 
conditioned by necessity, but also conditioned by desire. People who 
suffer from eating disorders also have a unique way of being and it is 
the body schema that plays a significant role, it organizes itself in rela-
tion to the world and, in this case, in relation to food. The Merleau-Pon-
tian body schema is always searching for organization, balance from 
the meanings, and desire always intervenes. It organizes itself intercor-
porally in a dialectical movement between the subject and the world, 
one’s own world, and this means that eating disorders should not be 
addressed solely as (dis)organization of the body schema in the individ-
ual sphere, but as a change caused by the radical exchange between the 
subject and the world, between bodies in the plurality.
4. The power of flesh: a deepening of corporeality
The notion of flesh allows one to go «deeper into the meaning of 
corporeality» [Saint Aubert 2013, 16]. In Merleau-Ponty’s words «it is 
through the flesh of the world that one can finally understand one’s own 
body» [Merleau-Ponty 1964b, 299]. Its power is linked to its daring in 
that it signals and emphasizes the radicality of our (co)existence in the 
world and our (co)belonging. Insofar as it enables the understanding 
and deepening of the body itself, the flesh enables us to consider psy-
chopathological experiences in a broader way. It encourages us to seek 
the sources of these modes of suffering in this carnal tissue. It is the 
understanding of eating disorders that radicalizes our relationships in 
the absence of rigid boundaries between the subject, the world, others, 
and culture.
The notion of flesh becomes a concept, a fundamental ontological 
category, for Merleau-Ponty realizes the insufficiency of what is ex-
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pressed in the Phenomenology of Perception related to the unity of the 
phenomenal body and the objective body. According to Dupond [2007], 
instead of differentiating the subject body and the object body, the no-
tion of flesh allows us to escape from the sense usually attributed to the 
body, placing the flesh as common matter that ensures the inseparabili-
ty of the body that sees and the sensible world.
4.1. (In)visibility and invasion: the body incrusted in the flesh
The main reference when the discussion concerns the notion of flesh is 
the work The Visible and the Invisible, along with its notes. From the 
beginning of this unfinished work, Merleau-Ponty focuses on the visi-
ble. To the extent that the world is what we see, «we must learn how to 
see it» [Merleau-Ponty 1964a, 18], the philosopher argues. Its goal is to 
discover the meaning of being in the world. This meaning takes place in 
the world at an original intersection with the universe of others. Our be-
ing is always affected by how other people see us [Merleau-Ponty 1960; 
Saint Aubert 2013]. Our world is visual, and its field of view is an open 
and inexhaustible scope, making our lives concrete. Man is essentially 
in the world through his corporeality, that is, thanks to the mundane 
condition of the body, he has access to the world and establishes himself 
as an (in)visible being.
The flesh is chiasm as it is eminently ambiguous, leaving no room 
for dichotomies. As a «way of being» [Saint Aubert 2013, 111], the flesh 
is both a way of inhabiting the world and considering it as a «singular 
way of being a body whose most essential and existential characteristic 
is being open to others and to the world» [Saint Aubert 2016, 324-325]. 
This evokes an «experience of our condition» [Saint Aubert 2004, 201], 
instituted as a trade between ‘flesh’ – a trade constituted by the invasion 
between «I and the perceived world, between myself and others» [ibid., 
201]. As a way of expressing itself, the flesh expresses the being and it is 
animated by the desire in its body anchorage. We are in the world, with 
our body, a being of the world, that is, of the same flesh.
The notion of flesh expands the notion of body. If we mention flesh 
in this article, it is because we consider that this notion provides a better 
understanding of eating disorders insofar as it allows the recognition of 
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the radicality and the obligatory character of our insertion in the world 
in its intersubjective character. Becoming ill by experiencing an eating 
disorder is not an individual attribution, it is not simply a behavioral act, 
but a way of being in the world whose conditions are also provided by 
the world. The body in flesh does not fail to affect the world and to be 
deeply affected by it.
The body is a symbol, or a sign, of the invasion that haunts the 
body’s relationship with the world. If the phenomenal body means the 
lived experience of a subject in its body and if the objective body allows 
intersubjectivity and the double experience of being seen and of seeing, 
despite the didactic separation, they revolve around themselves or even 
mutually invade the body dynamics [Merleau-Ponty 1964a]. However, 
the violence of invasion can lead to conditions that cause an imbalance 
between the body we are and the body we have (or should have). What 
is experienced by the body (our body) is invaded by others and by the 
world that does not cease to transgress, to invade us. The invasion of 
flesh, which marks the relationship between body and world, (dis)re-
gards the own dimension of the body insofar as this alleged own dimen-
sion does not cease to be, at the same time, usurped and placed in the 
carnal ties – an inalienable, active and passive bond.
The bodily forms, the way others see us and how we see ourselves, 
the judgments, to mention just a few examples, reveal the impossibility 
of moving away from the current dynamics that places the body at the 
center of the preoccupations of the contemporary subject. Eating disor-
ders can be seen, at the same time, as a sign and result of this invasion 
that places the body as a target and produces a subject, who is often 
lost in one’s own body dynamics. To recognize this invasion, we need 
another way of seeing it, another way to understand these modes of ex-
istence in their particular dimension and identify their roots in a carnal 
fabric that transgress and mark subjectivity.
4.2. The mirror phenomenon as an extension of the relationship with 
the body
Merleau-Ponty states in his notes to the book The Visible and the Invisi-
ble that: «flesh is a mirror phenomenon, and the mirror is the extension 
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of my relation with my body» [Merleau-Ponty 1964b, 309]. This sen-
tence illustrates the recurring position he assumes in his later writings 
regarding the mirror, an image often evoked in psychoanalysis, which 
is fundamental for the concept of flesh. The mirror highlights the fact 
that the phenomenal flesh can confuse the objective body and the phe-
nomenal body. A community is established between the lived body and 
its outer image, revealing the dual condition of the flesh (of being here 
and there, in and out). We can say that, according to Merleau-Ponty, the 
flesh is a «mirror phenomenon» as it reveals our ways of being-in-the-
world and visibility sustains us and establishes (or sometimes mixes) 
the connection between the body object and the subject body.
The mirror, in fact, besides evoking the visibility of the body itself, 
introduces a problem that forces us to face our body and our relation-
ships with others and the world: it reveals the phenomenality of flesh. Of 
course, the mirror, that places us on “scene” as an “I” since childhood, 
such as Wallon, Lacan, Merleau-Ponty and many others have argued, 
continues to shape us and engage us in our condition of change, unfin-
ishedness and vulnerability throughout our lives.
Reading Wallon allowed Merleau-Ponty to understand that the body 
schema from its origin invests and is invested by other images and that 
this is revealed by the experience of the mirror [Verissimo 2012], show-
ing the proposed path for the symbolic representation of the body and its 
unification. Merleau-Ponty, however, criticizes Wallon’s dimension that 
seems to be too intellectualistic, since, in his opinion, the child in front 
of the mirror, when she can create a sense of distance from the image, 
is restructuring her experience. Merleau-Ponty sees the possibility of 
progress related to the mirror and its implications through the process of 
individualization of the body itself, associated with the reflective expe-
riences, particularly in agreement with what psychoanalysis proposed 
and the aspects defended by Lacan.
The Lacanian mirror stage indicates the process of decentralization 
of the child and, in addition, its opening to the world [Verissimo 2012]. 
This idea is convenient for Merleau-Ponty for it enables the «relation-
ship of the being with the world, with others» [Merleau-Ponty 1997b, 
204]. Thus, a narcissistic function takes place simultaneously to the 
intrusion of the other, of the world. There is tension, «a restructuring 
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of the body schema» [Merleau-Ponty 2001, 527], which demonstrates 
the importance of the mirror image in child development and learning. 
However, this goes beyond the cognitive perspective. A particular sen-
tence of Merleau-Ponty draws our attention: «Recognizing her image in 
the mirror means (the child) is learning that there can be a spectacle of 
herself [...] she becomes capable of being a spectator of herself. With the 
acquisition of the mirror image, the child perceives that she is visible to 
herself and to others» [Merleau-Ponty 1997b, 202]. This visibility tends 
to be perpetuated, lived and increasingly mixed due to the seer-seen 
ambiguity, a symbol of the flesh, of our own flesh. To be visible is also 
to be judged, valued and forced to be in a body that is in the world and 
cannot hide.
Eating disorders reveal a subject who suffers with her body, with 
her body reflected in the mirror, with her body that is still visible (to 
herself and others) and is lived as if she were not in accordance with the 
ideal body, the desired body; contemplating the body without suffering 
becomes impossible. By gaining visibility, the «body is under the ju-
risdiction of the visible», Merleau-Ponty states [2001, 527]. If the body 
is what stands out as the most visible and anchoring point in the world, 
it is constantly subject to judgments based on this visibility. However, 
what (others) see and what is seen (the body of the subject) is not only 
an impression of others on the subject and vice versa, but the result of 
our relational and cultural dynamics. This dynamic, highlighted by the 
mirror, makes it possible to understand how imbalance and confronta-
tion between the body we have and the body we are is disturbed by the 
body seen in the mirror. This body of flesh that is reflected by the mirror 
is our body, but it is also the way others see it, how the world sees it. 
The mirror reveals our carnality and eating disorders reveal the impact 
of visibility to affect the experience of seeing one’s own body. There is 
vulnerability by the visible in which the subject loses the nature of the 
body itself, which is lost between what one is and what one has.
Another important influence for Merleau-Ponty was Paul Schilder, 
a previously mentioned author in the discussion on the body schema. 
His approach to the mirror, irrespective of Wallon’s approach, and con-
sidering that he did not know the work of Lacan, considers incomplete-
ness as a permanent characteristic of the body schema that affects the 
luCaS BloC & VIrGINIa moreIra
© 2018 Thaumàzein
10.13136/thau.v6i0
outlINe oF ClINICal pheNomeNoloGy
131
structuring of identity. Thus, the concept of being a body, our body, is 
increased if we admit that incompleteness is a characteristic, which is 
to say that «being is fundamentally unfinished, which induces a secret 
correlation between being one’s body and being in the world, being for 
others» [Saint Aubert 2013, 187]. It is our «incompleteness» that fas-
cinates us before the mirror. If our body (or even the image we have 
of it) did not change, there would be no need to look at it, to look at it 
often in the mirror. We have a «craving for the mirror» [Schilder 1968, 
285]. This unfinishedness carries a weight: it deprives us from our own 
body, and it can disturb our relationship with others, with the world. In 
an unpublished manuscript, Merleau-Ponty asks the question: «Why do 
we build mirrors? To see us, to convert the seer into visible, to complete 
our body» 1 [cited by Saint Aubert 2013, 198]. The mirror pursues the 
seer-seen dynamics and leads us to the necessary attempt to complete 
an unfinished body. The subject who experiences an eating disorder is 
particularly affected and intensively lives this process, rejecting, ques-
tioning and, above all, suffering with the body and the dynamics in-
volved in eating.
In The Eye and the Spirit, after discussing the sensations evoked by 
Schilder during the observation in front of the mirror, Merleau-Ponty 
emphasizes the «game» that takes place in front of the mirror, exposing 
the flesh and the dynamics of the visible (and invisible relations). The 
«man is a mirror to man» [Merleau-Ponty 1964a, 34], he states. Follow-
ing this statement, he places the mirror as «the instrument of a universal 
magic that transforms things into spectacles, spectacles into things, I 
into others and others into me» [ibid., 34], that is, beyond an object, the 
mirror has the power to change and place the subject before herself and 
others; this incompleteness is disturbing and it highlights the mixture of 
our flesh ties. Before the mirror, there is not only us, there is not only a 
reflected object body, everything is rearranged.
Merleau-Ponty thus expands the mirror phenomenon toward a cir-
cuit of relations, of (co)belonging whose «gaze of the other is the mirror, 
other human beings are ‘a mirror to me through their bodies’» [Saint 
Aubert 2013, 197]. There is a susceptibility, even a vulnerability, due to 
1  Merleau-Ponty, M., Notes de préparation du cours (cours du jeudi, janvier-avril 
1961), in: Notes de cours 1959-1961, cours du 2 février 1961, 161.
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the condition of being a mirror of our flesh, which reveals our relation-
ship with the world characterized by our projections and introjections. 
The flesh makes everything a mirror and it becomes a mirror of others 
and the world. It is a “circular set” of meanings. The body in flesh de-
notes the subject’s complicity with the world [Zielinski 2002], that is, 
the reciprocal impact of the world on the subject and the subject on 
the world. The mirror denotes this impact and its importance in one’s 
world, our world, haunted by the others, but which demands and impos-
es both active and passive engagement. In the case of eating disorders, 
one lives a radical impact of the other’s gaze that affects the way of 
being-in-the-world and the way of experiencing one’s own body. What 
is seen in the mirror reveals not only the bodily form, but also the way 
of relating to one’s own body, to others, to food.
Undoubtedly, our eating habits are sustained by, and sustain, our rela-
tionships. There is a long journey between being nourished during child-
hood and feeding oneself later, a course that makes us able to choose, cal-
culate and control what we eat. One of its characteristics is admitting the 
body as an unfinished, constantly changing, but increasingly singled out 
and controlled subject and object. Thus, the ways of being are constructed 
in relation to the established world and lived body that must eat to (live) 
survive. A body that calls into question the eating habit, which is always 
in a certain situation. One must obviously eat, but the consequences of this 
act (or its absence) go far beyond survival – the body is in scene in move-
ment with the carnal ties that reflect this power of incorporation.
4.3. The incorporation power of flesh
The way others see us affects us, which can, for example, disturb our 
way of seeing each other, especially if we consider the power, even if 
introspective, of the other’s gaze. We can see the world and others, prob-
ably due to this perspective and with a certain projective tendency, as 
part of a circular game governed by incorporations. It is also, we must 
say, a dynamic that can change or is constantly changing in view of our 
(co)belonging and contact with others in the world. The absence of this 
openness may even be a sign of a pathological or rigid way of life in 
view of our worldliness.
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Our body would then be affected by the other, creating an interac-
tion dynamic marked by incorporation. Fuchs places incorporation as 
«an invasive characteristic of the ‘lived’ or subjective body (Leib) that 
always transcends itself and connects with the environment» [Fuchs 
2016, 198]. To the extent that he points to a mutual incorporation, he 
shows that in our relationships the lived body extends and expands the 
relationships with other bodies. In other words, the evidence of incarna-
tion manifested, above all, by the gaze, emerges from the mutual action 
of one over the other. We are mutually affected by the incarnation and 
presence of the other in the chiasmatic structure of our body, which al-
lows our incorporations. It is a body that feels, expresses, affects, and is 
affected by the other in the dynamics created by the flesh.
Merleau-Ponty assumes a phenomenological bias of incorporation 
that is different from that of psychoanalysis that places it in relation to the 
objects and its assimilation of the body, considering, mainly, the parental 
relations and the oral phase. It is, in the psychoanalytic terms, a process 
that penetrates and maintains an object within its own body, which will 
constitute an objective drive and the characteristic ways of the oral phase. 
However, it should be noted that the emphasis is not on an erogenous 
zone, as described by Freud in the first edition of Three Essays on Sexu-
ality Theory, but on the aspect of a relationship (incorporation). This rela-
tionship, often used in discussions on eating disorders, focuses on the oral 
activity and food intake, even if other areas and other functions may also 
be involved. Incorporation is brought to the level of a bodily experience, 
even though it has whimsical elements. The psychoanalytic discussion 
of incorporation was of great interest to Merleau-Ponty, who refers to it 
in the courses at Sorbonne in which he considers the psychology of the 
child. Nevertheless, its direction changes and, we may say, “incorporates” 
other elements insofar as its concept of flesh evolves and recognizes its 
incorporation power. Placing incorporation into the flesh should be con-
sidered as an expansion in the sense of placing it in a wider tissue, includ-
ing the subject, the world, others, and culture, etc. Thus, incorporation is 
rooted in the bodily life from our carnal ties.
We have the hallmarks of our incorporations at take that consti-
tute our ways of being-in-the-world, our style. With the concern of not 
overly hypostatizing, we may state that incorporation is a pathway in 
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psychopathology and, more specifically here, to the understanding of 
eating disorders. When one eats, there is an incorporation that reflects 
the constitution of this act and, concretely, the fact that an object com-
ing from outside, from the exterior, is placed inside, passes through the 
interior of the body itself: food becomes body and, in this sense, it is 
incorporated. However, this incorporation is not only at the level of the 
object body (Körper), it reaches the subject in its totality and implies its 
ways of relating with others, with the world. But is everything incor-
porated? In this active-passive game, there are rejections, and therefore 
impossibilities to receive and assimilate everything, both at the level of 
the object body and at the relational level. Incorporating all would be an 
excess and nothing to incorporate would be a lack. Thus, the imbalance 
of incorporation can lead us both to the psychopathological experience 
by overcoming its absence. Eating reveals a meaning and, in eating dis-
orders, there is excessive attention on eating (or not eating) and on the 
body that is in action. There is confusion and opposition between the 
lack of control and rigidity over eating. Suffering does not originate 
exclusively from the eating act itself, but from how it is translated into 
expressions. These expressions, these ways of being, are tied to the flesh 
that places us in this infinite notion of incorporation.
5. Conclusion
Throughout this article, we could perceive the richness of Merleau-Pon-
ty’s phenomenology for the study of eating disorders. Its phenomeno-
logical approach, traced through the body, and extending to the ways 
of organizing the body schema and the radicality of the carnal ties that 
evidence our (co)belonging with and in the world is evident in the eating 
disorders. We insist on the importance of going beyond the body with-
out abandoning it, considering Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenology within 
all its breadth, which gives broader perspective for understanding eat-
ing disorders inscribed in the structure of the body.
The outline of a clinical phenomenology for eating disorders, in-
spired by the contributions of Merleau-Ponty, sets forth the way of 
being body rooted in the world. Focusing on experience, we highlight 
the changes of the way the body experiences eating disorders that arise 
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from intersubjective dynamics. It is a bodily experience composed of 
habits revealing an objectification of the body that leads to an imbalance 
between the subject body and the object body; an imbalance which is 
(dis)organized intercorporeality on the dimension of the body schema 
and constitutes its carnality marked by (in)visibility, by the mirror, and 
by the endless notion of incorporation. These clues, which deserve to 
be further investigated with those experiencing eating disorders, can be 
followed and inspire the search for understanding the different ways of 
functioning that govern eating disorders.
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Abstract
The aim of this article is to propose an outline of clinical phenomenology for eating 
disorders inspired by the philosophical phenomenology of Merleau-Ponty. We first 
describe the phenomenology of the body, showing how the discussions about habit 
and ambiguity between being and having a body can contribute to explain eating 
disorders. Next, we discuss the notion of the body schema as one that reveals the 
architecture of corporeality and the specific organization of being a body in eating 
disorders. Finally, we explore the notion of flesh to further investigate corporeali-
ty in eating disorders. The outline of clinical phenomenology for eating disorders 
sheds light on how being a body is rooted in the world. Focusing on experience, we 
highlight the changes of how the body experiences eating disorders that arise from 
intersubjective dynamics. It is a bodily experience composed of habits revealing an 
objectification of the body that leads to an imbalance between the subject body and 
the object body. Such a bodily experience is (dis)organized intercorporeality on the 
dimension of the body schema which is present in the carnality marked by (in)visi-
bility, by the mirror, and by the endless circuit of incorporations.
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DISPOSITION: THE “PATHIC” DIMENSION  
OF EXISTENCE AND ITS RELEVANCE IN AFFECTIVE 
DISORDERS AND SCHIZOPHRENIA
taBle oF CoNteNtS: 1. Preliminary remarks; 2. Disposition, moods and the 
world; 3. Existential feelings and atmospheres in understanding affective dis-
orders.
1. Preliminary remarks
This paper aims to explore the “pathic” dimension of existence, which is both the capacity of being affected and being situated within 
moods and atmospheres. Furthermore, it will show how this dimension 
affects psychopathological phenomena, such as affective disorders and 
schizophrenia. The importance of this dimension of existence is central 
in the way we conceive life in general, since feeling and understanding 
are not separate, rather they share a kind of mutual relationship that is 
able to give us access to ourselves, to the world, and to alterity in gen-
eral. The “pathic” dimension of existence is also important in the way 
we conceive illness and in particular the so called “psychiatric object”, 
an object which can neither be defined only in terms of illness, diag-
nosis, symptoms and methodologies able to capture valid phenomenal 
distinctions concerning the patient’s experience nor, at the same time, 
can be reduced to the human organism or some parts of it; rather, the 
‘psychiatric object’ is more complex and requires further explorations, 
understanding and acknowledgement of the importance of the interplay 
between moods and atmospheres, through which human being has to be 
[Heidegger 1962].
In order to reach this goal, the first part of this paper will insist on 
the significance of Heidegger’s meditation for a phenomenological ap-





lies in his attention to understand emotions and moods, and drawing on 
key concepts of Dasein’s constitution, such as Befindlichkeit [Brencio 
2019]; particularly,
whereas Husserl had put aside questions about ontology and 
metaphysics, Heidegger made these questions the foundation for 
his investigation of human experience and action. This has been 
characterised as a shift from reflective to hermeneutical phenom-
enology […] and asked how we are to understand (i.e. interpret), 
evaluate, and finally act on what we experience. This ontological 
shift introduced questions into the phenomenological investiga-
tion. […] Heidegger does not just ask what and how we experi-
ence, but also how we feel about our experiences. Furthermore, 
the question of how we feel inevitably entails further questions 
about the nature of our feelings (ontology) and what we should 
do about them (normativity) [Stanghellini & Rosfort 2013, 206].
Although today there are still some interpreters who consider Heidegger 
as merely the “Shepherd of Being” instead of a philosopher who took 
seriously many of the issues related to human being, it is indisputable 
that his contribution to the dialogue between philosophy and psychiatry 
has been pivotal throughout the mid-50s, thanks in part to the experi-
ence of the Zollikon seminars: they were a series of seminars delivered 
between 1959 and 1969 in front of an audience of doctors, psychiatrists 
and analysts, ranging from fifty to seventy participants, from two to 
three times each semester, held within the Zollikon house of Dr. Med-
ard Boss. Certainly, Heidegger has not been the only philosopher of the 
XX century to devote his efforts to understanding human beings under 
a new light and, surely he is not the only one to propose new approaches 
to medicine, but if we consider his education – predominately theolog-
ical and philosophical, and not medical in any sense – we cannot rec-
ognise the merit of his meditation within the context of fundamental is-
sues of Western science and its implication in the wellbeing of humans. 
In his meditation and far from elaborating any new anthropology or 
psychology, Heidegger tried to investigate the fundamental structures 
of existence throughout the so-called meditative thinking (Besinnung), 




inaugurated in Being and Time, to conceptualise existence.
In the second part, this contribution will discuss how moods and 
atmospheres are of interest within psychopathology. Additionally, it in-
tends to provide a hermeneutical-phenomenological account for the role 
of affects in understanding affective disorders.
2. Disposition, moods and the world
The core concept of the pathic dimension is a pursuit that Heidegger ex-
plores during his early lectures in Freiburg, precisely during 1918-1919. 
In these years Heidegger is concerned predominately with the issue of 
life and the living being, as the typical language of Lebensphilosophie 
shows; in the lecture courses of 1918 entitled The Idea of Philosophy and 
the Problem of Worldview and Phenomenology and Transcendental Phi-
losophy Value, Heidegger insists on the supremacy of life, understood 
as pre-theoretical, over the theoretical dimension: «This primacy of the 
theoretical must be broken, but not in order to proclaim the primacy of 
the practical, and not in order to introduce something that shows the prob-
lems from a new side, but because the theoretical itself and as such refers 
back to something pre-theoretical» [Heidegger 2002, 47]. In these years 
Heidegger is interested in showing how intentional life is grounded in the 
affective, both the active and the passive aspects of intentional directed-
ness. His early project can be understood as a kind of radicalization of the 
Husserlian-Brentanian notion of intentionality, in order to demonstrate 
that the unity of intentional life at a pre-theoretical level is grounded on 
the “pathic” dimension of existence. This purpose however must be con-
sidered carefully in regard to the risk of irrationalism, a danger that the 
young Heidegger was aware of. He finds a philosophical solution that is 
able to avoid this risk whilst simultaneously preventing the grounding of 
existence on the primacy of the theoretical; this philosophical solution is 
the discovery of a “pathic” element of existence, referred to in German as 
vorweltliche (pre-worldly):
What is essential about the pre-worldly […] signifying functions 
is that they express the characters of the appropriating event, i.e. 





with experience itself, they live in life itself and, going along 
with life, they are at once originating and carry their provenance 
in themselves. They are at once preceptive and retroceptive, i.e. 
they express life in its motivated tendency or tending motivation 
[Heidegger 2002, 89]. 
This “pathic” component represents the higher potential for life, a plu-
rality of possible meanings and this «possibility arises of understanding 
life as such. Then the absolute comprehensibility of life as such will 
emerge. Life as such is not irrational (which has nothing whatever to do 
with ‘rationalism’!)» [Heidegger 2002, 164]. It means not only to rede-
fine the grounds of existence as such, but also to take a first step in the 
direction of a different approach to meaning and truth: meaning is, in 
fact, primarily disclosed pre-conceptually and pre-theoretically: «This 
pre-theoretical, pre-worldly ‘something’ is as such the grounding mo-
tive for the formal-logical ‘something’ of objectivity» [ibid.]. According 
to Heidegger, it is through moods that we can know the world in general 
and the possibility of “truth”. Whereas modern philosophy holds that 
“truth” is a function of propositional logic, Heidegger argues that it is 
a pre-predicative mood that grounds all predicative truth [Held 1993].
It will be during the lectures of 1920-1921 in the field of phenomenol-
ogy of religion that Heidegger will develop not only his own approach to 
phenomenology but also his analysis of moods and the core concept of the 
pathic element in existence. In the Phenomenology of Religious Life he 
analyses religious life starting from those elements that permeate factical 
life, such as motivations and tendencies, two formal indications used to 
analyse how theories or beliefs emerge from within life itself: «Philoso-
phy arises from factical life experience. And within factical life experi-
ence philosophy returns back into factical life experience. The concept of 
factical life experience is fundamental» [Heidegger 2004, 6-7].
Factical life experience is that in which philosophy is enacted: 
«Philosophizing […] must be viewed in its original attitudinal enact-
ment (Einstellungsvollzug)» [ibid., 40]:
Factical life experience is very peculiar; in it, the path to philoso-
phy is made possible and the turning around which leads to phi-
losophy is enacted. This difficulty is to be understood through 
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a preliminary characterization of the phenomenon of factical 
life experience. Life experience is more than mere experience 
which takes cognizance of. It designates the whole active and 
passive pose of the human being toward the world. […] The pe-
culiarity of factical life experience consists in the fact that “how 
I stand with regard to things,” the manner of experiencing, is not 
co-experienced. What belongs to cognition according to its own 
meaning must be phenomenologically isolated prior to all de-
crees that philosophy is cognition. Factical life experience puts 
all its weight on its content; the how of factical life experience at 
most merges into its content [ibid., 8-9].
The peculiarity of factical life experience lies in the fact that the how 
of experiences (relation) merges with the what (the content) and with 
another how, in which the relational meaning is enacted (enactment). 
These three directions of sense (content-, relational-, enactment-sense) 
do not simply coexist, but form the totality sensing each experience. 
Heidegger is very clear on this point:
I experience myself in factical life neither as a complex of lived 
experiences nor as a conglomeration of acts and processes, not 
even as some ego-object in a demarcated sense, but rather in 
that which I perform, suffer, what I encounter, in my conditions 
of depression and elevation, and the like. I myself experience 
not even my ego in separateness, but I am as such always at-
tached to the surrounding world. This experiencing-oneself is no 
theoretical “reflection”, no “inner perception”, or the like, but is 
self-worldly experience, because experience itself has a worldly 
character and emphasizes significance in such a way that one’s 
own experienced self-world no longer stands out from the sur-
rounding world. […] One could object that I experience myself – 
how I feel – nonetheless factically, without special reflection […] 
but this how, too, is no thoroughly formed manner of relating to 
something but a significance factically tethered to the surround-
ing world. The factical of which cognizance is taken does not 
have an objective character but a character of significance which 






Motivation is for Heidegger the way in which factical life structures and 
enacts its movement; both tendency and motivation are the structures 
that constitute the grounds of experience, the so-called «naked homoge-
neity» (nackten Gleichartigkeit). They should not be understood as two 
independent “states” or “parts” of a process, but rather as two ways of 
describing the very same process, that which establishes manifestation 
(Bekundung), providing the “directional force” behind the intentional 
phenomenon [Heidegger 2013]. 
It is in the Phenomenology of Religious Life that Heidegger makes 
an explicit reference to mood: they are what is decisive in encountering 
things and they are the means of access to the world as we comprehend 
and signify it as it is. These moods are often called by Heidegger – in 
this context – affections, recalling the Latin word affectiones. These 
moods are examined in the context of Heidegger’s reading of S. Paul’s 
letter to Thessalonians and are basically reconstructed into two funda-
mental types: the first one is the distress, the absolute concern in the 
horizon of the return of Christ (θλῖψις), and the second one is the joy of 
Christ’s love (χαρά). Distress and joy represent the fundamental condi-
tion of Christians in the early communities, during the 1st century B.C.
According to Heidegger, Aristotle is the first philosopher to have 
investigated affects (or passions, from the old Greek πάθη) and to have 
stressed how human being is constitutively a being-in, because this be-
ing is always determined by πάθη. Being-in indicates again a kind of 
situatedness, our being in an emotional state: «It is, above all, decisive 
that we lose composure, as in the case of fearing without encountering 
something in the environing world that could be the direct occasion 
of fear. In this being-a-matter-of-concern of the πάθη, corporeality is 
co-encountered in some mode or another» [Heidegger 2009, 139-140]. 
In the summer of 1924, Heidegger lectured on Aristotle’s Rhetoric, 
showing how philosophical logos and the propositional judgment of 
philosophical discourse are grounded in everyday speech, originating 
from factical existence, in which situation, affect and mood disclose the 
determination of Dasein. Affect is thus a constitutive phenomenon of 
discursive disclosure, and logos is a fundamental characteristic of the 
Dasein whose capacity for meaningful disclosure is grounded in affect. 
In the discourse we find the διάθεσις (disposition) of the listener and 
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the importance of πάθη (affects): «These πάθη, ‘affects,’ are not states 
pertaining to ensouled things, but are concerned with a disposition of 
living things in their world, in the mode of being positioned toward 
something, allowing a matter to matter to it. The affects play a funda-
mental role in the determination of being-in-the-world, of being-with-
and-toward-others» [ibid., 83].1
Nevertheless, it will be in Being and Time that Heidegger will thor-
oughly explore the role of moods and the fundamental structure of ex-
istence, disposition2 (Befindlichkeit), as an a priori constitutive part of 
Dasein’s facticity. Befindlichkeit first appears in Heidegger’s work as 
a translation of the Aristotelian notion of διάθεσις (disposition). It is 
in the years 1924-1927 that he develops a concept of disposition that 
constitutes a radicalization of Husserlian’s phenomenological approach, 
in order to provide a concrete account of a phenomenological “begin-
ning” and to offer a description of human being in terms of “living 
life”. Befindlichkeit is not a starting point in the context of Heidegger’s 
understanding of fundamental structures of Dasein, but rather a step-
ping stone on his path toward phenomenology that illuminates his rela-
tionship with Aristotle, a central point of his philosophical education.3 
1  On this theme see also Coriando 2002.
2  The word Befindlichkeit is one of the most difficult to translate in English. In the 
essay entitled Affectivity in Heidegger: Moods and Emotions in Being and Time, An-
dreas Elpidorou and Lauren Freeman provide a broad account of how Befindlichkeit 
has been translated into English by various scholars, such as ‘state of mind’, ‘find-
ingness’, ‘affectivity’, ‘disposition’, ‘attunemet’ and many others. For a detailed re-
construction of the different translations, see Elpidorou & Freeman 2015. The choice 
to translate Befindlichkeit with ‘disposition’ is due to the use of the German reflexive 
verb sich befinden, which literally means “finding oneself”. In the ordinary way of 
speaking, the colloquial sentence “Wie befinden Sie sich?” means “how is it going?” 
or “how do you feel?”, etc. In the everyday language this expression remarks the 
situation in which someone finds himself/herself situated. It is starting from this 
situated experience that the world and some entities in the world are disclosed to 
Dasein: the ‘disposition’ is both this being into a situatedness, as ontological and 
constitutive dimension, and being open to the world, keyword for the transcendence 
and to openness.
3  The lecture Phänomenologische Interpretationen zu Aristoteles: Einführung in 
die phänomenologische Forschung (Winter Semester 1921-22), the course entitled 






Disposition expresses the fact that human beings are always situated 
in a mood and always open to the world; in this sense, Befindlichkeit 
works on two levels: on one hand, it shows how Dasein is essentially al-
ways disclosed to the world, to others and to entities; on the other hand, 
it shows how Dasein is always orientated toward both a horizontal and 
a vertical axis. Every mood and every consequential feeling activates 
this double axis and illuminates Dasein’s ability to understand itself, 
its existence as Mit-sein, and its way of behaving [Coriando 2002; von 
Herrmann 2008]. Heidegger identifies three ontological features of Be-
findlichkeit: the first is that it discloses to Dasein its thrownness; the 
second is that moods disclose being-in-the-world as a whole; the third is 
Befindlichkeit implies a disclosive submission to the world, out of which 
we can encounter something that matters to us. Disposition is itself the 
existential kind of Being in which Dasein constantly surrenders itself to 
the world and lets the world ‘matter’ to it.
In his magnum opus Heidegger shows that moods play a pivotal role 
in the feeling we have of belonging to the world: moods are not an in-
tentional state directed at something, rather they are conditions of pos-
sibility for such states. This is possible because of the ontological nature 
of Dasein, whose basic state is its being situated, or in other words, its 
relationship with the world: being-in-the-world stresses the topological 
feature of Dasein, its being in a place, being situated. The situatedness 
[Malpass 2006] is a constant feature of Dasein: finding ourselves al-
ready in situatedness means finding ourselves gathered “there”, as the 
German word Da-sein (being-there4) illuminates: «By its very nature, 
Dasein brings its ‘there’ along with it. If it lacks its ‘there’, it is not facti-
cally the entity which is essentially Dasein; indeed, it is not this entity at 
all. Dasein is its disclosedness, […] ‘Dasein is its disclosedness’, means 
lecture Platon: Sophistes (Winter Semester 1924-25) are important pathways of Hei-
degger’s understanding of the Aristotelian concepts πάθη (affects) and διάθεσις (dis-
position). On this topic see Hadjioannou 2013; Volpi 1984; Brogan 2005.
4  «To translate “Dasein” as “being-there”, while it does mean that the sense of “here” 
that can be involved with “Da” is lost, nevertheless makes clear the way in which 
Dasein is indeed a mode of being that is characterized by its “there” – it is its there 




at the same time that the Being which is an issue for this entity in its 
very Being is to be its ‘there’» [Heidegger 1962, 171]. The situatedness 
is strictly related to the existence’s facticity and it manifests itself in us 
precisely through our own moods (Stimmungen): «In having a mood, 
Dasein is always disclosed moodwise as that entity to which it has been 
delivered over in its Being; and in this way it has been delivered over 
to the Being which, in existing, it has to be. ‘To be disclosed’ does not 
mean ‘to be known as this sort of thing’» [ibid., 173].
Moods are not a kind of psychological state that we experience with-
in a given world, rather they are a «background through which it is pos-
sible to encounter things in the ways that we do, as ‘there’, ‘not there’, 
‘mattering’, ‘not mattering’, ‘for this’ or ‘for that’» [Ratcliffe 2010, 128]. 
Moods have neither an ‘internal’ nor an ‘external’ phenomenology: «A 
mood assails us. It comes neither from ‘outside’ nor from ‘inside’, but 
arises out of Being-in-the-world, as a way of such Being. […] The mood 
has already disclosed, in every case, Being-in-the-world as a whole and 
makes it possible first of all to direct oneself towards something» [Hei-
degger 1962, 176]. A mood is a «background to all specifically directed 
intentional states. It is part of the structure of intentionality and is pre-
supposed by the possibility of encountering anything in experience or 
thought» [Ratcliffe 2010, 128].5 Even though moods are considered to 
be psychological phenomena, Heidegger insists on the fact that psychol-
ogy is not able to grasp the ontological importance of mood through the 
lens of an ontological perspective: «Having a mood is not related to the 
psychical in the first instance, and is not itself an inner condition […]. 
It is in this that the second essential characteristic of states-of-mind 
shows itself. We have seen that the world, Dasein-with, and existence 
are equiprimordially disclosed; and state-of-mind is a basic existential 
species of their disclosedness, because this disclosedness itself is essen-
tially Being-in-the-world» [Heidegger 1962, 176].






3. Existential feelings and atmospheres in understanding affective dis-
orders
Heidegger’s contribution in understanding one of the fundamental struc-
tures of existence is important not only in understanding why moods 
give access to the world, but also in exploring affective disorders, a field 
in psychiatric studies that is particularly problematic due primarily to 
four reasons that can be summarised as follows. Firstly, a historical one: 
for a long time, in the history of emotions the attention devoted to in-
vestigating affectivity was relegated toward elusive mental states, more 
than often reduced to either cognition or volition or simply ignored as 
epiphenomena; secondly, a methodological one: emotional theory still 
stresses the traditional introjection of feelings into an inner “psyche”, 
separated from the body as well as from the world; thirdly, an epistemic 
one: theories that aim to investigate affectivity pay the price of Carte-
sian heritage, that is the mind-body problem that does not help us to 
comprehend how emotion can be perceived and felt through the body, a 
kind of split between these two “substances”; finally, an ontological one, 
that is affectivity itself, an umbrella term under which we can consider 
different manifestations of affectivity itself: moods, feelings, emotions, 
affects, passions, and so on. As pointed out by Thomas Fuchs, 
affects are not mental states in the immanence of the subject that 
we project onto an otherwise indifferent sum of objects. Rather, 
they are modes of bodily attunement to, and engagement with, 
the lived world. It is only through our affectivity that we find 
ourselves in a meaningful environment in which persons and 
things matter for us, and in which we care for them as well as 
for ourselves. Affects are the very heart of our existence [Fuchs 
T. 2001, 613].
In the following, I will examine two categories of affectivity:6 these 
are existential feelings, and atmospheres; I will try to show how their 
changes can alter affective disorders and schizophrenia.
The expression of existential feelings as defined by Ratcliffe refers 
6  For a detailed discussion of affectivity and interaffectivity, I refer the reader to 
Berrios 1985; Fuchs 2012; Fuchs 2013.
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to «a group of feelings that are not directed at specific objects or states 
of affairs within the world […] [but] constitute a sense of relatedness 
between self and world, which shapes all experience», in that «they 
give us a changeable sense of ‘reality’ and of ‘belonging to the world’» 
[Ratcliffe 2009a, 180]. Matthew Ratcliffe has been the first one to rec-
ognise that this group of feelings has been scarcely taken into consid-
eration by philosophers, who on the contrary have focused on standard 
listed emotions, and to find their expression in literary narrative or in 
autobiographical accounts of psychiatric illness, instead of philosophi-
cal works. Moving from Heidegger’s ontology of moods, Ratcliffe de-
velops his own idea around this group of feelings; usually they «suggest 
general existential orientations, in conjunction with feelings. Some are 
quite mundane, such as feeling ‘settled,’ ‘at home,’ or ‘part of things,’ 
whereas others, such as ‘feeling estranged from everything’, convey less 
frequent and sometimes pathological forms of experience» [ibid., 181]. 
These expressions say something about an alteration in perceiving the 
sense of reality, which impacts subjectivity and interferes with intersub-
jectivity, particularly in cases of severe and major depression. Existen-
tial feelings are not intentional states with specific stimuli – such as be-
ing afraid of something, or being sad about something else – neither are 
they non-intentional feelings, rather they represent «an all-enveloping 
sense of reality and embeddedness within a shared world, a world that 
is presupposed by our more localized experiences and thoughts» [Sass 
& Ratcliffe 2017, 93]. According to Ratcliffe, existential feelings have 
a dynamic structure and are inseparable from their dispositions to act. 
Among this group of feelings there are also the feelings of freedom and 
openness, as well as the feelings of vulnerability or uneasiness, the feel-
ings of certainty and familiarity as well as the feelings of estrangement, 
reality or surreal. The body is not perceived as an object of awareness, 
but as a medium through which one’s being-in-the world is experienced 
[Fuchs 2001]. Distortion of these feelings remain unnoticed, because 
they manifest themselves primarily in the way the world appears to the 
patient. As highlighted by Stephan and Slaby [Slaby & Stephan 2008], 
existential feelings can be divided into three groups: the first group is 
made up of elementary existential feelings (such as the feeling of being 






feeling of meaningfulness) and normally they are unquestioned, even 
if this requisite is not valid in the case of psychopathological phenom-
ena when these feelings are altered; the second group is composed of 
general existential feelings (i.e. feelings of being healthy, tired, satisfied 
or empty, in harmony or disharmony with oneself) and they are part 
of everyday experiences, as well as mental disorders; the third group 
is made up by social existential feelings (such as feeling at home in 
the world and with others, feeling welcome, familiar, or feeling like a 
stranger, distant, disconnected, rejected, or isolated); this last group of 
feelings is particularly important in describing depression or schizo-
phrenia.
Another important category of affectivity is the affective atmos-
pheres, aspects of subjective or intersubjective life expressed by a 
non-intentional relation. These are feelings that do not seem to refer to 
any distinct object at all; rather, they are a kind of tonality accompany-
ing our situation in the world and they cannot be relating to anything in 
particular: «Atmospheres are indeterminate above all as regards their 
ontological status. We are not sure whether we should attribute them 
to the objects or environments from which they proceed or to the sub-
jects who experience them. We are also unsure where they are. They 
seem to fill the space with a certain tone of feeling like a haze» [Böhme 
1993,114]. Atmospheres are ineffable albeit their distinctive feature is 
that they arise in the space of between – between people, between peo-
ple and situations, between a single person and things: they recall the 
Japanese concept of aida, a being between which originates the self 
[Kimura 1992].
Atmosphere is the intermediate space between the invisible and 
what lies behind. Atmospheres tell us that “you feel something in the 
air”: they are an unfinished quality that do not have a precise and de-
termined object. Due to their ambiguous characterization, atmospheres 
can be defined also as an important element for collective and shared 
emotions and can affect with certain force and participation the emo-
tional life of the subject. The word “atmosphere” recalls a broad series 
of sensations, moods and feelings that can be expressed, for example, 
through a particular kind of music, or through a certain way of painting, 
and or even literature and poetry. The aesthetic experience is the orig-
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inal basis for this word, however they have also become an important 
element in expressing one’s emotional life because of their indetermi-
nacy and vagueness. It is precisely due to this vagueness that affective 
atmospheres unsettle the distinction between affect and emotion and 
manifest their bearing in affecting social dimension:
Affect with the impersonal and objective. Emotion with the per-
sonal and subjective. Invoking one or the other term has come 
to signal a basic orientation to the self, world and their interrela-
tion […]. Atmospheres do not fit neatly into either an analytical 
or pragmatic distinction between affect and emotion. They are 
indeterminate with regard to the distinction between the subjec-
tive and objective. They mix together narrative and signifying 
elements and nonnarrative and asignifying elements. And they 
are impersonal in that they belong to collective situations and yet 
can be felt as intensely personal. On this account atmospheres 
are spatially discharged affective qualities that are autonomous 
from the bodies that they emerge from, enable and perish with 
[Anderson 2009, 80].
Substantial modifications in existential feelings and affective atmos-
pheres may impact affective disorders and schizophrenia. I would like 
to recall the role of “delusional atmospheres” in the manner in which 
Jaspers writes in his General Psychopathology as important example 
of these modifications. According to Jaspers, we can distinguish be-
tween ‘delusion proper’ from ‘delusion-like ideas’: the delusional belief 
is a secondary judgement that arises in the context of a more primary 
delusional experience, that is a non-specific shift in the person’s rela-
tionship with the world. Jaspers describes the «delusional atmosphere» 
with these words:
Patients feel uncanny and that there is something suspicious 
afoot. Everything gets a new meaning. The environment is some-
how different – not to a gross degree – perception is unaltered in 
itself but there is some change which envelops everything with 
a subtle, pervasive and strangely uncertain light. […] Something 
seems in the air which the patient cannot account for, a distrust-






eral delusional atmosphere with all its vagueness of content must 
be unbearable. Patients obviously suffer terribly under it and to 
reach some definite idea at last is like being relieved from some 
enormous burden [Jaspers 1997, 98].
Delusional atmosphere can be described as a particular kind of affective 
state which precedes the development of delusions and consists of a 
unique combination of perceived environmental changes such as anxi-
ety, perplexity and foreboding. In the frame of delusional atmospheres, 
we face a shift in the general structure of experience that substantially 
modifies our sense of reality. Derealisation is certainly one aspect, and 
when combined with depersonalization experiences significantly affect 
the patient’s existence. This can be found for example in the schizo-
phrenia spectrum (but also in other conditions as well, e.g. cases of 
dissociative, anxiety, and mood disorders) as described below by this 
first-person report:
At the age of 37, I had a psychotic break, just 3 years short of a 
diagnosis of late-onset schizophrenia. […] I now live with audi-
tory hallucinations, formally classified as “outer space” hallu-
cinations that I hear outside of myself and, for me, stem mostly 
from sounds in the environment. […] I am disturbed by sounds, 
especially by the hypnotic resonance of motors and fans, for they 
carry with them the most persistent voices. These voices refer 
to themselves as the Wherewho. […] Spaced out and terminally 
disconnected, I am not always able to focus even when trying 
my hardest. […] I feel like a fraction of myself in stark contrast 
to how I felt […] prior to the schizophrenia. […] Though I am 
working again, I have a pervading sense of loss about my life. 
This illness has affected all aspects of how I perceive myself 
and how others perceive me. There’s been a radical shift in my 
social interactions, family relations, and cognitive abilities [Wat-
son 2015, 6-8].
Delusional atmospheres involve a transformed sense of general mean-
ingfulness or significance and may produce an alteration in the dimen-
sion concerning the sense of continuity and predictability, for example 
the loss of the so called natural self-evidence [Blankenburg 1971]. De-
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lusional atmosphere involves at least partial loss of a consensus reality, 
or vital contact, and thus erosion of a distinction between what is ‘part 
of the public world’ and what is ‘imagined by me’, as the personal story 
of Elyn Sacks tells us:
Schizophrenia rolls in like a slow fog, becoming imperceptibly 
thicker as time goes on. At first, the day is bright enough, the sky 
is clear, the sunlight warms your shoulders. But soon, you notice 
a haze beginning to gather around you, and the air feels not quite 
so warm. After a while, the sun is a dim lightbulb behind a heavy 
cloth. The horizon has vanished into a gray mist, and you feel a 
thick dampness in your lungs as you stand, cold and wet, in the 
afternoon dark. For me (and for many of us), the first evidence 
of that fog is a gradual deterioration of basic common-sense hy-
giene, what the mental health community calls “self-care skills” 
or “activities of daily living” [Sacks 2007, 35].
The atmosphere of the depressive and the manic worlds are described 
either as gloomy or, on the contrary, as abnormally bright; by contrast, 
schizophrenic persons are often described as manifesting ‘flat’ [Sass 
& Pienkos 2013]. There are a number of features of affective psychosis 
that bear striking resemblance to these ‘atmospheric’ changes that are 
often assumed to be specific to schizophrenia: paranoia, with its sense 
of being at the centre of a threatening or insinuating world, is especially 
common in mania but also in depression [Sass & Pienkos 2013]. The 
disruption of affectivity disturbs the sense of reality, as the story of Cin-
dy, a schizophrenic patient, shows. Her mum to tell us her story:
Cindy has been living under the shadow of schizophrenia these 
past 17 years […], she has been a patient at a State hospital for 
11 years and was in and out of the hospital for 5 years before 
this “fog” (as she calls it) descended on her at the age of 20. […] 
Cindy’s habits of daily living and personal grooming are very 
poor, though she sees a rhyme and a reason for the things she 
does. Taking a shower means just standing under the water, usu-
ally cold, and two pats with a towel and she’s dry. She enjoys 
using fingernail polish and lipstick but can do so only under su-






are certain shoes that keep her legs thin and are worn for this 
purpose occasionally and keeping track of her glasses is really 
beyond her capabilities [Smith 1991, 689-691].
What emerges in considering how moods, existential feelings and at-
mospheres impact affectivity is not only a way to describe the narrative 
of people with affective disorders or schizophrenia, but also is an invi-
tation for practitioners to consider how affectivity can also influence the 
therapeutic encounter in the delicate process of meaning making: by as-
sessing psychopathological phenomena we face the fragile understand-
ing [Costa et al. 2019] grounded in clinicians’ own pathic pre-reflective 
experiences that are involved in the making process and participation of 
atmospheres in the frame of clinical encounter. Under this regard, the 
training of psychiatrists in this kind of understanding may have impli-
cations in the diagnostic realm, and in the therapeutic realm, namely by 
reinforcing the patient-doctor empathic relationship [ibid.].
References
Brencio, F. [2019], Befindlichkeit: Disposition, in: G. Stanghellini, A. 
Raballo, M. Broome, A.V. Fernandez, P. Fusar-Poli, R. Rosfort 
(eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Phenomenological Psychopathol-
ogy, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 344-353.
Anderson, B. [2009], Affective atmospheres, in: Emotion, Space and 
Society 2, 77-81.
Berrios, G.E. [1985], The psychopathology of affectivity: conceptual 
and historical aspects, in: Psychological Medicine 15, 745-758.
Blankenburg, W. [1971], Der Verlust der natürlichen Selbstverständli-
chkeit: Ein Beitrag zur Psychopathologie symptomarmer Schizo-
phrenien, Stuttgart, Ferdinand Enke Verlag.
Böhme, G. [1993], Atmosphere as the fundamental concept of a new 
aesthetics, in: Thesis Eleven 36, 113-126.
Brogan, W. [2005], Heidegger and Aristotle: The Twofoldness of Being, 
New York (NY), SUNY.
© 2018 Thaumàzein
10.13136/thau.v6i0 154
Coriando, P.L. [2002], Affektenlehre und Phänomenologie der Stimmun-
gen: Wege einer Ontologie und Ethik des Emotionalen, Frankfurt 
am Main, Klostermann Verlag.
Costa, C., Carmenates, S., Madeira, L., Stanghellini, G. [2019], Atmos-
pheres and the clinical encounter, in: G. Stanghellini, A. Raballo, 
M. Broome, A.V. Fernandez, P. Fusar-Poli, R. Rosfort (eds.), The 
Oxford Handbook of Phenomenological Psychopathology, Ox-
ford, Oxford University Press.
Elpidorou, A., Freeman, L. [2015], Affectivity in Heidegger I: Moods and 
emotions in Being and Time, in: Philosophy Compass 10, 661-671.
Fuchs, T. [2001], The phenomenology of affectivity, in: K.W.M. Fulford, 
M. Davies, R.G.T. Gipps. G. Graham, J.Z. Sadler, G. Stanghellini, 
T. Thornton (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy and Psy-
chiatry, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 612-631.
Fuchs, T. [2012], The feeling of being alive. Organic foundations of 
self-awareness, in: J. Fingerhut, S. Marienberg (eds.), Feelings of 
Being Alive, Berlin, De Gruyter, 149-166.
Fuchs, T. [2013], Depression, intercorporality and interaffectivity, in: 
Journal of Consciousness Studies 20 (7-8), 219-238.
Hadjioannou, C. [2013], Befindlichkeit as retrieval of Aristotelian 
διάθεσις: Heidegger reading Aristotle in the Marburg years, in: T. 
Keiling (ed.), Heideggers Marburger Zeit: Themen, Argumente, 
Konstellationen, Frankfurt am Main, Klostermann Verlag, 223-
236. 
Heidegger, M. [1962], Being and Time, trans. J. Macquarrie and E. Rob-
inson, New York (NY), Harper & Row.
Heidegger, M. [2002], Towards the Definition of Philosophy, trans. T. 
Sadler, London, Continuum.
Heidegger, M. [2004], The Phenomenology of Religious Life, trans. M. 
Fritsch and J.A. Gosetti-Ferencei, Bloomington (IN), Indiana 
University Press.
Heidegger, M. [2009], Basic Concepts of Aristotelian Philosophy, trans. 







Heidegger, M. [2013], The Basic Problems of Phenomenology (Winter 
Semester 1919/1920), trans. Scott M. Campbell, London, Blooms-
bury Academic.
Held, K. [1993], Fundamental moods and Heidegger’s critique of con-
temporary culture, in: J. Sallis (ed.), Reading Heidegger: Com-
memorations, Indianapolis (IN), Indiana University Press, 28-30.
von Herrmann, F.W. [2008], Hermeneutische Phänomenologie des Da-
seins. Eine Erläuterung von „Sein und Zeit”, vol. 3, Frankfurt am 
Main, Klostermann Verlag.
Jaspers, K. [1997], General Psychopathology (7th ed.), trans. J. Hoenig 
and M.W. Hamilton, Baltimore (MD), Johns Hopkins University 
Press.
Kimura, B. [1992], Ecrits de Psychopathologie phénoménologique, 
Paris, Presses universitaires de France.
Malpass, J. [2006], Heidegger’s topology. Being, place, world, Cam-
bridge (MA), The MIT Press.
Ratcliffe, M. [2009a], Existential feeling and psychopathology, in: Phi-
losophy, Psychiatry, & Psychology 16 (2), 179-194.
Ratcliffe, M. [2009b], The phenomenology of moods and the meaning 
of life, in: P. Goldie (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of 
Emotion, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 349-371.
Ratcliffe, M. [2010], The phenomenology and neurobiology of moods 
and emotions, in: D. Schmicking, S. Gallagher (eds.), Handbook 
of Phenomenology and Cognitive Sciences, Berlin, Springer, 123-
140.
Ratcliffe, M. [2013], Why moods matter, in: M. A. Wrathall (ed.), The 
Cambridge Companion to Heidegger’s Being and Time, Cam-
bridge, Cambridge University Press, 157-176.
Sacks, E. [2007], The center cannot hold, New York (NY), Harper & 
Row.
Sass, L.A., Pienkos, E. [2013], Space, time, and atmosphere. A compar-
ative phenomenology of melancholia, mania, and schizophrenia. 
Part II, in: Journal of Consciousness Studies 20 (7-8), 131-52.
Sass, L.A., Ratcliffe, M. [2017], Atmosphere: On the phenomenology 
© 2018 Thaumàzein
10.13136/thau.v6i0 156
of “atmospheric” alterations in schizophrenia – Overall sense of 
reality, ramiliarity, vitality, meaning, or relevance, in: Psychopa-
thology 50, 90-97.
Slaby, J., Stephan, A. [2008], Affective intentionality and self-con-
sciousness, in: Consciousness and Cognition 17, 506–513.
Smith, E. [1991], First person account: living with schizophrenia, 
in: Schizophrenia Bullettin 17 (4), 689-691.  DOI: https://doi.
org/10.1093/schbul/17.4.689 (accessed: 20.02.2019)
Stanghellini, G., Rosfort, R. [2013], Emotions and Personhood. Explor-
ing Fragility – Making Sense of Vulnerability, Oxford, Oxford 
University Press.
Volpi, F. [1984], Heidegger e Aristotele, Padova, Daphne Editrice.
Watson, M. [2015], Listening to the Wherewho: A lived experience of 
schizophrenia, in: Schizophrenia Bulletin 41 (1), 6-8. DOI: https://
doi.org/10.1093/schbul/sbt097 (accessed: 20.02.2019)
Keywords
Disposition; Heidegger; Moods; Atmospheres; Hermeneutical Phenomenology
Abstract
This paper aims to explore the “pathic” dimension of existence, which is both the 
capacity of being affected and being situated within moods and atmospheres. The 
broader sphere it intends to pursue is to show how the “pathic” dimension of exist-
ence is related to psychopathology and clinical practice, such as affective disorders 
and schizophrenia. In reaching its aims, the paper will initially focus on key concepts 
in Martin Heidegger’s meditation, such as Befindlichkeit, a structure of existence 
that, rather to be a starting point in the context of Heidegger’s understanding of fun-
damental structures of Dasein, it is a stepping stone on his pathway toward phenom-
enology and it roots, precisely, into Heidegger’s relationship with Aristotle, a central 
point of his philosophical education. In a second moment, the paper will discuss how 
moods, existential feelings and atmospheres are of interest of psychopathology and it 
intends to provide a hermeneutical-phenomenological account for the role of affects 
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«LIKE IN A SHELL»1 
INTERAFFECTIVITY AND SOCIAL COGNITION IN 
ASPERGER’S SYNDROME
A person can feel that there is something missing when relating to someone 
who is autistic – it is as if one is in the presence of a changeling, someone 
from a different world – but this escapes the net of scientific methods. 
Hobson [2002, 49]
taBle oF CoNteNtS: 1. What is autism spectrum disorder?; 2. Georg Frankl: 
an Analysis of Autism; 3. A Phenomenological account of Affective Contact; 
3.1. Intercorporeality; 3.2. Interaffectivity; 3.3. Intercorporeality and Interaf-
fectivity in AS: Frankl’s view revisited; 4. Conclusions.
Autism spectrum disorder and Asperger’s syndrome are generally considered as behavioral or neural deficits which prevent the sub-
ject from being engaged in social activities. Nonetheless, there is still no 
consensus about the real core of this disorder: is it a sensorial, percep-
tual or a social one? Is it cognitive or is it an episode which occurs well 
before the development of cognitive skills?
In this paper, I will argue that the real limitation of Asperger’s sub-
jects lies in intercorporeality and interaffectivity, that is, in the pre-reflec-
tive, intersubjective engagement with others. It will begin by first draw-
ing on the work of the psychiatrist Georg Frankl, by drawing from his 
research I will describe this engagement in terms of “affective language” 
and “affective contact”. The second part of this paper will emphasize how 
Frankl’s account can be coherent with a phenomenological perspective 
on sociality. In closing I will propose a therapeutic technique aimed at 
strengthening the intercorporeal, affective abilities of the subjects.
1  This expression comes from the famous paper by L. Kanner [1943].
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1. What is autism spectrum disorder?
Autism spectrum disorder was identified in the 1940s and during this 
time it piqued the interest of many researchers concerned with what 
it is at its core: while, on the one hand, numerous theories have con-
ceived it as a cognitive disorder [Happé 1994] it has also been described 
as an affective and behavioral deficit which prevents the subject from 
being interested in the world [Goldman 2006]. More specifically, As-
perger’s syndrome (AS) or high-functioning autism involves a range of 
symptoms generally associated with autism (abnormalities in the areas 
of social development, communicative development and imagination, 
combined with identified repetitive or obsessional behavior or unusual, 
narrow interests) but with normal development of verbal language skills 
and a normal or high IQ [APA 2013].
In the wide debate regarding autism, the most prominent models are:
• The central coherence model [Happé 1999; Happé & Frith 
1996], according to which the relevant dimension of Asperger’s 
is a weakness of the central coherence of information process-
ing, which implies giving greater attention to local details than 
to more global information;
• The folk psychology/folk physics model (developed by Bar-
on-Cohen in the empathizing-systematizing theory, cf. Bar-
on-Cohen et al. [2001]), affirms that in individuals with AS, the 
ability to understand how people function (folk psychology) is 
impaired, while the ability to understand how inanimate things 
work is intact or even superior;
• The executive dysfunction theory, according to which the core 
features of autistic spectrum disorders are best explained by 
an inability to plan actions and shift attention [Boucher 2009];
• The mindblindness theory, which affirms that children who 
display conditions associated with the autism spectrum are de-
layed in developing a theory of mind: the ability to put oneself 
into someone else’s shoes, to imagine and predict the other’s 
behavior [Baron-Cohen 1995];
• The magnocellular theory [Plaisted et al. 1999; Spencer et al. 




the visual pathways in the brain (the magnocellular pathway), 
which makes the subject more sensitive to moving stimuli and 
processing lower spatial frequencies;
• The predictive coding perspective [Pellicano & Burr 2012], 
according to which observations by autistic subjects are less 
influenced by contextual information, and therefore they see 
the world more accurately, as their perception is less modulated 
by experience;
• The broken mirror neurons hypothesis [Di Pellegrino et al. 
1992] suggests that we can link the social dysfunctions in au-
tism to impairments in the mirror neurons system, hindering 
autistic subjects’ ability to simulate and understand the other’s 
behavior;
• The social motivation hypothesis [Chevallier et al. 2012] claims 
that what is missing in autistic subjects is the propensity to ini-
tiate social contact.2
By oscillating between neural and behavioral levels of explanations, 
these investigations usually rely on a rather general understanding of 
intersubjectivity, one that ignores and undervalues its different forms 
and the different roles that they play in our social life.
This is the reason why in this article I would like to sketch a phe-
nomenological account of autism, by focusing, in particular, on the no-
tions of intercorporeality and interaffectivity. More specifically, I will 
take into account high functioning autism or Asperger’s syndrome, not 
only because the bibliography on this topic is limited, confounding 
and overall needs further clarification3, but also because typically AS 
subjects do not register cognitive or motor impairments: their primary 
limitation lies in the social domain. An analysis of AS syndrome will 
2  This thesis is brought into questions by the fact that it seems that autistic subjects 
are interested in social contacts and exchange, but only when the interaction is struc-
tured and organized [Schilbach 2016].
3  In 2013, the DSM V [APA 2013] included «Asperger’s syndrome» into the «Autism 
Spectrum Disorders» category and added the «Social Communication Disorders» 
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therefore allow us to unveil the complexity of the different forms of 
sociality, their structure and their essential requirements.
The final aim is to show where the impairment lies exactly: in the 
general realm of social cognition, or in something that occurs prior to 
cognition, namely, interaffective, bodily attunement?
In the first part of this paper I will draw on a psychiatric, relatively 
unknown account of autism and Asperger’s syndrome (that of Georg 
Frankl), in the second part I will contextualize this account into the 
phenomenological context, arguing that our pre-linguistic and pre-re-
flective forms of intersubjectivity are responsible for the development 
of more complex kinds of sociality, which is precisely what is disrupted 
in AS subjects.
2. Georg Frankl: an Analysis of Autism
The history of the origins of autism diagnosis is quite fascinating. For 
a long time, the identification of this disorder has been linked with two 
names who worked simultaneously: Hans Asperger, who worked in 
Wien (Vienna) and sadly has been recently associated with Nazi per-
secution [Sheffer 2018]; and Leo Kanner, a psychiatrist who worked 
in Maryland. Recently, two important publications [Silberman 2015; 
Donvan & Zucker 2016] shed new light on the genesis of the diagnosis 
of autism. According to new findings, it seems that there was a third 
man in those years who was not only researching autism, but who also 
met both Asperger and Kanner. This man was Georg Frankl, a Jewish 
psychiatrist who worked with Asperger in Wien, but then escaped to 
Maryland during the Second World War. It is here that Frankl met Leo 
Kanner and began to work in his clinic. Frankl’s perspective on autism 
remained largely unexplored, but I think that it’s worth of attention. 
While Asperger focused on autism as a behavioral deficit, and Kan-
ner provided a neurobiological analysis of this disorder, Frankl offered 
us an analysis of autistic language,4 and his survey was guided by the 
4  I am grateful to the University of Kansas’ Kenneth Spencer Research Library that 
has kindly allowed me to read the manuscript, Autism in Childhood: An Attempt of 
Analysis [Frankl, unpublished manuscript]. See also Frankl [1943, 251-262].
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question: How does the autistic child communicate or not communicate 
with the people around him?
According to Frankl, it seemed that the state of autism has its com-
plement in the state of “being in communication with people”. One is 
either in the one condition or in the other. Starting from the assumption 
that talking is different from communicating, he distinguishes between 
the affective language and the word language. The affective language 
concerns itself with non-verbal communicative symbolizations (facial 
expression, body gestures, the modulation of articulate and inarticulate 
sounds, etc.) and, in his view, comprises true communicative symbols, 
which have validity in the subject’s family, country, and to some extent, 
worldwide. It is a means of communication that is beyond the boundaries 
of the spoken language that the baby is soon to learn. On the other hand, 
the word language involves all verbal communicative symbolizations.5
According to Frankl, an autistic person is a person who does not 
communicate his thoughts and feelings to others. The term “to com-
municate” means to express feelings, affects and emotions. It is com-
prised of more than the mere ability to utter words and understand their 
symbolic meaning. It includes that set of gestural and vocal, non-verbal 
symbolizations which, in its totality, can be called “the affective lan-
guage”. In other words, autistic people fail to display this set of sym-
bolizations (facial and bodily gestures, modulation of the spoken lan-
guage, expressive, inarticulate sounds) which we define and experience 
as “good contact with persons”.6
Furthermore, in his view, the affect comprises:
1. a physical component;
2. an intentionally communicative, symbolizing representation.
In order to account for this dual characterization, Frankl makes the ex-
ample of rage: usually rage has its own bodily features that express 
aggression toward somebody (I am angry at you; I want to hurt you). 
5  It seems clear that our everyday language is always a fusion and integration of word 
language and affective language.
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In a fit of anger I can scowl at somebody; I can shake my fist at him or 
punch him. In other words, the adversary, the object of my rage is an es-
sential part of the rage itself. This expressive and intentional directness 
is missing in autism, its very core seems to be exactly the inability to 
tune in to the world.
In other words, it appears that a disturbance at the level of affective 
language leads to a disturbance in what Frankl calls affective contact. 
In low functioning autism, the priority of affective language over the 
word language is not so explicit however. In this case we have to deal 
with cognitive impairments as well, which sometimes prevent the sub-
ject from being able to talk (what Frankl calls “autistic mutism”) not 
only when trying to communicate. The centrality of the affective lan-
guage is on the other hand very visible in Asperger’s syndrome, where 
not all the intersubjective, communicative layers are impaired (indeed, 
they can maintain a «speaking relationship»7 with people although their 
contact with them is interrupted).
In the last part of his manuscript Frankl hypothesizes that a pseu-
do-affective language can be developed as a compensatory strategy to 
cope with the human necessity of «being in contact with others». These 
compensatory strategies are usually used by high functioning autistic 
subjects, who are provided with sufficient (and, often, extraordinary) 
cognitive capacities.
He furnishes four possible examples of alternative and artificial af-
fective languages:
1. The monotonous rote verbal production. According to Frankl, 
these vocal repetitions may assume a meaning and become a sort 
of substitute communicative system between the autistic subject 
and their primary carer;
2. The «automaton-like» language. Frankl observed that some chil-
dren do not only talk like an automaton, but their whole body 
looks like a mere mechanic support: completely missing those 
gestures and corporeal attitude that are typical of human motor 
behavior. Actions become mere interruptions of a state of immo-
7  Here and in the following I am quoting Frankl’s own description from his unpub-
lished manuscript, p. 53.
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bility, instead of expressions of a living body. Furthermore, they 
are restricted to moving those body parts which are immediately 
involved in action (for instance, the legs if the subject is walking; 
the arms and the hands if the subject is drawing). The body is 
motionless, the language is rare, unspontaneous and comes from 
this catatonic immobility;
3. The «scanning» language, that is a rhythmical language, yet life-
less and without emotional tone inflections. This is interpreted 
by Frankl as the effort to recapture, if not an affective speech 
modulation, at least a modulated speech structure;
4. The «declamatory» language, where feelings and emotions are 
re-produced in a very artificial manner, using an over-dramatized 
and the exaggerated inflection of the voice. Similar to what may 
be found in a theatrical performance.
All of these pseudo-affective languages can be immediately perceived 
by the listener as something very different from a genuine expression 
of affect. They are witnesses to subjects trying to capture and repro-
duce the feelings of others. To speak and to express themselves in the 
same manner that they perceive others. In other words, in order to be 
in relation with others, they emphasize their missing sense of affective 
language and its twin: affective contact, the ability to form relations to 
others, not merely trough a discursive understanding, but on the level of 
emotional attunement.
Frankl’s main contribution was undoubtedly the introduction of this 
notion: Kanner himself emphasized the importance of Frankl’s stud-
ies regarding this topic, which have certainly influenced his work [cf. 
Todd 2015]. Kanner’s first autistic patient, the well-known Donald T., 
was in fact taken into a two-week observation by Dr. Frankl and E. S. 
Cameron, who gave the first description of the subject. Kanner, in his 
famous paper Autistic Disturbances of Affective Contact [Kanner 1943], 
reports this fact, and underlines that Dr. Frankl followed also the «Case 
22», Elaine C., a girl with «unusual development». Throughout the en-
tire paper, Kanner seems to use the same expressions formulated by 
Frankl in his manuscript: he comments on patients’ use of language and 
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communicative value. There was no affective tie to people» [Kanner 
1943, 227-228]; «During the interview there was no kind of affective 
contact» [Kanner 1943, 229]; «He never used language as a means of 
communicating with people» [Kanner 1943, 237]. The emphasis given 
to the role of communication, and to its value within the syndrome is 
the same we can find in Frankl’s manuscript: communication means 
contact with people, and contact is a matter of affect, not a matter of 
cognition. Kanner claims that «The outstanding, ‘pathognomonic’, fun-
damental disorder is the children’s inability to relate themselves in the 
ordinary way to people and situations from the beginning of life» [Kan-
ner 1943, 242]. He also adds other features, such as: autistic loneliness; a 
failure to assume at any time an anticipatory posture;8 an excellent rote 
memory; echolalia; an obsessive desire for the maintenance of same-
ness; limitation in the variety of spontaneous activity; good relation to 
objects and not to people; good cognitive abilities. This description can 
be considered one of the first analysis of autism (given the “good cogni-
tive abilities” of Asperger’s syndrome in particular), but what is striking 
here is the emphasis put on the notions of “relation” and “communica-
tion”, which seem to be at the very core of the disorder.
As we noted at the beginning of this paper, the numerous theories 
that have been developed regarding autism and Asperger’s have not yet 
taken into account the relational impairment, nonetheless, none of them 
really discussed at length the meaning of intersubjectivity and the dif-
ferent layers that this umbrella term involves. Accordingly, the under-
standing of the disorder is still very broad, negatively influencing the 
presence of social stigma and the role of relatives who do not understand 
how and if the autistic subject is able to have some kind of contact with 
them.9 Unveiling the centrality of affective contact and its role in the de-
8  This is related to anticipation of the other’s reaction, and we can link this deficit to 
a lack of a sort of “synchronic intentionality”, an immediate and pre-reflective ten-
dency to bodily resonate with others.
9  It is no coincidence that, in the top ten questions for autism research, developed by 
Autistica, a leading autism research charity based in the United Kingdom, the second 
position is held by the request for more effective interventions in the development of 
communication skills in autism, while the 5th position is occupied by the proposal to 
achieve better education and improve social skills, as well as the need for parents and 
family members to better understand the autistic relatives.
© 2018 Thaumàzein
10.13136/thau.v6i0 166
velopment of social skills is therefore very important to achieve a better 
understanding of the syndrome, which will allow individuals to better 
cope with it. In my view, phenomenology can bridge this gap thanks to 
its concern for the different forms of sociality and their interrelations 
as well as to the priority that the phenomenological method gives to our 
pre-reflective structures. In the following pages, I will try to account for 
the intersubjective impairments present in Asperger’s syndrome, and I 
will try to trace some parallels between Frankl’s analysis and the phe-
nomenological resources. In doing so I hope to improve our understand-
ing of AS, unveiling what is the very core of this disorder.
3. A Phenomenological account of Affective Contact
Phenomenology is a very important source for the analysis of intersub-
jectivity (and its disruptions) since there are many descriptions of this 
dimension in its different forms, such as empathy, shared emotions and 
collective or group-based emotions.10 While some of these interactions 
mainly rely on inferential abilities, others are linked to a more immedi-
ate, pre-reflective attunement. In the case of Asperger’s syndrome, it is 
interesting to notice that, while some forms of interaction are still work-
ing,11 what is missing or severely impaired is the very core of affective 
attunement (or, in Frankl’s term, affective contact) which prevents them 
from being immediately engaged with the other and pre-reflectively un-
derstand others’ intentions and emotions.
I will therefore focus on the notions of intercorporeality and inter-
affectivity, notions that can be useful to understand where exactly AS’s 
impairments lie; which is congruent with Frankl’s perspective.
10  Cf. both contemporary literature: Zahavi [2015]; Szanto [2015]; and classical au-
thors: Husserl [1970, original 1954; 1967; 1973]; Stein [1989]; Scheler [1970]; Gur-
witsch [1979]; Walther [1923].
11  Drawing on the work of Salice and Henriksen [2015], we can argue that AS sub-
jects are able to deal with those kinds of sociality which involve the possession of 
«joint intentionality», which is distinctively goal-oriented and usually relies on ex-
plicitly formulated codes of conduct. Accordingly, they can participate in group ac-
tivities such as action-role-playing games and social media, and, to such an extent, 
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3.1. Intercorporeality
A main contribution of phenomenology is the emphasis on the living 
body and subjectivity that is conceived as a whole. It involves a psyche 
and a body inextricably entangled to each other. As the very core of 
perceptual activity, the body is the instrument which provides a link 
between the subject and the world, the ego and the alter ego.
In order to analyze these links, Merleau-Ponty12 uses the notion of 
intercorporeity, a pre-reflective and ‘lived in’ type of knowledge that 
allows the subject to recognize the other in an immediate and non-thetic 
manner. More specifically, he claims that the experience of self neces-
sarily presupposes the experience of otherness: essential to the subject 
is her ontological openness and the tendency of overcoming herself. 
Furthermore, in the perception both of self and of otherness, what is 
at stake is an embodied subjectivity in which the main feature is the 
involvement of an alterity.
In fact, our embodied self-awareness could be described as a 
pre-feeling of otherness, and the intersubjective experience as an echo 
of our own corporeal constitution:
My right hand was present at the advent of my left hand’s ac-
tive sense of touch. It is no different fashion that other’s body 
becomes animate before me when I shake another man’s hand 
or just look at him. In learning that my body is a ‘perceiving 
thing’[…] I prepared myself for understanding that there are oth-
er animalia and possibly other men. [Merleau-Ponty 1964, 212]
In Phenomenology of Perception, Merleau-Ponty explicitly faces this 
issue (especially in the chapter The Other and the Human World) and 
offers a contribution in the course Les relations avec autrui chez l’en-
fant, where he analyzes the psychoanalytic perspective and some devel-
opmental theories according to which we can talk about the perception 
of the alterity in psychogenetic terms.
According to Merleau-Ponty, we are intersubjective creatures from 
12  For reasons of space, I will focus only on Merleau-Ponty’s contribution. Nonethe-
less, I am deeply convinced that we can find an emphasis on the role of the lived body 
in Husserl as well [cf. Bizzari 2017].
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birth simply because we possess a corporeal schema. It is very inter-
esting to notice that an experimental study conducted by Meltzoff and 
Moore has shown that newborns (the “youngest” 42 minutes old, the 
“oldest” 72 hours old) are able to imitate facial expressions13, thanks to 
an inner capability very similar to the Merleau-Pontian corporeal sche-
ma which creates a bridge between interiority and exteriority.
Without the intervention of simulations or inferential capabilities, 
the subject is able to perceive the other’s corporeal movements as ex-
pressive and intentional starting from the first year of life, and can im-
mediately understand the other as an agent, and not as an object or 
Cartesian mind.
According to Merleau-Ponty, there are no epistemological functions 
exclusively committed to the understanding of other minds: the subject 
intuitively understands the rage in the other’s gestures or facial expres-
sions. To quote Gallagher: «Such perceptions give the infant, by the end 
of the first year of life, a non-mentalistic, perceptually based embodied 
understanding of the intentions and dispositions of other persons» [Gal-
lagher 2008, 540]. The body appears to be the place of the emergence 
of (shared) meaning.14 In the case of an intersubjective encounter, inter-
corporeality, therefore, is that pre-reflective intertwining of lived and 
living bodies that mutually resonate with one another without requiring 
inferential capacities. It is that mutual bodily synchrony that allows two 
subjects to experience subjective and objective qualities through their 
lived bodies.
13  Recent studies (Oostenbroek et al. [2016]) claim that there is no significant excess 
of matching reactions in newborns. Nonetheless, as noted by Fuchs [2018, 178] «even 
if it turns out that imitation is not an innate capacity, but develops in the course of 
mutual exchanges and matching reactions during the first weeks, it still functions as 
a major component of primary intersubjectivity».
14  The pre-reflective, bodily intentionality is not the only condition, but we need to 
take into account other elements: in fact, in the tradition of philosophical anthro-
pology, eccentric positionalism (reflexivity, cf. Plessner [1975]) or the reduction of 
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3.2. Interaffectivity
According to the phenomenological approach, a central concept of be-
ing in touch with the world and with oneself is affectivity. We should 
not conceive of affects as enclosed phenomena exclusively linked to our 
interiority. On the contrary, our affective life is the means by which the 
world is disclosed to us, together with those “affective affordances” that 
we intuitively grasp in our everyday life. According to Goldie [2002] 
feelings are bodily (we feel from the inside of our body) and towards 
(they usually have an object). For example, I feel fear because of the 
lion, I feel joy in meeting my friends etc. In face to face encounters, 
we can observe the circularity of this dual characterization: in fact, we 
work with two subjective cycles of affective intentionality that influ-
ence each other and allow the subjects to experience the kinetics and 
intensity of the other’s emotions through their own bodily kinesthesia 
and sensations [Fuchs 2016]. This kind of resonance «conveys an intu-
itive understanding of others’ emotions in our engagement with them» 
[Fuchs 2016, 195]. In other words, emotions are not only felt from the 
inside, but also displayed in our expressions and gestures.15
As described by Fuchs and Koch [2014], interaffectivity is the very 
intertwinement of two cycles of embodied affectivity, continuously 
modifying each partner’s affordances and bodily resonance. This res-
onance does not imply simulated processes and it is something prior to 
high forms of cognition, such as imagination and inferential processes. 
It represents the very first form of the immediate, pre-reflective attune-
ment that ties us with others. This is evident in childhood psychology, 
and in the famous description of primary intersubjectivity [Trevarthen 
1979] that seems to represent the first kind of intersubjective engage-
ment: described as the level of perception beginning from birth, when 
the baby sees the actions and movements of others and begins to imitate 
them. This kind of pre-reflective openness seems to be the very first 
form of intersubjectivity, which allows for the arising of an intuitive and 
empathic understanding. Already at this initial stage, it appears that the 
15  This reminds of Frankl’s example of the rage, which entails both subjective inner 
states and an object to which it is directed. Furthermore, usually emotions like rage 
involve specific corporeal gestures and expressions.
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subject is not only affectively bound to the other in a resonant, cyclic 
and dynamic relationship, but also inextricably linked and influenced 
by the other’s corporeality, showcased by the fact that since birth she is 
a body that expresses herself and is bound to the other’s embodied sub-
jectivities in a reciprocal exchange. The subject is not a body that feels, 
but a body that feels with and because of the other.
3.3. Intercorporeality and Interaffectivity in AS: Frankl’s view revisited
At this point, we can claim that being in “a good contact with others” is 
not a matter of mind-reading,16 but mostly of being bodily engaged in 
a meaningful, affective relationship. In my view, AS registers a loss of 
bodily resonance (intercorporeality) and emotional resonance (interaf-
fectivity), elements that are linked to one another and that can be con-
sidered as the phenomenological conceptual twins of affective contact 
and affective language.
We have described how, according to Frankl, affect is composed of 
a physical component and an intentionally communicative representa-
tion. In my view, these components correspond to intercorporeality and 
interaffectivity, elements that are usually mutually linked in a chiasmat-
ic relationship. Usually, intercorporeality and interaffectivity allow the 
subject to be involved in a chiasmatic, resonant and affective relation-
ship with the other, a relationship that in AS shows the deepest impair-
ment. In other words, the lack of affective language17 (intercorporeality) 
does not allow for the presence of affective contact (interaffectivity), 
while the word language is preserved. We can therefore claim that AS 
can talk, but not communicate.18
16  This is in opposition to the view of Baron-Cohen, according to which Asperger’s 
subjects are «mindblind», because they lack a theory of mind, that is the ability to 
read others’ intentions and mental states. In my view, we can indeed argue that the 
autism spectrum disorder is characterized by a «bodyblindness», or «interbodyblind-
ness», that is, a disorder of the corporeal and intercorporeal self (see Bizzari [2018]).
17  I believe that the word “language” is not really suitable for describing what Frankl 
had in mind: maybe, the word “attunement” is more correct.
18  Baron Cohen describes the case of Andrew, an Asperger subject who «cannot 
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If intercorporeality and interaffectivity are compromised or simply 
do not spontaneously arise, other higher forms of social engagement 
will show impairments. I am referring here to those kinds of shared 
emotions (such as empathy and collective emotions) which are char-
acterized by an intuitive attunement with others, an attunement that is 
genuinely affective and does not entail cognitive abilities. This could 
be the reason why AS subjects are able to deal with certain joint, in-
strumental activities, but are not able to “tune into” the world of being 
engaged in collective, empathic interactions.
This is also coherent with developmental psychology, for example 
with Greenspan’s affective diathesis hypothesis. In The Growth of the 
Mind, he claims that emotional interactions influence intelligence [Green-
span 1997]. According to his theory, affective interactions emerge earlier 
than the sensorimotor schemes postulated by Piaget [1962], and they are 
used to understand and conceptualize our experiences in the world. Fur-
thermore, even abstract thinking appears to be based on reflections about 
these personal affective experiences. This would mean that emotional and 
pre-reflective abilities are responsible for helping the child to go from 
simple interests in the world to social problem-solving, from sub-personal 
to symbolic knowledge. In particular, emotional interactions are consid-
ered responsible both for early social, cognitive and linguistic capacities, 
as well as for higher level intellectual and social skills.
The importance given to the emotional and bodily interactions for 
the development of higher social skills in neurotypical children finally 
leads to the question: Can we build a new affective language in AS 
subjects?
According to Frankl, in some autistic patients (those provided 
with the higher cognitive abilities whom today we call Asperger’s or 
high functioning subjects) we can observe the presence of alternative 
that are so ordinary to other people, such as reading their faces, knowing what to 
say next in a conversation, knowing how to comfort someone…He had this sense of 
being a Martian ever since school days, when he could see other children playing 
games in the playground that didn’t have clear rules. He had no idea how they knew 
what to do. He still talks at people rather than to them. Whilst Andrew can do maths, 
or memorize facts, or understand the laws of chemistry or physics effortlessly, he 
cannot fathom the unspoken rules of human interaction» [Baron-Cohen 2008, 9-10].
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and artificial “pseudo-affective” languages that allow them to estab-
lish meaningful relationships, at least with their relatives or those who 
take care of them. Once again, I think that phenomenology and de-
velopmental psychology can offer interesting tools for eliciting new 
kinds of pseudo-affective relationships and for making Asperger’s 
subjects able to communicate, and not simply talk, to others, or at 
least, to their closest people.
In 1998, Greenspan and Wieder developed a particular kind of ther-
apy, called the “D.I.R. model” (Developmental, Individual difference, 
Relationship-based model), aimed at the treatment of autistic patients, 
who lack emotional and (in case of low functioning autism) cognitive 
skills [Greenspan & Wieder 1998].
We can summarize the D.I.R. model as follows:
• Developmental: The basic level which needs be acknowledged 
by therapists. It involves understanding the developmental ca-
pacities (that are essential for spontaneous and empathic re-
lationships) of the subject. This includes helping children de-
velop the capacity to attend and remain calm and regulated, 
engage and affect basic gestures, engage in shared social prob-
lem-solving and intentional behavior involving a continuous 
flow of interactions in a row, and use ideas to communicate 
needs and think and play creatively;
• Individual differences: The D.I.R. model emphasizes the fact 
that each child has unique biologically-based mannerisms to 
internalize, regulate and use to respond to the environment and 
sensations. In fact, within the autism spectrum disorder some 
children are hyper sensitive to sound, others are less reactive 
to touch and so on;
• Relationship-based: This stage involves the learning relation-
ships with caregivers and therapists, and, like phenomenology, 
sheds light on the intersubjective nature of the subject.
The authors argue that, in order to help people affected by autistic spec-
trum disorder, the therapist should try to develop their practical and 
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the so-called “floortime”: a spontaneous interaction between the autistic 
child and the adult, which is helpful for the improvement of motor and 
social skills.19
Like phenomenology, and like Frankl’s account, the D.I.R. hypoth-
esis emphasizes the centrality of intentionality (the openness of the 
subject towards the world), reciprocity20 (the fact that the subject con-
stitutes herself in an intersubjective manner) and emotions (our engage-
ment towards the world is emotionally and axiologically characterized). 
It is undoubtable that this proposal tends to strengthen the interaffective 
skills of the subjects, nonetheless, it does not take into account intercor-
poreality, the true core of affective contact. For these reasons, I would 
like to modify this interaffective approach by creating an intercorpo-
real proposal that also emphasizes the emotional components. I do this 
by maintaining all of the original elements and adding the emphasis on 
embodiment. In this approach, the D.I.R. model becomes the D.I.R.E. 
model [Bizzari 2019], a therapeutic approach that also takes Embodi-
ment into account: adding a role for Embodiment makes it possible to 
enlarge the therapy by focusing more specifically on strengthening and 
recovering the kinesthetic, corporeal self, and consequently, the inter-
corporeal engagement with others.
The affective language might therefore be replaced by a contact that 
simulates and thus induces the missing affects, and this can be elicited by 
activities such as the floortime, dance therapies and those practices that 
consider the subjects as a kinesthetic, intersubjective, pre-reflective entity.
19  Another examples of “relational, affective therapies” can be music therapy: a joint 
activity where the subjects can change and improve his self/other awareness, and, in 
particular, the link between proprioception and intersubjective understanding. It has 
been noticed that music therapy is efficacious for autism, and is able to create some 
moments of collective engagement. This has nothing to do with the performance 
(nor with the cognitive capacities), on the contrary, we can affirm that it is all about 
“failing together”.
20  We can note the similarities with phenomenology: the uniqueness of the individual 
and the corporeal pre-reflective attunement towards the world are the central features 
of both of the accounts. The corporeal subjects is linked to the world in a unique 
kinesthetic manner: for this reason, a good therapeutic approach cannot consist in a 




In this paper, I tried to offer an alternative account of Asperger’s syn-
drome. In contrast to the main important tendencies, which consider 
Asperger’s core a brain disruption or a deficit in mentalizing, I claimed 
that Asperger’s difficulties lie in their pre-reflective domain, especially 
within their intercorporeal and interaffective ability to tune in with the 
other. In the first part I described a lesser known account of autism, that 
of Georg Frankl. In the second part I depicted some conceptual parallels 
between Frankl’s characterizations of autistic affective contact, and the 
phenomenological account of intercorporeality and interaffectivity.
By focusing on pre-reflective, emotional components, rather than on 
the neural correlations of intersubjective perception, we can begin an in-
quiry towards more promising paths. Taking into account both the fact 
that the subject is essentially a psychophysical organism, a living body, 
and the fact that she is ontologically intersubjective, a phenomenological 
analysis is suitable not only to explain intersubjective disorders, but also 
to find possible directions for their treatments, such as the Development, 
Individual difference, Relationship-based and Embodied model. 
The combination between Frankl’s perspective and the phenomeno-
logical accuracy in describing our intersubjective life opens up concrete 
directions to transform his idea of “pseudo-affective language” into a 
therapeutic direction that might allow those subjects who are not pro-
vided with an innate, automatic engagement with others to find alterna-
tive ways to communicate.
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Abstract
In this paper, I argue that the real limitation of Asperger’s subjects lies in intercor-
poreality and interaffectivity, that is, in the pre-reflective, intersubjective engage-
ment with others. I begin by first drawing on the work of the psychiatrist Georg 




«lIKe IN a Shell»
179
tive contact”. In the second part of the paper I emphasize how Frankl’s account can 
be coherent with a phenomenological perspective on sociality. In closing I propose 
a therapeutic technique aimed at strengthening the intercorporeal, affective abilities 
of the subjects.
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1. Introduction. Rari nantes in gurgite vasto
Our aim in this essay is to briefly explore the pathways, the personal history and the ideas of those who contributed to the foundation of 
the Italian School of Phenomenological Psychopathology. This school 
should be placed alongside other similar phenomenological schools 
that sprang up in Germany, France and Holland in the course of the 
20th century. As a philosophical approach, Husserl’s phenomenology 
reached Italy only in the 1920s thanks to Antonio Banfi’s translations 
(1886-1957). This first phase was followed by a long silence that lasted 
until the 1960s, when Enzo Paci (1911-1976) edited the translation of 
Husserl’s Crisis of European Sciences [Husserl 1972, original 1933; see 
also Scarantino 2018].
In the Italian psychiatric literature of the time, however, no mention 
was made of the fact that some German-speaking psychiatrists (such as 
Karl Jaspers and Ludwig Binswanger) had taken inspiration from phil-
osophical phenomenology already at the turn of World War I. The only 
exception was the isolated work of Giovanni Enrico Morselli. If we take 
1913 – the year of publication of Jaspers’ General Psychopathology – as 
the beginning of the phenomenological approach in psychopathology, 
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we can say that its Italian reception was delayed by thirty years. This 
can be explained by at least three factors:
1. The philosophical debate between the two wars (1918-1940) 
was completely dominated by idealism and historicism, against 
which both phenomenology and existentialism had taken a crit-
ical stance.
2. Neuropsychiatric positivism did not consider concepts initially 
developed in the field of philosophy and only subsequently ap-
plied to the clinical context as scientifically valid.
3. The absence, in Italy, of a psychiatric tradition in the true sense 
of the word. Except for the work and the philanthropic ideas of 
Vincenzo Chiarugi in the 18th century, psychiatric assistance in 
Italy had as its primary objective – according to the 1904 law – 
the custody of mental patients entrusted to psychiatric hospitals. 
At the academic level, instead, mental illnesses were considered 
an epiphenomenon of the diseases of the nervous system.
The first studies dedicated to phenomenological psychopathology in It-
aly were written by Danilo Cargnello between 1947 and 1948. In the 
following decades, the development of territorial or community-based 
psychiatry (starting with the 1978 law No. 180), together with the ab-
sence of a strong psychiatric tradition analogous to that of France and 
Germany, created an atmosphere of conflict between a scientist-positiv-
istic paradigm and a socio-political one. In this context, surprisingly, the 
original contribution of phenomenological psychopathology, despite its 
few adherents, consisted precisely in its ambiguous position between, 
on the one side, the clinical domain and, on the other, the transcenden-
tal dimension of philosophy. A new psychopathological ‘science’ could 
therefore emerge: engaged in a search for meaning within the clinical 
context, it interfaced with trends in cultural anthropology (as in the di-
alogue between Ernesto de Martino and Bruno Callieri) and ethnopsy-
chiatry and, more recently, worked toward a definition of a phenomeno-
logically-based psychotherapy.
In 1965, the journal L’Évolution Psychiatrique, founded and edit-
ed by Eugène Minkowski and Henri Ey, dedicated a special issue to 
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Italian psychiatry entitled Hommage à la Psychiatrie Italienne [Ey et 
al. 1965]. Among the contributors were Franco Basaglia, Adolfo Bovi, 
Bruno Callieri, Lorenzo Calvi, Franco Giberti and Guido Gozzano. 
The presence of Franco Basaglia among them testifies of the impact of 
the phenomenological perspective within the reformist and democrat-
ic renaissance promoted by the new Italian psychiatry. The typically 
phenomenological idea of «bracketing the illness» represented a clean 
break with a form of psychiatry that revolved around the ineluctability 
of a chronic evolution of schizophrenia. Only much later, in January 
2011 another journal, L’Art du Comprendre, edited by Georges Char-
bonneau, devoted an entire issue to the ‘Italian School’ entitled Délirer: 
analyse du Phénomène delirant [Ballerini & Di Piazza 2011]. The con-
tributors were Arnaldo Ballerini, Bruno Callieri, Lorenzo Calvi, Lu-
dovico Cappellari, Riccardo Dalle Luche, Gilberto Di Petta, Clara Mus-
catello, Mario Rossi Monti, Paolo Scudellari and Giovanni Stanghellini.
These two dates – 1965 and 2012 – can be taken as symbolic bench-
marks. This time span saw the development, in Italy, of a form of psy-
chopathology that, starting with the work of a small group of ‘pioneers’, 
gradually turned into an accredited school of thought, thereby finding 
its own place among the bio-psycho-social epistemologies that char-
acterized the second half of the 20th century. Laurent Feneyrou’s in-
troductory essay [Feneyrou 2016] to the French translation [Cargnello 
2016] of Danilo Cargnello’s Alterità e alienità («Alterity and Alienity») 
recognized the existence of an Italian School stratified across genera-
tions and with its own relevant literary production.
In its first phase, the Italian movement was engaged in the transla-
tion, introduction and dissemination of the phenomenological approach 
in psychiatry. Cargnello in his Alterità e alienità [2001, 1st ed. 1966] 
introduced the thought of Binswanger, Callieri that of Schneider (Psi-
copatologia clinica [2004, original 1954] – «Clinical Psychopatholo-
gy»), Priori that of Jaspers (Psicopatologia generale [2009, 1st ed. 1964] 
– «General Psychopathology»), Ferro and Ballerini that of Blanken-
burg (La perdita dell’evidenza naturale [1998] – «The Loss of Natural 
Self-evidence»), Dalle Luche and Di Piazza that of Tatossian (Feno-
menologia delle psicosi [2003] – «Phenomenology of Psychoses»), and 
Ballerini that of Kimura Bin (Scritti di psicopatologia fenomenologica 
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[2005] – «Essays in Phenomenological Psychopathology»).
In November 1994, the Italian Society for Psychopathology was 
established in Florence under the honorary presidency of Bruno Cal-
lieri and the direction of Arnaldo Ballerini.1 The journal Comprendre, 
founded in 1988 and edited by Lorenzo Calvi, was adopted as its offi-
cial organ: the Italian School had emerged from its initial ‘clandestine’ 
phase, so to speak. In 2001, the Society organized its first Residential 
Course in Phenomenological Psychopathology, held annually until 
2003 in Pistoia, and from 2003 until today, in Figline Valdarno. The 
Course, now in its eighteenth edition, was directed until 2015 by Ar-
naldo Ballerini and is currently coordinated by Gilberto Di Petta and 
Giampaolo Di Piazza: classes meet for a total of seven weekends over 
a semester.
Starting from 2010, some members of the Society’s board have been 
engaged in the promotion of the School of Phenomenological-Dynamic 
Psychotherapy. Based in Florence, approved in 2015 by the Ministry of 
Education, University and Research (MIUR), the School is thereby le-
gally authorized to confer the title of «psychotherapist». In addition to a 
four-year course in phenomenological-dynamic psychotherapy directed 
by Giovanni Stanghellini, a Basic Course in Phenomenological Psy-
chopathology is organized annually in Florence as to stress the found-
ing importance of psychopathology for a phenomenologically oriented 
psychotherapy. In the meantime, the Italian Society for Psychopatholo-
gy – still under the presidency of Arnaldo Ballerini – was renamed Ital-
ian Society for Phenomenological Psychopathology. Since the passing 
of Ballerini in 2015, Gilberto Di Petta has been its president.
2. Geographical and conceptual maps
Until 1994, Italian phenomenological psychopathology developed 
thanks to small groups of psychiatrists or, better, to single mentors with 
few or no disciples at all. Italian psychopathologists, kept at the mar-
1  The founding members were Arnaldo Ballerini, Andrea Carlo Ballerini, Lorenzo 




gins of academic teaching [Rossi Monti & Cangiotti 2012], have often 
been accused of using an esoteric, elitist and clinically unsubstantiated 
language. Also, they have not done much to share, transmit and dissem-
inate their worldview. The establishment, in 1994, of the Italian Society 
for Psychopathology marked a significant trend reversal due to the pro-
fessional and human contribution of Arnaldo Ballerini: thanks to him, 
an atmosphere characterized by an exasperated «narcissism of small 
differences» and an insistence on incompatibilities was replaced by one 
of mutual exchange of ideas.
In its dialogue with major representatives of the European schools 
of phenomenological psychopathology (Wolfgang Blankenburg, Geor-
ges Charbonneau, John Cutting, Gisela Gross, Gerd Huber, Joachim 
Klosterkötter, Karl Kraus, Georges Lanteri-Laura, Eugéne Minkowski, 
Michael Musalek, Jean Naudin, Josef Parnas, and Kurt Schneider), 
the Italian School has distinguished itself for a number of peculiari-
ties, which will be illustrated here through a geographic and conceptual 
map. This will allow to see how different groups and approaches, with-
in the phenomenological movement in psychopathology, have gradually 
overlapped or merged.
2.1. The Lombard group2
The godfather of the Lombard group – or rather of all Italian phenom-
enological psychopathology – was Danilo Cargnello (1911-1998). For a 
long time, Cargnello, a distinguished psychiatrist and psychopatholo-
gist, was considered the most authoritative candidate to the first Ital-
ian professorship of Psychiatry, which, however, went to Carlo Lorenzo 
Cazzullo [Rossi Monti & Cangiotti 2012]. Cargnello was head of the 
Psychiatric Hospital of Vicenza, Teramo, Sondrio and, at the end of 
his career, Brescia (1963). Perfectly fluent in German, Cargnello took 
on the task of introducing the thought of Ludwig Binswanger in Italy. 
Alterity and alienity – his most important work – was published in 1966 
(a second expanded edition appeared in 1977 [Cargnello 2010a]): it still 
remains the only comprehensive attempt to present the thought of Bins-
2  We would like to thank Dr. Paolo Colavero for his contribution to this paragraph.
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wanger as outlined in his Grundformen [1942]. In 1984 he published Il 
caso Ernst Wagner (Cargnello [2002, 1st ed. 1984] – «The case Ernst 
Wagner»), in which he drew on the studies of the great German psycho-
pathologist Ernst Kretschmer and devoted a complete series of essays to 
Binswanger’s conception of schizophrenia.3
Lorenzo Calvi (1930-2017) was the only student of Cargnello, with 
whom he worked very closely in Sondrio for five years. After grad-
uating in Medicine at the State University of Milan (1954), where he 
also attended Cesare Musatti’s lectures, Calvi used to hang about the 
lively scene of the Catholic University and attend the lectures held at 
the «Laboratory of Psychology» by Father Gemelli and other eminent 
figures of the time, such as Ferdinando Barison, Enrico G. Morselli 
and Cargnello himself. In 1958, Cargnello offered him a position at the 
psychiatric hospital in Sondrio. Based there, where he was habilitated 
to teach Clinical of Nervous and Mental Diseases (1964) and Psychi-
atry (1969), Calvi did not abandon the Milanese philosophical school. 
In Milan, Enzo Paci was leading a group of students – still very well-
known today – who, together with their mentor, would give historical 
contributions to the Italian phenomenological tradition (among others: 
Giovanni Piana, Carlo Sini, Salvatore Veca, Pier Aldo Rovatti and Ste-
fano Zecchi). Calvi studied extensively the lived experience of phobia 
and innovatively employed the concept of epoché as a way to access 
the lifeworld (Lebenswelt) of neurotic subjects suffering from phobias. 
His famous 1963 work on the construction of the phobic object as a 
phenomenological exercise4 followed an essay and some presentations 
held abroad together with Cargnello; very significantly, it also predated 
Wolfgang Blankenburg’s insight into the importance of phenomenolog-
ical epoché as a window on the lifeworld of the de-mundanized patient 
[1998, original 1971].
Due to his professional experience as a neurologist and his exten-
sive dealing with so-called neurotic cases, Calvi is the Italian psychopa-
thologist who has been most engaged in clarifying the phenomenolog-
3  Now collected in Cargnello 2010b.
4  Published in the first issue of Psichiatria Generale e dell’Età Evolutiva in 1963 (a 
journal founded and edited by Ferdinando Barison) and later reprinted in two parts in 
Calvi 2005; 2007. See also Calvi 2013 and Calvi & Colavero in press.
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ical structure of the lifeworld of phobic, obsessive and hypochondriac 
subjects. In 1988 he founded the journal Comprendre. Archive Interna-
tional pour l’Anthropologie et la Psychopathologie Phénoménologiques 
with the ambition to bring together fellow European psychopatholo-
gists. In 1994 he contributed to the establishment of the Italian Society 
for Phenomenological Psychopathology. Paolo Colavero, deputy editor 
in chief of Comprendre, is currently editing a posthumous collection of 
some of his unpublished essays.
2.2. The Venetian group5
The Venetian group formed around the charismatic figure of Ferdinan-
do Barison (1906-1995). Head of the Psychiatric Hospital «dei Colli» 
(Padua), medical officer in Crete during the Second World War, he was 
later head of the Psychiatric Hospital of Padua from 1947 to 1971. In 
the 1950s, drawing from his deep awareness of the importance of the 
environment for psychiatric patients, he wrote a manual for psychiatric 
nurses (Vademecum dell’infermiere – «A Nurse’s Handbook»). In the 
same years, he devoted part of his activity to the community, first by 
opening a number of clinics and later by following the example of the 
French Sector Psychiatry (as Ballerini did in Tuscany). In this sense, 
Barison aimed at an improvement and humanization of psychiatric hos-
pitals (opening of the wards, staff training, meetings with the patients, 
etc.), not at their total closure as proposed in those years by his Venetian 
colleague Basaglia, whose ideas Barison always regarded with a cer-
tain skepticism. In 1963, he founded the journal Psichiatria Generale 
e dell’Età Evolutiva («General and Developmental Psychiatry»), which 
for many years provided a space for discussion and debate and was a 
vehicle for the dissemination of French and German psychopathology 
in Italy. Around him gravitated Giovanni Gozzetti, Pier Enrico Turci, 
Giorgio Maria Ferlini (1934-2017), Lodovico Patarnello, Paolo Rovero-
ni and Lodovico Cappellari.
Giovanni Gozzetti (1933-2013) graduated in Bologna in 1958, spe-
5  We would like to thank Dr. Ludovico Cappellari and Dr. Paolo Colavero for their 
contribution to this paragraph.
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cialized in Clinical of Nervous and Mental Diseases in 1962 (still in Bolo-
gna) and was habilitated to teach Psychiatry in 1971. Head of the psychi-
atric ward in Verona and later in Padua (1971-1978 and from 1978 to 1992 
in the Ospedale Civile Clinicizzato), he was editor-in-chief of the journal 
founded by his mentor Barison. Gozzetti (1998) was a pioneer in promot-
ing an encounter between phenomenology and psychoanalysis and devel-
oped a close relationship with other important figures who had preceded 
him on this path, such as Gaetano Benedetti in Basel and Salomon Resnik 
in Paris. His most famous book, La tristezza vitale (Gozzetti [2008, 1st ed. 
1996] – «The Vital Sadness»), remains a fundamental point of reference 
for those who approach the study and treatment of melancholy.
Pier Enrico Turci has always been particularly receptive toward 
developments in the field of philosophy of mind. Recently, he has pub-
lished, together with Carlo Umiltà, an essay entitled Breve viaggio in 
spazio, tempo e soggettività (Turci & Umiltà [2017] – «A Brief Explora-
tion of Space, Time and Subjectivity»), which is evidence of this inter-
est. Lodovico Cappellari, who directed for many years the Department 
of Mental Health of the Veneto region, has translated the methodolog-
ical approach of phenomenological psychopathology into an effective 
and advanced psychiatric practice. Particularly active in the context of 
the Venetian branch of the Italian Society of Psychiatry, Cappellari has 
done much to promote and disseminate the phenomenological approach 
within the mental health services. Currently, this work is being carried 
on by a student of Gozzetti and Cappellari, Leonardo Meneghetti, who 
is committed to preserve the relationship between phenomenological 
psychopathology and clinical practice within the services.
Maria Armezzani [2002], Ludovico Patarnello, and Giorgio Maria 
Ferlini, also thanks to a fruitful dialogue with Resnik and Benedetti, 
have kept the phenomenological tradition within the university alive. In 
2003, Ferlini established a post-graduate specialization school in phe-
nomenological-psychoanalytic psychotherapy (Aretusa Institute), which 
was open until his death in 2017.
2.3. The Piedmontese group
Giovanni Enrico Morselli (1924-1973), head of the Novara Psychia tric 
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Hospital, mentor of both Eugenio Borgna and Filippo Ferro, established 
important international ties with figures such as Karl Jaspers, Abra-
ham Meyerson, Bénédict Morel, Henri Ellenberger, Juan Lopez Ibor, 
Manfred Bleuler, Robert Volmat, Jean Bobon, Henry Ey and Eugéne 
Minkowski. He became convinced that in the mentally ill person – 
alongside or perhaps thanks to psychotic disintegration – creative mech-
anisms develop connected more to the individual than the illness – as if 
the psychopathological condition gave rise to a different form of exis-
tence, a kind of «new life». In this sense, Morselli’s Caso Elena, o Sulla 
dissociazione mentale («The Elena Case, or On Mental Dissociation»), 
published in 1930 in the Rivista Sperimentale di Freniatria6 is emblem-
atic. Mention should be made also of his paper on the experience of 
self-intoxication with mescaline, which he presented at the Neurology 
Congress in London in 1935.
At the beginning of his career, Eugenio Borgna focused on clinical 
examination of psychoses and favored an epistemological-hermeneu-
tic approach. Later, he produced a series of pathobiographies such as 
those on Rainer Maria Rilke, Antonia Pozzi, Georg Trakl and other 
twentieth-century personalities whose life had been particularly tragic. 
Filippo Maria Ferro, currently honorary president of the Italian Society 
for Phenomenological Psychopathology, established himself as a histo-
rian of psychiatry and as an art historian, thereby becoming particularly 
skilled in tracing evolutional similarities between psychopathological 
conditions and historical forms of artistic expression. Working at the 
intersection of phenomenology and psychoanalysis, Ferro has taught 
psychiatry at the University of Chieti for many years.
2.4. Tuscany and the Florence school
Tuscany proved a particularly fertile ground for the growth of a psycho-
pathological tradition. In addition to Arnaldo Ballerini and his first stu-
dents Mario Rossi Monti and Giovanni Stanghellini, we must mention 
Enzo Agresti, Giampaolo Di Piazza, Luciano del Pistoia (a student of 
Georges Lanteri Laura), Riccardo Dalle Luche and Massimo Ballerini. 
6  Later republished as a volume. See Morselli 1995.
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Fellow travellers were also Andrea Carlo Ballerini and Giuliano Casu. 
However, the first core of the school originated around Arnaldo Bal-
lerini (1928-2015). Later on, this group would rightly earn the name of 
«Florentine School», and would lead to the establishment, in 1994, of 
the Italian Society for Psychopathology. It is hard, however, to trace 
back in time the very ‘foundation’ of the school. From a legal point of 
view, there is no doubt that the Society was established in the Florentine 
study of notary Mario Piccinini on November 3rd, 1994. Around that 
table sat Arnaldo Ballerini, Andrea Carlo Ballerini, Lorenzo Calvi, Lu-
ciano Del Pistoia, Giovanni Gozzetti, Mario Rossi Monti and Giovanni 
Stanghellini. This is what is written in the official documents.
In reality, the birth of the society was preceded – like every other 
birth – by a series of events and by a long ‘labor’, which originated 
in Arnaldo Ballerini’s desire to revolutionize the so-called ‘culture’ of 
mental institutions and innovate the working practice of psychiatric ser-
vices in Tuscany. Following the death of his mentor, Ballerini left the 
Clinic of Nervous and Mental Diseases at the University of Bologna – 
where he was training as a neurosurgeon – and was suddenly thrown 
into the tough reality of the Florentine mental hospital. There, he was 
tragically struck by the shallowness of the local psychiatric culture. He 
used to tell the following episode: «When I mentioned to a colleague 
the possibility that a patient had internal schizophrenic experiences, he 
appeared perplexed and told me that schizophrenic subjects do not have 
internal experiences».
Alongside an in-depth and almost obsessive study of Karl Jaspers’ 
General Psychopathology and Kurt Schneider’s Clinical Psychopa-
thology, Ballerini pursued a strong interest in the ways in which psy-
chopathological culture can translate into a psychiatric practice aware 
of the patient’s lived experience. Inspired by the principles of French 
Sector Psychiatry, he developed a first model of territorial or commu-
nity-based psychiatry in the Valdarno region, thereby combining the 
rich tradition of phenomenological psychopathology with the practical 
needs of clinical management of very complex cases. Thanks to this 
tireless work – and also to the insatiable curiosity with which he ex-
plored territories not strictly related to psychopathology – phenome-
nological psychopathology was able to escape the cul-de-sac in which 
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it had been long trapped: admired and idealized, on the one side, for 
the depth of its insights, it was often downplayed, on the other, as the 
useless diversion of an elitist group of psychiatrists fascinated by philo-
sophical questions scarcely relevant to clinical practice. Ballerini’s life-
long dedication, instead, created a shared space where the majority of 
Italian psychopathologists could finally recognize themselves, debate 
and, when necessary, argue and disagree.
Mario Rossi Monti and Giovanni Stanghellini are Ballerini’s two 
main students. Trained in both psychopathology and psychoanalysis under 
the Italian Psychoanalytic Society (SPI) Rossi Monti’s standpoint reflects 
the history of the complicated relationship between phenomenological 
psychopathology and psychoanalysis. He shares this approach with 
Antonello Correale, psychiatrist and psychoanalyst, who has always 
been familiar with serious pathologies and psychiatric institutions 
[Correale 1991; 2001; Correale & Berti Ceroni, 1998; Correale, Cangiotti, 
Zoppi 2010] and has integrated the psychoanalytic perspective with 
that of phenomenological psychopathology. Giovanni Stanghellini has 
established extensive ties with the English-speaking world, particularly 
with Oxford, and has played a mediating role between the analytic and 
the continental approaches in the field of psychopathology.
Stanghellini, who has worked with Josef Parnas in Copenhagen 
and with Thomas Fuchs in Heidelberg, has founded with Bill Fulford 
(Oxford) the International Network of Psychiatry and Philosophy. Cur-
rently, he is the editor (together with Bill Fulford, Katherine Morris and 
John Sadler) of a series entitled International Perspectives in Philoso-
phy and Psychiatry, published by Oxford University Press. Both Rossi 
Monti and Stanghellini, after working in community-based psychiatry, 
have reached the academia, obtaining a professorship respectively of 
Clinical Psychology (University of Urbino) and Dynamic Psychology 
(University of Chieti). This way, they can make a substantial contribu-
tion to the transmission of psychopathological knowledge in the train-
ing of clinical psychologists and psychotherapists.
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2.5. The Emilia-Romagna group7
Carlo Gentili, head of the Psychiatric Clinic of the University of Bolo-
gna, was one of the few Italian professors of psychiatry to contribute to 
the field of phenomenological psychopathology, as well as to develop an 
integrated working model compatible with both university and commu-
nity-based psychiatry. Clara Muscatello carried on Gentili’s work in the 
Bologna clinic. Today, this tradition is kept alive by Paolo Scudellari, 
professor of Psychiatry at the University of Bologna, a student of Mus-
catello, with whom he has published important contributions, particu-
larly on the subject of narcissism, paranoia and hypochondria.
Carlo Maggini, who was head of the Psychiatric Clinic of the Uni-
versity of Parma, always relied in his work on the principles of classical 
psychopathology. Riccardo Dalle Luche, a student of Maggini, intro-
duced the Bonn Scale for the Assessment of Basic Symptoms (BSABS) 
in Italy, according to the original model developed by Huber and Gross 
at the Bonn School. He has dealt with cinema and psychiatry and has 
written pathographies of historical characters, artists and personalities 
now part of the collective imagination (Adolf Hitler, Frida Kalo, Mary-
lin Monroe).
Paolo Verri, a psychiatrist and psychopathologist from Ferrara, 
was a student of Antonio Slavich (a longtime collaborator of Basaglia). 
From Modena, where he headed the local section of Democratic Psychi-
atry, Slavich invited him to come to Ferrara, where he took part to the 
dismantlement of the mental hospital. There, he also headed for many 
years various mental health departments. Matteo Rossi, a new genera-
tion psychopathologist who did his training between Figline and Flor-
ence, has focused on the psychopathology of adolescence.
2.6. Rome
Bruno Callieri (1923-2012) – undoubtedly the main protagonist of Italian 
psychiatry and psychopathology during the second half of the twentieth 
century – graduated in Rome in 1948. Trained with Mario Gozzano in 
7  We wish to thank Dr. Paolo Colavero for his contribution to this paragraph.
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the field of neurology, thanks to his knowledge of German he pursued 
an in-depth study of Jaspers’ and Schneider’s works on psychopathol-
ogy. He abandoned neurology and quickly became the main point of 
reference for phenomenological psychopathology in Italy. In those years 
he developed his studies on Wahnstimmung (delusional mood) and on 
Weltuntergangserlebnis (the schizophrenic experience of the end of the 
world), which gained him international reputation [Callieri 1982]. His 
dream of a professorship in Psychiatry, however, faded quickly. His in-
terests did not coincide with those cultivated within academic circles; in 
fact, he was often encouraged to abandon his field of study if he really 
wanted to obtain an academic position.
After the encounter with Ernesto De Martino, founding father of 
Italian cultural anthropology, Callieri’s approach became increasingly 
anthropological. His participation in international events, such as the 
2nd Congress of Psychiatry in Zurich in 1957, where he went with Fran-
co Basaglia, allowed him to meet with key representatives of psychi-
atric and psychopathological thought, such as Jung, Binswanger and 
Minkowski. In 1961 Callieri was in Heidelberg with Kurt Schneider, 
with whom he had established a long epistolary relationship since the 
Italian translation of Schneider’s Clinical Psychopathology. In 1962, 
Callieri was the only Italian invited to contribute with an essay on 
Wahnstimmung to a collection of texts celebrating Schneider’s seven-
ty-fifth birthday [Callieri 1962]. Left out of the academy, Callieri head-
ed the Guidonia Psychiatric Hospital until the beginning of the 1980s, 
after which he lived in ‘splendid isolation’ in his apartment in Via Nizza 
59 in Rome. Many psychiatrists of different generations studied with 
Callieri. Gilberto Di Petta is undoubtedly the one who has most devel-
oped his ideas.
2.7. Naples8
Starting from the 1960s, Sergio Piro (1927-2009) played an important 
role in the battles that led to the closure of mental hospitals. In 1951 he 
graduated in Medicine and Surgery in Naples; he then specialized in 
8  We wish to thank Dr. Giuseppe Ceparano for his contribution to this paragraph.
GIlBerto DI petta & marIo roSSI moNtI
© 2018 Thaumàzein
10.13136/thau.v6i0
the ItalIaN SChool oF  pheNomeNoloGICal pSyChopatholoGy
193
neuropsychiatry in Cagliari in 1956, with a thesis on the semantics of 
schizophrenic language [see Piro 1958; 1967]. A multifaceted person-
ality, his interests ranged from music to anthropology, from psychopa-
thology to psychology and phenomenology. Mostly remembered for his 
contribution to the movement that led to Law 180, Piro was head of the 
Materdomini Psychiatric Hospital, in the Municipality of Nocera Supe-
riore, from 1959 to 1969. In 1965 he had a documentary shot for the first 
time entirely inside a psychiatric hospital, whose aim was to publicly 
denounce the conditions of hospitalization of the mentally ill. Embarked 
on a collision course with the mental institution he was heading, he was 
fired in 1969. From 1974 to 1975 he was head of the Leonardo Bianchi 
Psychiatric Hospital in Naples, and from 1975 to 1994 he headed the 
Frullone Psychiatric Hospital. Piro’s contribution to phenomenological 
psychopathology stands out in his many texts and articles, where refer-
ences to (among others) Binswanger, von Gebsattel, Heidegger, Husserl, 
Jaspers, Merleau-Ponty, Minkowski and Strauss abound. His continuous 
dialogue with authors such as Ballerini, Callieri, Calvi and Cargnello is 
also evident. His contributions are distributed along two main lines: the 
study of schizophrenia and the cultural training of psychiatric workers.
3. Lines of development of the Italian School
When Kraepelin, at the end of the 19th century, elaborated the notion of 
Dementia praecox, subsuming under it catatonia, hebephrenia and para-
noia, he passed down to the 20th century all the tenets of nineteenth-cen-
tury positivism: a chronic, progressive, irreversible disease leading to a 
deterioration similar to that of senile dementia, apart from its tragic ear-
ly inception. In 1911, Eugen Bleuler, inspired from the French tradition 
and the emerging psychodynamic culture, broke with this paradigm, 
translating the notion of dementia into that of schizophrenia. However, 
even Bleuler’s construct proved problematic because too elastic. Only 
Kurt Schneider, in the 1950s, was able to set precise psychopathologi-
cal-clinical coordinates: the so-called first-rank symptoms (FRS). From 
that moment on, the notion of schizophrenia was destined to be split in 
two: the nosographic level would no longer coincide with the psycho-
pathological one. From a nosographic point of view, Schneider’s lesson 
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was incorporated into the DSM series and would survive to the present 
day.
The idea of schizophrenia as a disease was grounded on productive 
symptoms, incoherence or disorganization. Its conceptual construction 
in the context of anthropo-phenomenological psychopathology, instead, 
followed a different course: the nuclear schizophrenic disorder was pro-
gressively identified with autistic perplexity. In fact, when Minkowski 
and Binswanger elaborated their notion of schizophrenia, they did 
nothing but develop Bleuler’s original intuition of its autistic character. 
However, while doing this, they shifted such notion – a very significant 
fact – from an ontic-psychological plane to an ontological-structural 
and transcendental one. Callieri’s work on Wahnstimmung, begun in 
1962, went precisely in this direction. From this point of view, his work 
certainly qualifies as the first major exploration undertaken by an Italian 
psychopathologist of the vast territory disclosed by European psychopa-
thology. The landmarks of this journey can be identified as follows: Cal-
lieri’s essay on Wahnstimmung in 1962; Blankenburg’s study on Anne 
Rau in 1971; Ballerini’s contribution on schizophrenic autism in 2002.
In 1962, as we know, Callieri published his work on Wahnstim-
mung in the Festschrift dedicated to Schneider [Callieri 1962]. In it, 
he completely re-interpreted the notion of Wahnstimmung in light of 
Husserlian phenomenology. From an experience of atmospheric distur-
bance almost mechanically preceding the delusional outbreak, Wahn-
stimmung became an experience of transcendental suspension in which 
one’s intentionality no longer finds its object, and the signifier no longer 
finds its meaning. On closer inspection, Callieri’s phenomenological 
re-interpretation of Wahnstimmung actually anticipated Blankenburg’s 
insights. In retrospect, Callieri’s Wahnstimmung appears, in fact, as a 
psychopathological experience of epoché. Rather than the first step un-
dertaken by the phenomenologist, the epoché has become – in an evoc-
ative, but dramatic development – the false step of the schizophrenic.
It is clear that in this new conception of schizophrenia so-called 
productive symptoms become totally useless, because they tell us nothing 
– in psychopathological terms – about the profound structure of the 
disease. From a psychopathological standpoint, the presence or absence of 
delusions and hallucinations is not an indication of the presence or absence 
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of the disease. Some subjects are not delusional or do not hallucinate, 
but are schizophrenic; some are delusional and do hallucinate, but their 
schizophrenia is not due simply to these factors; finally, other subjects are 
delusional and hallucinate, but this does not mean they are schizophrenic. 
Together with some of the work of Giovanni Stanghellini, Arnaldo 
Ballerini’s studies on autism, his strong reliance on Blankenburg, and his 
in-depth analysis of sub-apophenic schizophrenia as an essential factor 
in basal schizophrenic disorders illustrate how Italian psychopathological 
research focused on the transcendental modes of constitution of common 
sense as fundamental structure of everyday life and on its disruption in 
the schizophrenic world.
4. Perspectives on delusion9
For the Italian school of phenomenological psychopathology, delusion 
has always been a favorite object of phenomenological research: starting 
with Cargnello’s studies on Binswanger, this focus characterized Cal-
lieri’s studies on Wahnstimmung and, as we shall see, Mario Rossi Mon-
ti’s Forme del delirio e psicopatologia [2008] («Forms of Delusion and 
Psychopathology»). In the decades covered so far, research on delusion 
increasingly expanded its range to include many of its forms: paranoid, 
schizophrenic, melancholic, borderline, and organic. However, not only 
the type, but also the concept of delusion has been investigated, espe-
cially as regards its different stages of emergence: from basic symptoms 
and prodromal gestation phases [Stanghellini 1992; Gross et al. 1992] 
to pre-psychotic perplexity [Callieri 1982; Di Petta 1999] to the most 
mature phases [Gozzetti et al. 1999; Rossi Monti & Stanghellini 1999], 
from the analysis of vulnerability [Stanghellini 1997] and premorbid 
personality in the light of Kretschmer’s psychopathology [Kretschmer 
2016, original 1918; Ballerini & Rossi Monti 1990] to the description of 
the fate awaiting the delusional person once the flames of his madness 
have turned into lukewarm ashes [Ballerini & Rossi Monti 1983] to the 
definition of schizophrenia as a disease of the ontological-metaphysical 
structure of the subject [Ballerini & Di Petta 2015].
9  We wish to thank Dr. Paolo Colavero for his contribution to this paragraph.
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5. The world of a drug addict
Starting in 2004, Gilberto Di Petta began to explore the phenomeno-
logical structure of the intoxicated conscience with Il mondo tossico-
mane: fenomenologia e psicopatologia («The World of Drug Addiction: 
Phenomenology and Psychopathology»), followed in 2006 by Gruppo-
analisi dell’esserci («Group Analysis of Existence»). In 2016, with Le 
psicosi sintetiche («Synthetic Psychoses»), edited with Danilo Tittarelli, 
he has attempted to identify the boundaries between endogenous and 
substance-induced psychotic experiences. Few authors within the phe-
nomenological tradition have developed a real interest in the experien-
ces triggered by the use of drugs. There are hints scattered here and 
there in the literature, but there is no comprehensive study. As for the 
lifeworld of the drug addict, Di Petta distinguishes a world of fluctu-
ating life, where one’s conscience is intoxicated by the substance; a 
lifeworld marked by chemical hunger, in which abstinence devours the 
subject and forces him to seek the substance; a frozen lifeworld, where 
the development of tolerance removes the patient from the enjoyment of 
life. One’s sense of space, time, body, self and one’s relationship with 
others change significantly in each of these lifeworlds.
From a psychopathological-clinical perspective, instead, Di Petta 
and Tittarelli have drawn on the work of Morselli, Cargnello and Callieri 
on experimental psychoses, arguing that substance-induced psychoses 
more often than not appear as a conglomerate of symptoms without a 
specific psychotic structure. As for the therapeutic approach, Di Petta 
has extended the Dasein-analysis model from a dual to a group setting, 
thereby developing a methodology that he has defined Group-anal-
ysis of existence or Dasein-analytic Group. Starting from 1998, Da-
sein-group analysis has been practiced in various clinical, institutional, 
experiential, educational and didactic contexts. This methodology has 
also been adopted in the training of phenomenological-dynamic psy-
chotherapists, and a collaboration has been established with the Group 
Analysis Laboratory in Turin.
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6. Psychotherapeutic perspectives
The School of Phenomenological-Dynamic Psychotherapy, ap-
proved by MIUR in 2015, has its roots in the tradition of European 
phenomenological psychopathology and takes shape thanks to the con-
fluence of two important traditions, the phenomenological and the psy-
choanalytic one. The common ground for both is general and clinical 
psychopathology, whose knowledge is indispensable for any further 
therapeutic development. For phenomenological psychopathology, un-
derstanding is the necessary premise for the establishment of a ther-
apeutic relationship. Mental pathology begins when the reciprocity of 
dialogue and understanding start to fail. However, mental pathology 
remains, even in its most extreme forms, something that can, and must, 
be approached. Given these premises, the School of Phenomenologi-
cal-Dynamic Psychotherapy aims to train and provide therapists with 
a method (rather than a technique) of encounter: with the help of phe-
nomenology, hermeneutics, ethics and dynamic psychopathology, the 
goal is to help the patient to become aware of his own vulnerability and 
thereby to understand and transform his posture toward the disorder 
afflicting him.
Thanks to the experience of clinical encounter between the subjec-
tivity of the therapist and that of the patient, phenomenological-dynam-
ic psychotherapy allows a collaborative construction of a new meaning. 
In this process, space, time, and corporeity undergo a metamorphosis, 
and an important change in the relationship with the world, oneself, and 
others is made possible. This transformation of subjectivity is experi-
enced – in dual and group settings – through an intersubjective recon-
struction of one’s fundamental anthropological structures. Assigning 
shape and meaning to experiences is key to find one’s position in the 
world and among others. If mental pathology can be seen as a crisis in 
one’s dialogue with otherness, phenomenological-dynamic psychother-
apy represents a dialogue with a method: its purpose is to reactivate the 
person’s dialogue with himself and with other people after it has been 
disrupted by mental pathology.
As Binswager [1956] has written, «what we call psychotherapy is 
nothing more than a practice intended to ensure that the mentally ill 
person comes to ‘see’ the overall structure of human existence, his ‘be-
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ing in the world’, and to understand the moment when he got lost». The 
method, as formalized by Stanghellini, is that of PHD: Phenomenol-
ogy, Hermeneutics, and Dynamics. Phenomenology focuses on lived 
experience and aims at unfolding in front of the subject the sheet of 
his conscience, so to speak, thereby allowing what is implicit to come 
to light [see Stanghellini 2016; Stanghellini & Mancini 2018]. Herme-
neutics demands that the subject takes a position toward what is being 
unfolded. Each experience is the result of a (mostly implicit) self-inter-
pretation. In particular, a symptom is a type of self-interpretation in 
which the patient reduces the experience of the encounter with other-
ness to a single meaning. Psycho-Dynamics places both the experience 
unfolded by Phenomenology and the position taken by Hermeneutics 
within a historical-narrative context. That is, it identifies the matrix of 
that experience. The goal is to help the patient to rethink himself and his 
psychopathological experience in light of a given past.
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The purpose of this paper is the historical and conceptual reconstruction of the con-
stitution of both the Italian Society for Phenomenological Psychopathology and the 
School of Phenomenological-Dynamic Psychotherapy considering phenomenolog-
ical psychopathology as the essential basis of every therapeutic treatment. In this 
reconstruction we applied a geographical criterion to show how in different parts 
and in different moments of the story of psychiatry of our contry different authors 
developed an interest for the great heritage of knowledge of phenomenological psy-
chopathology, with special regards to the clinical areas of delusion, psychosis, drug 
addiction, and serious personality disorders.
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